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Varying institutional environments have provided the foundation for a great deal of 
entrepreneurship research; however, relatively little empirical work has examined the 
interaction effect between formal and informal institutions on the development of 
entrepreneurial activity in emerging economies. This is surprising given the 
importance placed on entrepreneurship, and especially new business start-ups, as a 
key determinant of economic growth, prosperity and sustainable development.  
Drawing from entrepreneurial and institutional theories, this doctoral study addresses 
this gap by examining the effect of formal institutions, such as the number of 
procedures, education and training, access to credit and firm-level technology 
absorption, on the rates of entrepreneurial activity in emerging economies. It will test 
the thesis that this relationship becomes more instrumental when they are 
accompanied by lower levels of corruption as an informal institution. Moreover, this 
thesis suggests that entrepreneurs in emerging economies respond differently to the 
dynamics of the institutional environment depending on the nature of opportunities 
that arise from the country’s stage of development, and whether they are factor-
driven, efficiency-driven, or innovation-driven economies. 
A review of the theoretical and empirical literature reveals that the dynamics of the 
institutional environment on the development of entrepreneurial activity in emerging 
economies is imperfectly understood, and the empirical analysis undertaken in this 
thesis represents a step towards greater understanding in this area. 
The role of the institutional environment is investigated by testing a number of 
hypotheses reflecting formal and informal institutions, and the extent to which these 
variables can explain variations in the level of entrepreneurial activity. Panel data 
models were constructed for 44 emerging economies over a nine-year period (2006-
2014), from which a variety of hypotheses will be tested, and conclusions drawn. 
On the basis of the quantitative data derived from several global research projects 
(i.e., the World Bank, UNESCO, and the Global Competitiveness Report), the 
research findings will show that lower levels of corruption moderates positively the 
effects of a country’s number of procedures, and education and training on the rates 
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of entrepreneurial activity, whereas it moderates negatively the effects of access to 
credit and technology absorption on the levels of entrepreneurial activity. 
Furthermore, in emerging economies, these interaction effects are similar, regardless 
of the stage of economic development.   
This study is among the first to empirically examine the dynamics of institutional 
variables to predict new business activity; it paints a nuanced picture of how formal 
institutions might be more significant in contexts characterised by weak institutions 
if more control of corruption supported them. Regarding the theoretical debate, this 
thesis may provide empirical evidence for the idea that the variations in rates of 
entrepreneurial activity cannot be fully understood without giving attention to the 
context of the institutional environment dynamics in which those variables were 
observed. In particular, the main results of this thesis will suggest that the interaction 
effects of formal and informal institutions, rather than direct effects, are useful in 
explaining systematic variations in new business prevalence in emerging economies.  
On the basis of the results reported in this study, entrepreneurship policy should 
attempt to address the entrepreneurial deficit and focus on developing an attractive 
institutional environment towards entrepreneurship in order to promote economic 
growth, job creation and higher levels of investment in emerging economies. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Overview 
In the new global economy, both developed and developing countries are facing 
different economic growth challenges. According to the Global Entrepreneurship 
Index (GEI) report, developed countries tend to be more concerned with increasing 
their economic productivity to sustain the current living standards, despite growing 
ageing rates. At the same time, developing countries will have to create more than 
three billion new jobs for their young populations by 2050 (Acs et al., 2014b).  
There is a growing body of literature that recognises the importance of 
entrepreneurship as a key in addressing the challenges of sustainable productivity in 
developed economies while developing economies struggle to find the most 
productive way of integrating their fast-growing populations into their economies 
(Acs et al., 2014b). In this context, entrepreneurship is defined as “opportunity-
driven agents who drive economic change through innovative new firms” (Naudé, 
2011, p. 7).  
Therefore, for the purpose of this study, the concept of entrepreneurship used 
considers other terms such as strategic, high growth, productive or opportunity 
entrepreneurship as synonymous (see also Section 2.2 for entrepreneurship’s key 
concepts and definitions). 
Entrepreneurship has been considered recently as a driving force for economic 
growth and development through employment, innovation, and prosperity. However, 
it does not appear like “manna from heaven” as a country moves through the stages 
of economic development. Instead, the above relationship is contingent upon the 
level of institutional development in a given country. Where institutions are 
effective, entrepreneurs are more likely to focus their energies towards productive 
activities that contribute to economic growth and development. Therefore, 
researchers and policymakers have renewed their interest in investigating the 
environments and determinants that ameliorate entrepreneurial activity, particularly 
given that the stages of economic development in countries appear to be gradually 
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more linked to the rates of entrepreneurial activity (Baumol, 1990; Acs et al., 2008a, 
2014a, b). 
1.2 Research Problem 
In consideration of the earlier discussion, examining the effect of the institutional 
environment for entrepreneurship poses a challenge for both theoretical and 
empirical research (Bjørnskov and Foss, 2016). The above phenomenon arises 
because the theoretical background regarding individual choices to become 
entrepreneurs with the institutional environment remains understudied (Aidis et al., 
2012). While most studies have only focused on the relationship between formal 
institutions (e.g., regulations, formal laws and rules) and entrepreneurship (Carlos 
Díaz Casero et al., 2013; Fuentelsaz et al., 2015), the link between informal 
institutions (e.g., social norms and culture) and entrepreneurship remains 
underdeveloped (Hayton and Cacciotti, 2013). Moreover, despite the constant 
interactions between formal and informal institutions (North, 1990; Williamson, 
2000), the literature lacks consensus regarding such interactions and their influence 
on entrepreneurial activity (Bjørnskov and Foss, 2016; Ghura et al., 2017; Urbano et 
al., 2018).  
In line with prior theoretical challenges, still missing from the empirical literature is 
a large longitudinal panel study of country-level rates of entrepreneurship. Such 
panel data analysis is worth pursuing to enhance the validity of the research while 
considering sufficient controls to account for institutional differences in the context 
of emerging economies (Bruton et al., 2008; Levie and Autio, 2011).   
1.3 Research Needs 
Recent trends in entrepreneurship research have heightened the need for 
understanding the variations of entrepreneurial activity through the lens of 
institutional theory in the case of emerging economies. However, the review of both 
the theoretical and empirical literature has revealed that most studies addressing the 
development of entrepreneurial activity have failed to consider the interaction effect 
of formal and informal institutions in emerging economies that are located at 
different stages of development (Acs et al., 2014a, b; Aparicio et al., 2016; Urbano et 
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al., 2018). Therefore, considering the institutions mentioned above independently 
could be misguiding researchers and policymakers in emerging economies as the 
joint effect of the formal and informal institutions might offer different outcomes on 
enhancing the rates of “productive” entrepreneurship (North, 1990; Baumol, 1990). 
For that reason, we need to offer a new institutional framework that allows the 
development of entrepreneurial activity based on the interplay between the formal 
and informal institutions. 
1.4 The Applicability of the Conceptual Model to the Study 
Theoretically, this study is built on Gnyawali and Fogel’s (1994) entrepreneurial 
framework, and follows North’s (1990, 2005) propositions on institutional dynamics 
in addition to Williamson’s (2000) model of the hierarchy of institutions. Gnyawali 
and Fogel (1994) offered a conceptual framework where the rates of entrepreneurial 
activity rely on different factors, such as the socio-economic and political context. In 
this respect, North (1990) suggested that these factors can be related to the interplay 
between the formal and informal institutions of a particular society. He further 
argued that informal institutions that are culturally derived might constrain or support 
the reforms of formal institutions and, therefore, produce outcomes that have a 
significant effect on increasing “productive” entrepreneurial activity (Baumol, 1990). 
This idea was supported by Williamson (2000) who considered that informal 
institutions at the top of the hierarchy of institutions affect lower levels, such as 
formal institutions, because they are the deepest rooted and the slowest changing. 
The findings from examining this theory should make an essential contribution to 
this growing area of research by examining how the dynamics of institutional 
variables may explain variations in the level of entrepreneurial activity (Estrin et al., 
2013; Belitski et al., 2016; Fuentelsaz et al., 2018).  
The application of this theory is particularly important in the case of emerging 
economies. Despite distinct differences in levels of entrepreneurial activity between 
these countries, relatively little empirical work has explicitly examined the causes of 
entrepreneurship or attempted to give an explanation as to why some emerging 
economies have higher (or lower) levels of entrepreneurial activity than others 
(Bruton et al., 2010; Acs et al., 2014a, b). For this study, emerging economies are 
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described as low-income countries that go through encouraging private enterprise 
development and increased economic liberalisation (Hoskisson et al., 2000). While 
emerging economies consist of both developing (i.e., low and middle income) and 
post-communist transition countries, developed economies are high-income countries 
where most people have a high standard of living (World Bank, 2017). In 
comparison with established firms, entrepreneurs who start new businesses play a 
crucial role in emerging economies as they operate as engines of structural change 
and economic growth (De Clercq et al., 2010a; Naudé, 2010; Aparicio et al., 2016). 
However, entrepreneurs in emerging economies face different institutional 
challenges when starting their new ventures. These institutional obstacles are derived 
from immature or an absence of institutional infrastructures, which can discourage 
ambitious entrepreneurs from exploiting new opportunities in the market (Aidis et 
al., 2008; Tonoyan et al., 2010; Smallbone et al., 2014). Therefore, such economies 
offer a natural laboratory to study the evolution of institutions that can create an 
hospitable environment for the development of entrepreneurial activity (Bruton et al., 
2009) (see also Section 4.2 for more discussion regarding the context of emerging 
economies).  
As discussed earlier, institutional burdens are different, and they can be grouped into 
formal and informal institutions (North, 1990, 2005). In emerging economies, formal 
regulatory burdens might involve inconsistent or unpredictable government 
regulations or higher costs of taxes (Klapper et al., 2006). In addition, these countries 
share common histories concerning their pervasive corruption problems in 
comparison to developed countries, and entrepreneurs often lack respect and social 
status (Bruton et al., 2008; De Clercq et al., 2010a; Kiss et al., 2012). The latter are 
examples of informal institutional burdens. In the same vein, different studies 
suggested that the impact of these institutional burdens (formal and informal) on 
entrepreneurship was found to be conditional on that country’s level of economic 
development (Aidis et al., 2012; Carlos Díaz Casero et al., 2013). For example, the 
impact of corruption on entrepreneurial activity is more explained in developing 
countries than in developed countries (Aidis et al., 2012). Hence, this study also 
takes into account the fact that the effect of key institutions on entrepreneurship plays 
a different role at different stages of economic development.  
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1.5 Research Aim and Objectives   
The principal aim and contribution of this research is to examine the effect of 
institutional dynamics on the development of entrepreneurial activities in the context 
of emerging economies given the importance placed on entrepreneurship, and 
especially new business start-ups, as a key driver to economic growth and 
development. This study suggests that the differences in rates of entrepreneurial 
activity in emerging economies are shaped by the influence of formal and informal 
institutions, and this effect may vary based on the stage of development of a specific 
country. It specifically argues that the impact of formal institutions presented by the 
number of procedures, education and training, access to credit, and technology 
absorption on the rates of entrepreneurial activity is stronger in the presence of lower 
levels of corruption, and this impact may vary under the level of development of a 
particular emerging economy. 
Although the selected institutions in this study do not represent all the aspects of the 
institutional conditions, they are, nevertheless, significant for improving countries’ 
entrepreneurial productivity by facilitating knowledge and encouraging resource 
allocation (Gnyawali and Fogel, 1994; Álvarez and Urbano, 2011; Stenholm et al., 
2013; Aparicio et al., 2016). Moreover, this study was able to extend the current 
literature, which only addressed these institutional variables separately (e.g., 
Stenholm et al., 2013; Fuentelsaz et al., 2015; Aparicio et al., 2016).  
To achieve the research aim, the following objectives are established: 
• to explore the intricate relationship between entrepreneurship, economic 
growth and development, and institutions, and how the latter is linked to the 
development of entrepreneurial activity; 
• to investigate the impact of the institutional dynamics on the development of 
entrepreneurial activity in emerging economies; 
• to develop a framework that can be applied in addressing the interaction 
effect of formal and informal institutions on the rates of entrepreneurial 
activity in emerging economies that are located at different stages of 




• to validate the proposed framework through using panel (longitudinal) data 
supported by statistical analysis. 
As a result, this research can provide a better understanding about the interaction 
effect of formal and informal institutions on developing entrepreneurial activity, as 
well as contributing to the limited body of existing research analysing 
entrepreneurship in the context of emerging economies located at different stages of 
development. 
Hopefully, the results of the study can offer guidance for governments and 
policymakers concerned with the design and implementation of entrepreneurship 
policy, within the framework of encouraging an hospitable environment to increase 
new business activity in emerging economies. 
1.6 Research Design 
A quantitative (longitudinal) analysis was employed to examine the interaction effect 
of formal and informal institutions on the development of entrepreneurial activity 
across 44 emerging economies over the years 2006-2014. In the panel (longitudinal) 
data analysis of the study, a series of econometric models were examined, based on 
the conceptual model developed in Chapter 3, to determine any statistical 
relationships between the selected variables of the formal and informal institutions 
and their influence on the rates of entrepreneurial activity. In this respect, 
government procedures, education and training, access to credit and technology 
absorption are considered as formal institutions, whereas control of corruption is 
regarded as an informal institution in this study (see Figure 3.1). The findings from 
the panel data analysis of the study were then synthesised to offer a more 
comprehensive and comparative understanding of the dynamics of the institutional 
environment and their impact on the development of entrepreneurial activity in the 
context of emerging economies.  
The panel (longitudinal) data analysis allows the researcher to examine the validity 
of the conceptual framework. It also supports the significant statistical results to 
obtain a more in-depth understanding about the dynamics of those institutional 
variables and their influence on the rates of entrepreneurial activity through a 
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specific period of time; this is not possible in other quantitative approaches, such as 
panel surveys or cross-national analysis (Williamson, 2000; Levie and Autio, 2011; 
Stenholm et al., 2013) (see Section 4.10 for the rationale for using a panel data 
model for this study). 
1.7 Thesis Outline  
This thesis is structured in seven chapters. The order and the details of each chapter 
are outlined below.  
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the thesis, research problem, research aims and 
objectives, research needs, the applicability of the conceptual model to the study, 
research design, and thesis structure. 
Chapter 2 is a review of the literature. Since the definition of entrepreneurial adopted 
in this study is about entrepreneurs who are motivated by opportunity and contribute 
to economic growth and development through innovation and starting new firms, the 
review concentrates on the main definitions and types that address entrepreneurial 
activity. After that, the role of entrepreneurship in economic growth, development 
and prosperity, and its relationship to the institutional theory at different stages of 
economic development is studied. The next section explores the theoretical 
foundations of the interaction effect between formal and informal institutions. Then, 
the overview of the theory is followed by a review of the empirical studies 
addressing the institutional variables linked to entrepreneurial activity. Finally, we 
introduce the emerging research gaps between the institutional theory and 
entrepreneurial activity. 
Chapter 3 is the conceptual model developed to suggest the interaction effect of 
formal and informal institutions on the development of entrepreneurial activity. 
Hypotheses are conducted based on the conceptual framework and are examined and 
validated in the following chapters. 
Chapter 4 is the research methodology chapter, and describes the research context of 
the study. Also, it provides an overview of the research paradigms and the rationale 
for choosing the positivism approach. This is followed by presenting the study 
hypotheses and the research design. The data sources and the description of the 
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dependent, independent and control variables will be discussed thoroughly in this 
chapter. Finally, the rationale for using a panel data analysis approach to examine the 
conceptual framework will be discussed; this will be followed by an explanation of 
the different models of panel data analysis. 
Chapter 5 presents the descriptive statistics and the dynamics of the institutional 
variables used in this study. This is followed by the model specification and 
estimation tests of the panel data analysis and the empirical results concerning the 
research hypotheses.  
Chapter 6 contains a discussion and interpretation of the research findings reported in 
Chapter 5. The quantitative results are discussed to confirm or contradict the 
developed framework drawn from the theoretical and empirical literature in Chapters 
2 and 3.  
Chapter 7 provides the conclusions and policy recommendations based on the main 
findings reported in Chapters 5 and 6. The study contributions are also discussed and 
outlined here. Finally, this chapter provides the study limitations and suggests some 




CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter attempted to provide a brief introduction of the literature 
relating to the relationship between entrepreneurship, economic growth and 
institutions. The outcomes of Chapter 1 highlighted the urgent need for a new 
institutional framework where the interaction effect of both formal and informal 
institutions on the development of entrepreneurial activity may offer a better 
understanding of this relationship. 
This chapter aims to review the theoretical and empirical literature addressing the 
relationship between the fields of entrepreneurship and development economics in 
order to highlight the emerging research of the effect of institutions in both fields. As 
will be discussed and underscored throughout this chapter, there is a growing body of 
literature that recognised the role of entrepreneurship in economic development. 
However, the variation rates of entrepreneurial activity cannot be explained only 
through the characteristics of individuals (e.g., risk taker), but take place among a 
wide range of the institutional variables that regulate the market structure. Therefore, 
this study takes stock of the body of knowledge on the impact of the institutional 
environment on entrepreneurship, and underlines the challenges that will keep on 
driving the research. This discussion will provide the theoretical basis of the 
conceptual model developed in Chapter 3 to explain the interplay between formal 
and informal institutions and their effect on the development of entrepreneurial 
activity in emerging economies. 
Investigating the field of entrepreneurship and its relationship to the theory of 
economic development and institutions can be grouped into three themes. These 
themes provide the structure for this chapter, which is organised as follows.  
The first theme gives a brief overview of the history of entrepreneurship definitions 
and theories through the lens of economic perspective, as outlined in Section 2.2. As 
the definition of entrepreneurship adopted in this study is about entrepreneurs who 
are motivated by opportunity and contribute to economic growth and development 
through innovation and starting new firms, the review concentrates on the three key 
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topics that address entrepreneurial activity from an occupational, a behavioural, or an 
outcome point of view. The following Section 2.3 discusses the most common types 
of entrepreneurship existing in the research of entrepreneurial economies. This 
review is necessary to make a clear distinction between different types of 
entrepreneurship that exist in the literature. 
The second theme deals with describing the relationship between entrepreneurship 
and global prosperity (Section 2.4), and provides a theoretical and empirical 
background on the role of entrepreneurship in economic growth and development 
(Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2). By reviewing the nature of economic development and its 
relationship with different types of entrepreneurship, Section 2.4.3 mainly addresses 
how entrepreneurship based on knowledge can contribute positively to the 
knowledge economy. However, the empirical research between measures of 
economic development and measures of entrepreneurship has attracted conflicting 
interpretations from different stages of economic development (Section 2.4.4). These 
interpretations will be discussed within the field of the institutional theory that can 
explain the differences in entrepreneurship rates across countries located at different 
levels of development. In the context of our study, emerging economies should 
develop favourable environmental conditions to increase entrepreneurship in the 
form of new start-ups and consequently contribute to economic growth and 
development, as highlighted in Section 2.4.5. 
The third theme begins by laying out the theoretical dimensions of the research and 
looks at how institutional theory is particularly relevant in explaining the variation 
rates of entrepreneurial activity among emerging economies (Section 2.5.1). Section 
2.5.2 of this study provides a more detailed account of the institutional types. The 
contributions here describe the relationship between formal and informal institutions 
and their effect on the development of entrepreneurial activity. Building on the 
interaction effect between formal and informal institutions in the previous section, 
Section 2.5.3 interrogates the possible causes of inefficient institutions and their 
impact on entrepreneurship outcomes in emerging economies. The most common 
institutional dimensions that are relevant to entrepreneurship have been reviewed in 
Section 2.5.4. Our review of both the theoretical and empirical literature showed that 
the vast majority of studies addressing the development of entrepreneurial activity 
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had not considered the interaction effects of formal and informal institutions. 
Therefore Section 2.5.5 sheds more light on the recent research gaps discussed 
concerning institutional theory and entrepreneurship fields. Finally, the chapter ends 
with conclusions derived from reviewing the literature (Section 2.6). 
2.2 The Development of Entrepreneurship Theories and Definitions 
The following sections provide an overview of the theories and definitions that are 
related to the research of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial activity. This review 
is crucial because it forms the starting point for the study regarding the historical 
context of entrepreneurship study, and therefore clarifies different underlying 
assumptions and definitions being used in this thesis. 
Several studies have suggested that the theories and definitions (Table 2.1) of 
entrepreneurship have been a matter of on-going discussion among different 
academic disciplines in psychology, economics and management (Wennekers and 
Thurik, 1999; Ahmed and McQuaid, 2005; Davis, 2006; Avanzini, 2011; Parker, 
2013; Álvarez et al., 2014). Therefore, given the orientation of the study’s work, 
most of the literature in this thesis deals with entrepreneurship from an economic 
perspective (macro-level) and the institutional factors related to it. In the field of 
entrepreneurial economics, theories and definitions of entrepreneurship can be 
grouped into three themes: (1) an occupational, (2) a behavioural, and (3) an outcome 
perspective (Naudé, 2011). These three key themes will allow the author to offer an 
initial context for the thesis by highlighting and explaining the critical role of 
institutions in shaping and developing entrepreneurial activity in a particular country. 
2.2.1 The occupational perspective 
From an occupational perspective, entrepreneurs are those who are business owners 
and/or self-employed (Naudé, 2008, 2011). Occupational definitions are attributed to 
the notion that a person can either be in waged employment, self-employed, or 
unemployed (Naudé, 2008, 2011). However, many of these entrepreneurs are self-
employed due to the lack of waged employment. Therefore, the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) offered a distinction in the measurement of 
entrepreneurship based on the motivation of the individual to be an entrepreneur. In 
the GEM report, necessity-driven entrepreneurs are self-employed because they have 
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no other options in the labour market, while opportunity-driven entrepreneurs are 
independent by choice to exploit some perceived opportunity in the market (for more 
details, see GEM in Section 4.7.1) (Singer et al., 2015). 
While the occupation concept of entrepreneurship is broadly used with economic 
development (Naudé, 2008, 2011), this understanding of entrepreneurship has not 
managed to identify potential entrepreneurs or explain the variance in self-
employment decisions across developing and developed countries (Levie and Autio, 
2011). For example, sample data based on 2001 showed that the highest rates of self-
employment were in developing countries, such as Colombia (44.8%), Pakistan 
(43.0%) and Zambia (40.6%), while the rate in developed countries is much lower, 
such as Sweden (10.0%), Germany (9.9%) and the United Kingdom (9.5%) (Robson, 
2007). Moreover, Acs et al. (2018b) argued that the Total Entrepreneurial Activity 
(TEA) from the GEM report, which captures self-employment, is negatively 
correlated with economic freedom, economic growth, and global competitiveness. In 
other words, the economy of a specific country is worse when the TEA rates are 
higher. In that sense, Uganda is more entrepreneurial than the United States because 
the former has the highest TEA rate in the world (Acs et al., 2018b).  
This discrepancy between entrepreneurship measured by self-employment and 
economic growth may be explained by the fact that the notion of entrepreneurship in 
the previous decades of the 20th and 21st centuries paid less attention to the 
individual’s context (Acs et al., 2014a, b). Therefore, the TEA does not consider the 
“productive” entrepreneurship that contributes to economic growth and development, 
but instead entrepreneurship quantity (Baumol, 1990) (this will be discussed further 
in the following sections). 
2.2.2 The behavioural perspective 
Theories of behavioural entrepreneurship have abounded since the seminal work of 
Richard Cantillon (1680-1734, cited in Ahmed and McQuaid, 2005 and Davis, 
2006), who described the entrepreneur as an arbitrageur who bears the risk and 
allocates the resources to sell a product demanded by the market (Ahmed and 
McQuaid, 2005; Davis, 2006). In this respect, Joseph Schumpeter (1942) defined 
entrepreneurs as the coordinators of production and economic agents of “creative 
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destruction” (for more details about this theory, see Section 2.4.3). He further 
contended that the behaviour of entrepreneurs consists of creating new methods of 
production, inventing new goods for customers, entering new markets and 
developing new business models (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 83). Therefore, this line of 
thought traditionally related entrepreneurship to the possession of specific attributes, 
personal or psychological traits that the entrepreneur has to explain why some 
individuals and not others recognise and choose to seek entrepreneurial 
opportunities. 
Although differences of opinion still exist, there appears to be some agreement in the 
last decade that entrepreneurship refers to “sources of opportunity; the processes of 
discovery, evaluation and exploitation of opportunities; and the set of individuals 
who discover, evaluate and exploit them” (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000, p. 218). 
What is useful about this definition is that it captures many essential features of 
activities in which an entrepreneur is involved. Also, it helps to distinguish between 
the earlier individual-oriented approach of self-employment and the process-oriented 
one.  
However, individuals who have the high capacity to be entrepreneurs may not 
necessarily become entrepreneurs. This is because individuals’ decisions to seek and 
exploit opportunities (Kirzner, 1997) are mainly influenced by the institutional 
context that regulates the market structure (Levie and Autio, 2011). Therefore, Acs et 
al. (2014a, p. 479) defined entrepreneurship as the “the dynamic, institutionally 
embedded interaction between entrepreneurial attitudes, abilities, and aspirations, by 
individuals, which drives the allocation of resources through the creation and 
operation of new ventures”. Acs et al.’s (2014a, b) definition explained that 
institutions have consistent interaction with entrepreneur’s behaviour in which the 
institutional context can drive entrepreneurs to be more productive to contribute to 
economic growth. 
2.2.3 The outcome perspective 
Modern economic theories defined entrepreneurship by the outcomes in which 
different forms of entrepreneurship can contribute to the economy. These concepts 
are founded on the understanding that not all types of entrepreneurship are essential 
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for economic development. In particular, Baumol (1990) suggested that 
entrepreneurial activity exists in all economies. However, different outcomes of 
entrepreneurship may appear in a specific marketplace; these include productive, 
unproductive (e.g., rent-seeking), or destructive (e.g., illegal activities) activity. 
Baumol (1990) further argued that only the productive form of entrepreneurship is 
significant to the economy. In this regard, Baumol (1990) described productive 
entrepreneurs as “persons who are ingenious and creative in finding ways that add to 
their own wealth, power, and prestige” (Baumol, 1990, p. 987). Therefore, a creative 
entrepreneur is one who contributes to the economy and “provides a new product or 
service or that develops and uses new methods to produce or deliver existing goods 
and services at lower cost” (Baumol et al., 2007, p. 3). In line with the previous 
argument, different studies proposed different types of entrepreneurship that can 
contribute to economic growth and development. For example, using GEM data from 
37 countries in 2002, Wong et al. (2005) found that only high-potential 
entrepreneurial activity is positively associated with economic growth. There will be 
further discussion about the types of entrepreneurship and their impact on economic 
growth and development in Section 2.3. 
2.2.4 This study’s definition of entrepreneurship 
Based on the previous discussion, the term entrepreneurship is used here to refer to 
entrepreneurs as “opportunity-driven agents who drive economic change through 
innovative new firms” (Naudé, 2011, p. 7). This definition coincides with Gartner 
(1985, p. 697), who defined entrepreneurship as “new venture creation”, and Hart 
(2003, p. 3), who described entrepreneurship as a “process of starting and continuing 
to expand new businesses”. However, this thesis adopts a broader view where 
entrepreneurship is not limited to the actual outcome of new firm formation. Naudé’s 
(2011) definition leads to a more specific explanation on how the behaviour of 
“discovery and exploitation of opportunities” (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000, p. 
218) has an impact on economic growth and development by exploiting opportunities 
through the creation of new business firms. Hence, the process of entrepreneurship 
involves the behaviour of exploiting opportunities as well as the creation of new 
start-ups, whether successful or not (Ho and Wong, 2007; Levie and Autio, 2011).  
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This understanding of the adopted definition of entrepreneurship has recently been 
supported by Acs et al. (2018b, p. 17), who defined the entrepreneur as “a person 
with the vision to see innovation and the ability to bring it to market”. Acs et al. 
(2018b) further argued that entrepreneurs are the bridge between invention and 
commercialisation. Because innovative ideas without entrepreneurship stay in the 
university laboratory or the R&D facility, entrepreneurs such as Steve Jobs and Jack 
Ma are the ones who commercialise other people’s innovative ideas. In reality, 
entrepreneurs have a vision and try to fill a gap in the market by offering a product or 
a service to customers (Leibenstein, 1968; Audretsch, 2007; Levie and Autio, 2008).  
Moreover, Acs et al.’s (2018b) definition helped to distinguish between the small 
business owners who are driven by necessity (they have no other options in the 
labour market for making money and replicate what others are doing) and 
entrepreneurs who are driven by opportunity and generate commercial success (Acs 
et al., 2018b). While necessity-driven entrepreneurs, such as traders or shop owners 
who perform a sort of small business management, are essential for creating jobs and 
income for their families, this study is more concerned with opportunity-driven 
entrepreneurs who generate high growth commercial success, scalability and serious 
job creation (Acs et al., 2018b). This distinction between necessity and opportunity-
driven entrepreneurship is necessary because only innovative, growth-oriented 
entrepreneurship can contribute to economic growth and development, unlike the 
self-employment captured by GEM’s TEA rate (Acs et al., 2018b). 
The adopted definition in this study is also in line with other researchers such as 
Haltiwanger et al. (2013, p. 360), who have highlighted the significant role of 
business start-ups and young businesses in US job creation. These authors further 
suggested that:  
“Measuring and understanding the activities of start-ups and young 
businesses, the frictions they face, their role in innovation and productivity 
growth, and how they fare in economic downturns and credit crunches are 
clearly interesting areas of inquiry given our findings” (Haltiwanger et al., 
2013, p. 360).  
To this end, in the methodology Section 4.7.2, this thesis looks at Naudé’s definition 
of measuring entrepreneurial activity.  
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Table 2.1: The development of entrepreneurship theories and definitions 
Author Period Definition 
Cantillon as cited in 
Davis, 2006, p. 14 
1730 “Self-employment of any sort involved in a process of bearing 
the risk to organize factors of production to deliver a product or 
service demanded by the market” 
Schumpeter, p. 81-
86 
1942 Entrepreneurs are coordinators of production and economic 
agents of “creative destruction” 
Leibenstein, p. 75 1968 “Entrepreneur is an individual or group of individuals with four 
major characteristics: he connects different markets, he is 
capable of making up for market deficiencies (gap-filling), he is 
an “input-completer,” and he creates or expands time-binding, 
input-transforming entities (i.e., firms)” 
Gartner, p. 697 1985 “The creation of a new business” 
Baumol, p. 897 1990 “Entrepreneurs are ingenious and creative in finding ways that 
add to their own wealth, power, and prestige” 




2000 “It involves the sources of opportunity; the processes of 
discovery, evaluation and exploitation of opportunities; and the 
set of individuals who discover, evaluate and exploit them” 
Hart, p. 3  2003 “Process of starting and continuing to expand new businesses” 
Baumol et al., p. 3 2007 “provides a new product or service or that develops and uses 
new methods to produce or deliver existing goods and services 
at lower cost” 
Bosma et al., p. 8 2010 “Intrapreneurship or corporate entrepreneurship is a special of 
entrepreneurship which refers to initiatives by employees in 
organizations to undertake new business activities” 
Naudé, p. 7 2011 “Opportunity-driven agents who drive economic change through 
innovative new firms” 
Acs et al., p. 479 2014a “The dynamic, institutionally embedded interaction between 
entrepreneurial attitudes, abilities, and aspirations, by 
individuals, which drives the allocation of resources through the 
creation and operation of new ventures” 
Acs et al., p. 17 2018b “Entrepreneur is a person with the vision to see an innovation 
and the ability to bring it to market” 
Source: Devised by author  
This research acknowledges that adopting the definition of entrepreneurship as new 
business creation has its limitations in fully reviewing entrepreneurship. Specifically, 
it does not consider other types of high growth entrepreneurship such as 
intrapreneurship (or corporate entrepreneurship), which refers to “initiatives by 
employees in organisations to undertake new business activities” (Bosma et al., 
2010, p. 8). In other words, intrapreneurship is a special type of “productive” 
entrepreneurship and it involves “opportunity perception, idea generation, designing 
a new product or another recombination of resources, internal coalition building, 
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persuading management, resource acquisition, planning and organizing” (Bosma et 
al., 2010, p. 8; Turró et al., 2014). 
In line with the previous argument of corporate entrepreneurship, Acs et al. (2014a, 
b) found an S-shaped relationship between entrepreneurial activity and economic 
development; this relationship indicated that the increasing rate of entrepreneurial 
activity eventually drops among developed nations. Perhaps entrepreneurs in 
developed countries are allowed to “behave entrepreneurially” within established 
organisations, and they receive high compensation for so doing. Therefore 
individuals in such economies are more likely to choose high-wage employment. As 
a result, the increasing rates of corporate entrepreneurship (intrapreneurship) might 
replace new business activity within such economic conditions (Reddy, 2012; Acs et 
al., 2014a, b). This distinction between new start-ups and corporate entrepreneurship 
is necessary as there are several types of entrepreneurship that contribute to 
economic growth and development. In the next section, this study sheds more light 
on the main types of entrepreneurship that are linked to economic growth and 
development. 
2.3 Types of Entrepreneurship 
As discussed in the previous section, entrepreneurship is a complex subject of study, 
and its features, dynamics, factors and manifestations differ among countries. 
However, entrepreneurship may take different forms based on the overall level of 
economic development for a specific country (Desai, 2011). Therefore, this section 
sheds more light on the most common types of entrepreneurship that exist in the 
literature. 
In general, entrepreneurship is discussed in several dichotomous terms such as 
formal and informal entrepreneurship (Acs et al., 2008b; Ayyagari et al., 2014), legal 
and illegal entrepreneurship (Desai, 2011), necessity and opportunity 
entrepreneurship (Wennekers et al., 2005; Sternberg and Wennekers, 2005; Valliere 
and Peterson, 2009; Aparicio et al., 2016), local and systematic entrepreneurship 




2.3.1 Formal and informal entrepreneurship 
According to Desai (2011), the distinction between formal and informal 
entrepreneurship is recognised by registration status. In this regard, the firm is 
considered a formal entity if it has been registered with the proper government 
agency. Therefore, the description of a firm as “formal” or “informal” is based on 
whether the organisation is registered to the formal (taxable) sector or not (informal 
sector), regardless of the nature of its activities (Desai, 2011).  
Developing countries tend to have more informal entrepreneurship than developed 
countries. Klapper et al. (2010) contended that this discrepancy of the size of the 
informal labour force is due to the incentive structure provided by the institutional 
environment of a particular country. On the one hand, entrepreneurs who work on a 
small scale are less motivated to join the formal sector, especially if high taxes and 
complex regulations accompany it. On the other hand, entrepreneurs are more likely 
to register in the formal sector to benefit from the advantages of the formal economy, 
such as better access to export markets. Therefore, entering the formal sector can be 
a careful decision by entrepreneurs, depending on the trade-off between 
formalisation advantages and regulatory disadvantages (Klapper et al., 2010; Doing 
Business, 2018). 
With regard to the level of economic development, some studies offered a better 
understanding of the role of formal and informal entrepreneurship in the context of 
developed and developing countries. In this regard, different measures of 
entrepreneurship have led to inconsistent or uncertain empirical findings. Hence, Acs 
et al. (2008b) conducted an empirical study that focused on comparing two common 
datasets designed to capture entrepreneurial dynamics: the GEM data for TEA, and 
the World Bank Entrepreneurship Group Survey (WBEGS) dataset for formal 
business registration. The authors found that rates of entrepreneurship as defined by 
the GEM database are higher in developing countries, whereas the rates of 
entrepreneurship defined by the WBEGS are lower in developing countries rather 
than developed countries. 
Acs et al. (2008b) suggested that the discrepancy between previous results was 
because both datasets measure different dynamics of entrepreneurial activity. In 
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particular, the WBEGS measures the rates of formal entry in the form of a Limited 
Liability Company (LLC) establishment, while the GEM data include informal 
entrepreneurship, especially in the case of developing countries. As a result, GEM 
data might measure the potential supply of entrepreneurship, while WBEGS data 
could measure the actual rate of entrepreneurship (Acs et al., 2008b). Moreover, the 
authors found that entrepreneurs are more motivated to start a business formally in 
developed countries than in developing countries; this is based on the incentives 
provided by the institutional environment, such as fewer procedures to start the 
business, better access to formal financing and labour, and improved tax regulations.  
While Acs et al. (2008b) examined the role of formal and informal entrepreneurship 
in developing countries, Ayyagari et al. (2014) used formally registered firms to 
investigate the contribution of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) on total 
employment, job creation and economic growth across 104 developing countries. 
The authors examined this relationship by analysing a comprehensive dataset from 
the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (ES) regarding types of formal firms (firm size, 
young versus mature firms) and total employment, labour productivity and labour 
generation across the entire size distribution.  
Ayyagari et al. (2014) found that SMEs (<99 employees) generate more jobs than 
large firms. However, they have less productivity growth in comparison to large 
firms. Therefore, the authors suggested that policymakers in developing countries 
should focus not only on creating jobs but also on creating better quality jobs to 
promote economic growth. Moreover, Ayyagari et al. (2014) contended that 
policymakers should focus on entrepreneurs who are motivated to grow rapidly and 
become bigger; this is because they are the engine of growth in developing 
economies. The authors further suggested that in order to increase productivity 
growth, policymakers should focus on removing the obstacles faced by aspiring 
entrepreneurs, such as lack of business incubators that provide finance, training and 




2.3.2 Legal and illegal entrepreneurship 
The terms legal and illegal activities have been a source of confusion in the field of 
entrepreneurship (Desai, 2011). This is because this dichotomy is often used 
interchangeably and without precision with formal and informal dichotomy, albeit 
they are not the same. While the terms formal and informal firms are more concerned 
with their registration status, the terms legal and illegal firms are more concerned 
with their selected activity. In this sense, legal firms are those who comply with the 
activities permitted by law and regulatory frameworks in a specific country. On the 
other hand, illegal firms are those who are involved in illegal activities, whether they 
are registered formally or informally, such as mining in prohibited areas (Naudé, 
2011). In his seminal work, Baumol (1990) named illegal activities as destructive 
entrepreneurship that has no impact on increasing economic growth. To this end, all 
informal organisations are not necessarily illegal, and all formal organisations are not 
necessarily legal, as shown in Table 2.2 (Desai, 2011; Naudé, 2011). 
Table 2.2: Formal, informal, legal and illegal entrepreneurship 
 Formal Informal 
Legal “Registered firm that is engaged in legal 
activities”. 
“Example: Registered manufacturing firm 
producing plastic packaging for medical 
supplies, in compliance with national 
health, safety, environmental and factory 
regulations”. 
“Unregistered firm that is engaged in legal 
activities”.  
 
“Example: Unregistered private cars in 
Bangkok, operating as corporate drivers and 
tourist taxis”. 
Illegal “Registered firm that is engaged in illegal 
activities”.  
“Example: Registered foreign law firms in 
China, operating outside authorized 
areas of expertise as explicitly defined 
by Chinese government legal code”. 
“Unregistered firm that is engaged in illegal 
activities”.  
“Example: Loan sharking that occurs in many 
slum areas in Mumbai; unregistered 
entrepreneur lending money at above-market 
interest rates to borrowers without access to 
the formal, official banking system”. 
Source: Desai (2011) 
2.3.3 Necessity and opportunity nascent entrepreneurship 
The concept of nascent entrepreneurs (i.e., people actively involved in starting a new 
venture) can be divided into necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs based on the 
motivation for starting the business (Wennekers et al., 2005, p. 294). While 
necessity-driven entrepreneurs are involved in entrepreneurship to avoid 
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unemployment, opportunity-driven entrepreneurs are motivated by a perceived 
opportunity in the market for profit maximisation (Singer et al., 2015). 
In general, the percentage of necessity entrepreneurs out of TEA is greater in 
developing countries than in developed countries. According to the GEM report in 
2014, rates of necessity entrepreneurship for India, Brazil, Croatia and South Africa 
ranged between 28% and 46.5% in 2014, compared to 3.5% and 7.9% in Norway and 
Sweden, respectively (Singer et al., 2015). 
Desai (2011) argued that the high levels of necessity entrepreneurship in developing 
countries are associated with the size of the informal sector. Individuals who become 
entrepreneurs to avoid unemployment tend to have low skills and sell basic products 
and services. Hence, necessity entrepreneurs have no incentives to formalise their 
business activities (Desai, 2011).  
On the other hand, opportunity entrepreneurship in developing countries could be 
both formal and informal. Emerging economies that are increasingly moving to 
market orientation could offer better opportunities to new entrants (Bruton et al., 
2008). However, opportunity entrepreneurs tend to shift their business from the 
informal sector to the formal sector once they perceive better benefits from the 
institutional environment (Desai, 2011; Klapper et al., 2010). 
2.3.4 Local and systematic entrepreneurship 
Sautet (2013) conducted a conceptual study with a different perspective on the 
relationship between entrepreneurship and economic development, by offering a 
possible explanation of how productive entrepreneurship can contribute to economic 
growth. 
According to Sautet (2013), the current types of entrepreneurship, such as necessity 
and opportunity entrepreneurship from GEM data, do not provide a clear picture to 
explain the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic development. 
Instead, Sautet (2013) suggested that local and systematic entrepreneurship offer a 
better understanding of this relationship. Sautet (2013, p. 392) described local 
entrepreneurship as a  
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“socially productive entrepreneurial activity that is limited to a small number 
of market transactions (i.e., the exploitation of local gains from trade); does 
not entail a complex division of labour; does not involve a deep accumulation 
of capital; and primarily rests on personal and informal relations.”  
He further argued that local entrepreneurship is based on the opportunity in the 
market that limits the growth of the business, whereas necessity entrepreneurship 
from GEM data is based on the motivation of the individual.  
In addition, Sautet (2013, p. 393) described systemic entrepreneurship as a  
“socially productive entrepreneurial activity that is based on large volumes of 
market transactions exploiting large gains from trade and innovation entails a 
complex organizational structure that enables economies of scale and scope to 
be captured, involves a deep accumulation of capital, rests on impersonal and 
formal relations, and generates entrepreneurial momentum”.  
He also contended that systematic entrepreneurship is based on the opportunities 
available in the market, unlike opportunity entrepreneurship from GEM data that is 
based on the individual’s motivation. To this end, Sautet (2013) suggested that firms 
in developing countries tend to focus their opportunities locally; therefore, they limit 
the growth of productive entrepreneurship and economic growth. 
2.3.5 Research-based and imitative entrepreneurship 
Minniti and Lévesque (2010) presented a theoretical model to analyse the 
relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth. The authors suggested 
that entrepreneurship plays a vital role in developed and emerging economies. 
However, there may be different types of entrepreneurship depending on the level of 
the economic development of each country. Minniti and Lévesque (2010, p. 306) 
described entrepreneurs as “arbitragers who are willing to incur upfront costs in the 
hope of realizing profit expectations”.  
Furthermore, the authors suggested that entrepreneurial activity has two types; 
research-based entrepreneurs (i.e., those who commercialise technological inventions 
and incur R&D expenditure), or imitative entrepreneurs (i.e., those who increase 
product supply and competition by copying technologies established in a different 
place, and consequently do not incur R&D expenditure). The results showed that 
there is a dynamic role of imitative and research-based entrepreneurship in economic 
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growth. In this regard, both research-based and imitative entrepreneurs have a 
positive effect on economic growth. However, imitative entrepreneurs contribute 
significantly to economic growth, especially in the case of emerging economies, as 
they increase competition and product availability when the revenues to R&D 
expenditure are low (Minniti and Lévesque, 2010).  
In summary, the reviewed literature regarding the types of entrepreneurship revealed 
that entrepreneurship is a complex phenomenon, and its relationship to economic 
growth and development is subject to a great debate among scholars and 
policymakers. Thus, in the following section, we will try to offer a more in-depth 
analysis of the intersection of the fields of entrepreneurship and economic 
development. 
2.4 The Intersection of the Field of Entrepreneurship and Economic 
Development 
According to Naudé (2011, p. 3),  
“The intersection of the fields of entrepreneurship and development 
economics is a challenging and potentially rewarding area of research for 
social scientists, with important implications for policymakers, donors, 
development agencies as well as business owners and managers”.  
However, only a few scholars in economics (e.g., Schumpeter, 1942; Leibenstein, 
1968) have been able to draw on any systematic research into the role of 
entrepreneurship in economic growth and development.  
Recently, there has been renewed interest in the relationship between 
entrepreneurship and economic development (Ahmed and McQuaid, 2005; 
Audretsch et al., 2008; Minniti and Lévesque, 2010; Acs et al., 2014a, b; among 
others). In this respect, Naudé (2011, p. 3) stated that this:  
“Interest was reignited by the improved availability of relevant cross-country 
data, by the resurgence of entrepreneurship after the fall of communism and 
the gradual reforms initiated by China since the late 1970s, by the emerging 
recognition of the role of institutions in both fields, and by the increasing 




Therefore, in light of recent events in the new global economy, it is becoming 
extremely difficult to ignore the contribution of entrepreneurship in economic growth 
and development (e.g., Acs et al., 2014a, b; Aparicio et al., 2016). This section 
reviews the evidence for the role of entrepreneurship in global prosperity, economic 
growth and development, and underlines the importance of institutions in offering a 
better understanding of this relationship. 
2.4.1 The role of entrepreneurship in global prosperity  
Early scholars in economics such as Schumpeter (1942) considered entrepreneurial 
innovations as the engine of economic welfare and prosperity. In recent years, 
entrepreneurship has been widely recognised as a means of “growing the pie” by 
increasing economic activity to create more jobs and generate more income for more 
people, instead of simply redistributing the wealth from one group to another 
(Baumol et al., 2007; Acs et al., 2008a; Acs et al., 2016). However, the literature on 
entrepreneurship lacks clarity regarding how entrepreneurship is accurately 
correlated with human wellbeing and a global prosperity (Acs et al., 2016). In this 
regard, Ahmed and McQuaid (2005, p. 8) stated that:  
“Entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship play important roles in today’s global 
business environment. Even though entrepreneurship has been an important 
part of society for many years, there are still many different perceptions and 
misconceptions about it”.  
Therefore, Baumol (1990) suggested that entrepreneurs can contribute effectively to 
the general welfare and prosperity of an economy based on the institutions that 
prevail in a certain society (Baumol and Storm, 2007). This is because institutional 
environment that encourages “productive” entrepreneurial activities becomes the 
ultimate determinant of economic growth and prosperity (Sobel, 2008; Carlos Díaz 
Casero et al., 2013). 
A good summary of the role of entrepreneurship, combined with institutional quality, 
in global prosperity has been provided in the work of the Global Entrepreneurship 
Index (GEI). The findings of GEI’s report showed that the role played by 
entrepreneurship is correlated positively with different aspects of human well-being. 
This section offers some evidence to that outcome. 
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In Table 2.3, Acs et al. (2016) explored the relationship between GEI data in 
comparison with six variables across the social, economic and environmental fields 
to demonstrate how these variables might work in tandem, or whether there is no 
correlation between each other. These factors are  
“GDP per capita (PPP); income equality (GINI); digital evolution (The 
Digital Evolution Index, Tufts); environmental performance (Yale 
Environmental Performance Index); economic freedom (Heritage Foundation 
Index of Economic Freedom); and peace (Institute for Economics and Peace 
Global Peace Index)” (Acs et al., 2016, p. 7). 
Table 2.3: Entrepreneurship correlated variables with R-squared coefficients 
GEI-Correlated Variable R-Squared 
GDP per capita 0.58 
Income equality 0.13 
Digital evolution 0.72 
Environmental performance 0.72 
Economic freedom 0.51 
Peace 0.34 
Source: Acs et al. (2016) 
Acs et al. (2016) found that entrepreneurship correlates relatively highly with the 
most common economic measure, GDP per capita (0.58), although many other 
factors may contribute to GDP growth. In another common economic measure, 
income equality correlates weakly positively with entrepreneurship (0.13). Other 
significant aspects of prosperity are digital evolution and environmental 
performance, where both have the highest correlations with entrepreneurship (both 
0.72). Lastly, economic freedom (0.51) and peace (0.34) have less close correlations 
with entrepreneurship.  
As Table 2.3 shows, there is a significant relationship between entrepreneurship and 
the digital revolution. This strong relationship could be explained by the fact that 
entrepreneurs create new firms by adopting digital technologies and innovations to 
transform every industry around the world (e.g., Uber, Google, Amazon and 
Facebook). Therefore, to have a better understanding of economic development 
forces in the 21st century, it is crucial to include digital technologies as it is not useful 
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to explain the 19th century industrial revolution without focusing on the role of steam 
engines (Acs et al., 2017). 
In this realm, the Internet is the core competency for entrepreneurs who adopt new 
technologies for both factor market inputs and product market outcomes. For 
example, Carrefour without the Internet may not be efficient, but it would function 
since it has a physical outlet. On the other hand, Uber could not survive without the 
Internet because it has no physical location. Therefore, these new young, only a few 
years old in some cases, firms have strong potential growth regarding the number of 
users and market share (Acs et al., 2017). 
The results in this section indicated that entrepreneurship could broadly be 
recognised as a “global good” as it is correlated positively with all six of these 
indicators. Hence, entrepreneurship is likely to contribute to different facets of 
human welfare and prosperity. The next section, therefore, moves on to discuss 
specifically the role of entrepreneurship in economic growth and development. 
2.4.2 The role of entrepreneurship in economic growth and development  
Research into economic development has a long history. Since Adam Smith’s (2003) 
(original work published in 1776) seminal work, The Wealth of Nations, several 
theories have contributed to the explanation of economic development. In the 
literature, economic development is considered a complex and multifaceted process 
that includes interactions among different designed goals and policies over time in a 
specific country (Dang and Pheng, 2015). This process of economic development 
may require structural changes leading to an overall higher growth trajectory on 
different cultural, social, political systems and institutional levels. Therefore, the 
concept of economic development goes beyond the definition of economic growth 
(GDP, GNP or GNI) per capita, as the latent is considered one of the dimensions of 
development (Naudé, 2010; Dang and Pheng, 2015). However, Dang and Pheng 
(2015) argued that economic development objectives could not be achieved without 
understanding the sources of economic growth as the country needs resources to 
accomplish other long-term goals. To this end, for the purpose of this study, we are 
going to discuss the role of entrepreneurship in both economic growth and economic 
development, as growth underlies an essential requirement for development.  
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While development theories abound, many of the theories to date have not 
considered the role of entrepreneurship in economic growth and development (Dang 
and Pheng, 2015). Solow (1956), in his neoclassical growth model, contended that 
the nuances and dynamics of economic growth among countries come to higher 
productivity in a population; therefore, rich countries have better factors of 
production. While Solow (1956) considered physical and human capital as driving 
forces in achieving economic growth, Romer (1990) developed Solow’s (1956) 
model by emphasising the importance of knowledge capital as an endogenous factor, 
whereby human capital and technological innovations are the key drivers to 
economic growth. Romer (1990) further argued that new ideas, and most research 
and development (R&D), are produced by well-educated entrepreneurs who create 
and exploit new technological advances and ultimately drive economic growth.  
Although Romer’s (1990) economic growth model helped to explain the divergence 
in growth rates among countries, Acemoglu et al. (2014) contended that institutions 
could play a pivotal role in producing and organising the factors of production (i.e., 
physical capital, human capital, and technological innovations). Building on previous 
research, other studies suggested that these institutions create appropriate incentives 
for entrepreneurs to be more productive and eventually contribute to economic 
growth and development (e.g., Acs et al., 2014a, b; Aparicio et al., 2016; Urbano et 
al., 2018). 
In line with this argument, different studies developed theoretical models by offering 
possible explanations of how entrepreneurship can contribute to economic growth 
(see Minniti and Lévesque, 2010; Sautet, 2013 in Section 2.3). Moreover, a 
considerable amount of empirical studies have analysed the role of entrepreneurship 
in economic growth (e.g., Audretsch and Keilbach, 2004a, b, 2005, 2008; Acs et al., 
2018a).  
In their study, Audretsch and Keilbach (2004a) analysed the association between 
different measures of entrepreneurship capital and regional economic performance, 
measured as per-capita income for Germany. In this regard, entrepreneurship capital 
is defined as “those factors influencing and shaping an economy’s milieu of agents in 
such a way as to be conducive to the creation of new firms” (Audretsch and 
Keilbach, 2004a, p. 419). The results showed that entrepreneurship capital has a 
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positive relationship with regional economic performance (Audretsch and Keilbach, 
2004a).  
Similarly, Audretsch and Keilbach (2004b) have suggested expanding Solow’s 
(1956) model of the production function to include entrepreneurship capital as a 
factor for economic growth. The results indicated that entrepreneurship capital is a 
significant factor shaping output and productivity in German regions (Audretsch and 
Keilbach, 2004b).  
In addition to the importance of the traditional factors of economic growth, such as 
human capital and R&D, Audretsch and Keilbach (2005) empirically analysed 327 
West German regions and found that entrepreneurial activity also plays a significant 
role in generating economic productivity. In the same vein, using country level data 
from West Germany, Audretsch et al. (2008) found empirical evidence that 
entrepreneurship could be a mediator between innovation efforts and economic 
performance. Moreover, they contended that this indirect effect is ignored in 
previous empirical studies that examined the direct impact of innovation on 
economic performance. 
In consideration of this, Acs et al. (2018a) contributed to this relationship by 
exploring the role of entrepreneurship and institutions, in combination in an 
ecosystem, in economic growth. In this regard, Acs et al. (2018a) found empirical 
evidence for the role of the entrepreneurial ecosystem in economic growth by using 
GEM data and institutional sources for 46 countries over the period 2002-2011. 
Overall, these recent articles suggested that entrepreneurship plays a vital role in 
economic growth and development. In the next section, we will discuss how 
entrepreneurship can contribute to the knowledge economy. 
2.4.3 Linking between entrepreneurship and knowledge economy 
Building on the knowledge spillover theory, entrepreneurs who exploit knowledge 
spillovers via new venture creation can contribute significantly to the knowledge 
economy by commercialising new products and services to the market (Acs and 
Szerb, 2007). According to the World Bank (2007, p. 14):  
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“[The] knowledge economy …meaning is broader than that of high 
technology or the new economy, which are closely linked to the Internet, and 
even broader than the often-used information society. Its foundations are the 
creation, dissemination, and use of knowledge. A knowledge economy is one 
in which knowledge assets are deliberately accorded more importance than 
capital and labour assets, and where the quantity and sophistication of the 
knowledge pervading economic and societal activities reaches very high 
levels”. 
Historically, Schumpeter (1942) first introduced the significant role of 
entrepreneurship in economic growth. He contended that innovative entrepreneurs 
are described as “agents of creative destruction”. These “agents” destroy the value of 
existing markets by creating new markets with new products, services and 
technological innovations that offer a higher rate of return than that provided by 
existing firms. Contrary to growth models discussed in the previous section, 
Schumpeter (1942) concluded that creative destruction is the ultimate source of 
economic growth.  
In general, entrepreneurship is considered a key driver to economic growth in which  
“entrepreneurs create new businesses, and new businesses, in turn, create 
jobs, intensify competition, and may even increase productivity through 
technological change. High measured levels of entrepreneurship will thus 
translate directly into high levels of economic growth” (Acs, 2006, p. 97).  
In reality, however, this treatment of the relationship between entrepreneurship and 
economic growth is more complicated. Mainly, if the relationship includes a 
measurement of entrepreneurial activity such as informal self-employment, which 
occurs due to high levels of bureaucratic barriers that complicate the process of 
formal business creation, then entrepreneurship may be seen as negatively correlated 
with economic growth (Acs, 2006). 
Therefore, with economic growth and development in mind, it would be best to focus 
on “productive” entrepreneurship that can lead to economic growth (Baumol, 1990; 
Acs, 2006; Ayyagari et al., 2014). Recent studies have clearly indicated that 
entrepreneurship based on knowledge makes a more significant contribution to 
economic growth in comparison to other types of entrepreneurship, such as necessity 
entrepreneurship (i.e., individuals who feel obliged to start their own business 
because all other work alternatives are either absent or insufficient) (Audretsch and 
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Keilbach, 2004a, b, 2005, 2007, 2008; Audretsch, 2007; Audretsch et al., 2008; Acs 
et al., 2012). In particular, Reynolds et al. (2005) argued that entrepreneurship based 
on knowledge could be positively related to transforming an opportunity into a real 
start-up that has an added value to the market.  
In this regard, Reynolds et al. (2005) contended that entrepreneurship could be 
considered the result of an individual’s decision to create a new business opportunity 
based on knowledge. However, questions have been raised about the usefulness of 
entrepreneurship in economic growth (Wong et al., 2005). Specifically, Acs et al. 
(2012) recommended that entrepreneurship should be examined with its capacity to 
initiate new start-ups and stimulate knowledge in the country simultaneously. 
Together, some studies suggested that entrepreneurship serves as a conduit to 
transfer knowledge capacity and, consequently, produce spillover dynamics that 
contribute to economic growth for a specific society (Audretsch and Keilbach, 2008; 
Acs et al., 2012). 
In the same vein, Acs et al. (2012) challenged Romer’s (1990) conclusions, arguing 
that knowledge may not automatically be associated with economic growth as 
presumed in models of endogenous growth. Thus, there has been an increasing 
amount of literature that has investigated the effects of entrepreneurship as a conduit 
of knowledge (Audretsch, 2007; Audretsch and Keilbach, 2008; Noseleit, 2013; 
Aparicio et al., 2016). In this sense, previous research has considered the importance 
of entrepreneurs’ abilities and motivation to innovate and grow businesses that 
contribute to economic growth (Audretsch, 2007; Aparicio et al., 2016). In 
particular, Audretsch et al. (2008) contended that innovative entrepreneurs who are 
motivated by business opportunity bring the benefit of new knowledge to economic 
growth by creating new products and services that lead to a continuous increment of 
knowledge spillovers. Therefore, entrepreneurship is considered a key driver in 
transforming the new knowledge into economic growth (Audretsch et al., 2008).  
Several studies supported Audretsch et al.’s (2008) conclusions, arguing that 
increasing entrepreneurship rates are positively linked to the creation of knowledge 
and technology that could contribute to economic growth (Wong et al., 2005; Acs et 
al., 2012; Noseleit, 2013; Aparicio et al., 2016). Based on a panel of 
entrepreneurship data from 18 countries, Acs et al. (2012) provided empirical 
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evidence that entrepreneurial activity serves to encourage economic growth in 
addition to the measures of R&D and human capital. Moreover, Noseleit (2013) 
analysed the role of entrepreneurship for adjustments of the structural change from 
industrial to the knowledge economy, and its relevance for regional economic 
development in Germany over the years 1975 to 2002. Noseleit’s (2013) empirical 
results suggested that structural change produced by entrepreneurial activity is 
positively associated with economic growth. A recent study by Aparicio et al. (2016) 
found that opportunity entrepreneurship impacts economic growth positively by 
using unbalanced panel data of 43 countries (2004-2012).  
To conclude, although there are other mechanisms where knowledge spillovers are 
exploited, such as corporate entrepreneurship (Bosma et al., 2010; Parker, 2013; 
Turró et al., 2014) (see Section 2.2.4 for more discussion about corporate 
entrepreneurship), through new start-ups entrepreneurship seems to play an essential 
role in the knowledge economy. According to Acs and Szerb (2007, p. 112),  
“Entrepreneurship can contribute to economic growth by serving as a 
mechanism that permeates the knowledge filter. It is a virtual consensus that 
entrepreneurship revolves around the recognition of opportunities along with 
the cognitive decision to commercialise those opportunities by starting a new 
firm. Thus, according to the Knowledge Spillover Theory of 
Entrepreneurship, by serving as a conduit for knowledge spillovers that might 
otherwise not exist, entrepreneurship permeates the knowledge filter and 
provides the missing link to economic growth”.  
Considering all of this evidence, it seems that entrepreneurship plays a significant 
role in promoting economic growth and development. However, such studies 
remained narrow in focus, dealing only with developed countries such as Germany. 
Therefore, questions have been raised about the role of entrepreneurship in 
developing countries and whether it has the same effects in regards to its relationship 
to employment, job creation and innovation.  
Let us now turn to consider the different effects of entrepreneurship on economic 
growth and development among developed and developing economies. 
2.4.4 The divergent effects of entrepreneurship on economic growth 
Although entrepreneurship has been commonly recognised as a key driver to 
economic growth and development, the relationship between entrepreneurship and 
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economic development has attracted conflicting interpretations from different stages 
of economic development. In particular, some studies found that there is a U-shaped 
relationship between entrepreneurship and the level of economic development 
(Sternberg and Wennekers, 2005; Wennekers et al., 2005; Thurik, 2009).  
For example, Wennekers et al. (2005) conducted an empirical study to examine the 
determinants of entrepreneurship and the macro-level of nations by using GEM data 
from 36 countries for the year 2002. The authors yielded that there is a U-shaped 
relationship between nascent entrepreneurship (i.e., people actively involved in 
starting a new venture) and the level of economic development (see Figure 2.1). 
Specifically, opportunity-based nascent entrepreneurial activity has a U-shaped 
relationship with economic development. When the country develops economically, 
the entrepreneurial activity decreases. However, from a certain level of economic 
development onwards, the entrepreneurial activity levels off, or even tends to 
increase again. Also, the authors suggested that the differences in nascent 
entrepreneurship rates were mainly affected by “laws” related to the level of 
economic development (Wennekers et al., 2005). 
 
Figure 2.1: The U-curve of entrepreneurship and economic development  
Source: Wennekers et al. (2005) 
In the same vein, Sternberg and Wennekers (2005) reviewed seven papers presented 
at the First GEM Research Conference in Germany in 2004. The authors focused on 
their review to explore the determinants of nascent entrepreneurship and new 
business start-ups. The main findings showed that the role of entrepreneurial activity 
differs across the levels of development. In particular, there is a U-shaped 
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relationship between the rate of entrepreneurship and stage of development; this 
relationship is negative in developing economies but positive in developed countries. 
Building on these findings, Sternberg and Wennekers (2005) suggested that 
entrepreneurship may have a different effect on a country’s innovation and economic 
growth rate based on its type, and only high growth business start-ups and 
opportunity entrepreneurship improve knowledge spillovers and economic 
development.  
Comparing between emerging and developed countries, Valliere and Peterson (2009) 
conducted an empirical study to investigate the effect of entrepreneurship on 
economic growth by using GEM data of 44 countries for the years 2004 and 2005, 
and the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) to measure economic performance. 
The authors found that entrepreneurship has a vital role in predicting and explaining 
the economic performance of countries. However, the impact of entrepreneurship on 
economic growth is more significant in developed economies rather than emerging 
economies. Therefore, Valliere and Peterson (2009) suggested that emerging 
economies should prioritise their economic development policies on bringing gazelle 
firms (i.e., fast-growing firms) into the formal economy to increase productive 
entrepreneurship and economic growth.  
Recently, Chowdhury et al. (2015b) analysed the data from 44 countries during 2001 
to 2005. They concluded that economic development has a consistent negative 
relationship with entrepreneurial activities regarding nascent/new firm ownership, 
self-employment and new firm start-up. 
According to Acs et al. (2014a, b), the current datasets of measuring 
entrepreneurship are somewhat controversial, and the vast majority of researchers 
have not considered the interaction effects of entrepreneurship and institutions. They 
further argued that entrepreneurs tend to be more productive regarding employment 
and economic development when operating under an appropriate institutional 
environment. In addition, Acs et al. (2014b) provided evidence in the Global 
Entrepreneurship Index (GEI) that some emerging economies, such as Estonia and 
Slovenia, could have an effective national system of entrepreneurship (i.e., 
institutional environment) where entrepreneurship plays an essential role in 
economic development. According to the GEI measure, these emerging nations are in 
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the first 22 out of the 120 countries who lead the world of entrepreneurship (Acs et 
al., 2014b).  
The previous discussion showed that entrepreneurship could play a different role 
under the stage of economic development and the quality of the institutional 
environment. The next section offers better explanations about this relationship. 
2.4.5 Entrepreneurship and stages of economic development 
Currently, developing and developed countries in the global economy face different 
challenges in aspiring for and sustaining economic development. This being said, 
there is not a set formula for nations to use in their developmental endeavours. For 
example, what Ghana needs to increase its competitiveness is not the same as what 
Argentina needs to do so. This divergence is due to Ghana and Argentina being in 
different stages of development (Schwab and Sala-i-Martín, 2014). Competitiveness 
can be defined in this context as “the set of institutions, policies, and factors that 
determine the level of productivity of an economy, which in turn sets the level of 
prosperity that the country can achieve” (Schwab and Sala-i-Martín, 2016, p. 4). 
In his classical handbook on economic development, Syrquin (1988) suggested that 
countries go through three stages. The first stage of economy relies mainly on 
agricultural products and small-scale manufacturing. In the next stage, the economy 
moves from small-scale production to manufacturing. In the last stage, and due to the 
increase in wealth among developed countries, the economy starts to shift from 
manufacturing towards services. 
Another well-known study that is often cited in research on understanding the stages 
of economic development and its effects is that of Rostow (1959). In his historical 
study, Rostow (1959, p. 1) suggested that countries go through five stages of 
economic development: “(1) the traditional society (2) the preconditions for take-off 
(3) the take-off (4) the drive to maturity and (5) the age of high mass-consumption”. 
While these stages identified critical historical events in the development of modern 
economies, they could not explain other critical events and discrepancies. One such 
discrepancy is the failure of the Soviet Union to reach the mass consumption stage, 
partly due to a lack of total factor productivity. Consequently, Rostow’s (1959) 
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theory regarding stages of economic development was deemed inadequate in 
describing economic development preconditions and stages (Acs and Szerb, 2010). 
In line with the economic theory of stages of development, Porter et al. (2001) made 
a valuable contribution to Rostow’s (1959) and Syrquin’s (1988) studies. Porter et al. 
(2001) argued that a country’s development is distinguished by three stages of 
economic development: a factor-driven stage, an efficiency-driven stage, and an 
innovation-driven stage. Countries are allocated into stages of development based on 
two criteria: GDP per capita at market exchange rates, and the extent to which 
countries are factor driven by measuring  
“the share of exports of mineral goods in total exports (goods and services), 
assuming that countries that export more than 70% of mineral resources 
(measured using a five-year average) are to a large extent factor driven” 
(Schwab and Sala-i-Martín, 2011, p. 10).  
Also, countries in the transition stage fall between two of the three stages. For 
transitioning countries, “the weights change smoothly as a country develops, 
reflecting the smooth transition from one stage of development to another” (Schwab 
and Sala-i-Martín, 2011, p. 10). 
While Rostow (1959) was more concerned with the age of high mass consumption, 
Porter et al. (2001) focused on the innovation-driven stage (i.e., the knowledge 
economy). In particular, Porter et al. (2001) contended that countries must embrace 
technology and innovation to produce higher levels of income and eventually be 
more competitive. 
In accordance with Schumpeter’s (1942) historical view that entrepreneurship is a 
crucial driver for economic growth, entrepreneurship is increasingly considered a 
driving force for development through creating “new combinations” of economic 
activity, such as physical, biological and digital systems for the innovation-driven 
stage of development (Acs and Szerb, 2010; Schwab and Sala-i-Martín, 2016). 
Economists have contended that entrepreneurship activities serve in the capacity of 
“input-completing” and “gap-filling” in their contribution to innovation and 




While few emerging countries are in the innovation-driven stage, most emerging 
economies are in the efficiency-driven or the transition to the innovation-driven stage 
(Schwab and Sala-i-Martín, 2014). In addition, emerging economies that are in the 
innovation-driven stage most likely have higher rates of export-oriented 
entrepreneurship than emerging economies located in lower stages (De Clercq et al., 
2008). Therefore, it is critical for emerging economies to promote innovation in 
order to reach a technological frontier, and consequently become a knowledge-based 
economy that is particular to the innovation-driven stage (Acs and Amorós, 2008). 
In describing entrepreneurship in different stages of economic development (Table 
2.4), the factor-driven stage is highlighted by high rates of agricultural self-
employment. Countries in this stage compete based on their factor endowments (i.e., 
primarily natural resources and unskilled labour). The type of business is commonly 
marked by sole proprietorships (i.e., self-employed) in which they compete on the 
basis of price and sell basic products. Therefore, these countries at this stage are not 
able to create knowledge for innovation or exporting. There are precondition 
requirements that countries must adopt in order to transfer to the second stage (i.e., 
the efficiency-driven stage). These requirements include increasing production 
efficiency and educating the workforce in order to adapt to the subsequent 
technological development phase. In addition, the first transition from factor-driven 
to efficiency-driven is characterised by improving the quality of institutions (Porter 
et al., 2001; Acs et al., 2008a; Acs and Szerb, 2010). 
As countries become more competitive, they move into the efficiency-driven stage. 
Countries in this stage compete on efficient production processes and increase 
product quality in large markets, which allows firms to exploit economies of scale 
opportunities. Also, industries in this stage primarily produce basic services 
(Syrquin, 1988). The rates of self-employment in these developing countries decline 
as individuals tend to prefer working for larger firms (e.g., government ownership, 
private enterprise or foreign direct investment) over managing small businesses due 
to higher returns. The second transition is marked by increasing the activity of 
individual agents (Acs et al., 2008a; Acs and Szerb, 2010). 
Finally, as countries move into the innovation-driven stage, there is an increase in 
knowledge spillover (Romer, 1990). At this stage, knowledge is a crucial input (i.e., 
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endogenous) for these countries to increase total productivity. In particular, 
individual agents tend to compete with firms by producing new knowledge in this 
stage (Acs et al., 2009). 
Table 2.4: The entrepreneurship policy nexus through the stages of a country’s 
development  
Stage of development Private sector mode Type of state orientation 
Factor-driven: 
“Production most 
intensive in unskilled 
labour and natural 
resources” 
Traditional economy: 
“Dominance of primary 
sectors” 




“Small entrepreneurial base” 
Fragile or facilitating: 
“Establishing authority, capacity and/or 
legitimacy important to move from 
fragile to facilitating” 
“No industrialisation under fragile state 
conditions” 
“Facilitating state aims at establishing 
conducive business environment 
(property rights, stability, rule of law, 
accessibility)” 
“Functional and broad-based industrial 













“Larger firms, SOE and 
MNEs dominate” 
“‘Fordist’ production by 
obtaining productivity 
growth through economies 
of scale” 
“Growing clustering” 
Development or facilitating: 
“Development state to use active and 
selective (industrial) policies to 
encourage domestic technological 
capability formation” 
“As the economy develops, this role may 
change towards the facilitating role 
focusing on industrial policies aimed at 
high technological innovation” 
Innovation-driven: 
“Production of high-
tech goods and 




“Rise in service sector” 
“High value-added 
manufacturing activities 
dominate with greater 
specialisation” 
“High tech clusters stabilise” 
“Re-emergence of small 
businesses on both national 
and international markets” 
Facilitating: 
“The state promotes basic framework 
conditions” 
“Substantial focus on innovation, 
technology” 
“Market competition, market 
development through entry of new 
entrepreneurial firms important” 
Source: Naudé (2011) 
Acs et al. (2008a) contended that entrepreneurial activity increases in the innovation-
driven stage due to the development of the services sector over the manufacturing 
sector. The expansion of the services sector allows more opportunities for individuals 
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to start new businesses (e.g., USA, Germany and Sweden). In addition, Acs et al. 
(2008a) argued that improvements in information technologies (e.g., 
telecommunications, photocopying services, express mail services, personal 
computers, the Internet, mobile phone services and web services) may incentivise 
individuals to start a new business due to the potential for higher returns (e.g., better 
exchange information, fewer expenses and less time consuming). Therefore, the 
innovation-driven stage is marked by high value-added services industries in which 
entrepreneurial activity is significant (Acs et al., 2008a). 
This understanding of entrepreneurship concerning stages of economic development 
is different from the previous notion that most entrepreneurial countries in the world 
are those who have a high number of entrepreneurs. In particular, developing 
countries such as Zambia and Nigeria have the highest rates of self-employment. 
However, these countries lack the human capital and infrastructure needed to create 
innovative high-growth start-ups as many individuals sell soft drinks and fruit on 
street corners. Therefore, quality entrepreneurship matters more than quantity. 
Entrepreneurial countries need to have more productive entrepreneurs, not 
necessarily a higher number of entrepreneurs (Acs et al., 2016). 
In the same vein, Acs et al. (2014b) found that there is an S-shaped relationship 
between entrepreneurial activity and economic development (see Figure 2.2). Also, 
Acs et al. (2014b) yielded that countries in the factor-driven stage are marked by low 
entrepreneurial activity, and the opportunity for increased income or wealth is 
limited. On the other hand, entrepreneurial activity increasingly plays a more 
important role among countries in the transition from efficiency to the innovation-
driven stage (the knowledge-driven stage) until it levels off. This argument was 
supported by Naudé (2010), who suggested that if the demand for entrepreneurship 
was established in the context of developing countries, entrepreneurship could make 
a better contribution to these countries. In line with Galindo and Méndez (2014), 
Castaño et al. (2015) empirically found that higher rates of economic growth create 
new opportunities for entrepreneurs and stimulate innovation.  
This S-shaped relationship between entrepreneurship and economic development is 
consistent with Baumol’s (1990) theory that entrepreneurial activity has existed in all 
countries, but it is distributed among destructive, unproductive and productive 
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entrepreneurship forms. Destructive entrepreneurship (e.g., the illegal drug business) 
tends to happen in developing countries with some degree of political instability, 
although it happens in some form across most countries. Hence, these unstable 
countries depend mainly on primary industries and the opportunities for increasing 
entrepreneurial activity to may not appear immediately. 
 
Figure 2.2: The S-curve of entrepreneurship and economic development  
Source: Acs et al. (2014b) 
Another type of entrepreneurship that is prevalent in both developing and developed 
countries is unproductive entrepreneurship, where wealth is transferred from one 
group to another. This form of unproductive entrepreneurship is known in academia 
as rent-seeking (i.e., privilege seeking). When rent-seeking by the government and 
other groups exists, the opportunity for entrepreneurs to make strategies for long-
term investment to sustain productive high-impact firms is limited. As a result, 
countries with extractive institutions at the expense of others do not have sustainable 
economic development (Baumol, 1990). 
Therefore, destructive and unproductive entrepreneurship could be removed by 
improving the quality of institutions and changing society’s incentive structure. This 
requires good government and governance that support innovative and high-growth 
firms (i.e., productive entrepreneurship) through strengthening institutions that are 
related to better technology, importing skilled employees, building a well-
functioning infrastructure, offering specialised advice and support, building business 
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premises, availability of venture capital, and a supportive regulatory framework in 
order to contribute mainly to economic development (Acs et al., 2016). 
In this realm, Méndez-Picazo et al. (2012) conducted an empirical study to examine 
the relationship between governance, institutions and entrepreneurship using a panel 
data analysis (such as GEM, World Bank and Gini index) for 11 developed countries. 
Due to multiple definitions of governance, Méndez-Picazo et al. (2012) defined 
public governance from the perspective of institutions. The authors considered that 
good governance can only exist if there is a proper set of institutions in which they 
can affect entrepreneurial activity in a country. Méndez-Picazo et al. (2012) yielded 
that there is a positive association between governance and entrepreneurship. In 
particular, governments could achieve sustainable economic development by creating 
a desirable environment where entrepreneurs can change the structure of the 
economy. 
This previous argument was supported by Schwab and Sala-i-Martín (2014), who 
contended that the first two stages of development are controlled by institutions to 
support productive entrepreneurship. In particular, innovation has a limited 
contribution to economic activity of 5% in the factor-driven stage; this increases to 
10% in efficiency-driven economies and has a more considerable contribution to 
economic development of 30% in the innovation-driven stage. In addition, economic 
development involves change, and entrepreneurs become the best agents for this 
change (Acs and Szerb, 2010).  
However, some studies suggested that the institutional variables influence 
entrepreneurial activity differently based on the stage of economic development 
(Bowen and De Clerq, 2008; Carlos Díaz Casero et al., 2013; Acs et al., 2014a; 
Belitski et al., 2016). In this regard, Bruton et al. (2010, p. 433) suggested:  
“… to compare different emerging economies that may be at different stages, 
the time periods studied in the different countries have to be comparable in 
that they cover similar periods of the countries’ development, but are not 
overly separated in time to make comparisons difficult”.  
In this respect, Carlos Díaz Casero et al. (2013) analysed the influence of some 
institutional variables on entrepreneurship in groups of countries that were classified 
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based on their economic development. The authors found that the impact of 
institutions on entrepreneurship is determined by the development stage of a specific 
economy. In particular, the “size of the business sector” and “health and primary 
education” were significant for developing countries, while “integrity of the legal 
system” and “fulfilling contracts” were important variables for transition economies. 
Finally, the two institutional dimensions of “size of the government” and “credit 
available to the private sector” were crucial to increase entrepreneurial activity for 
developed economies (Carlos Díaz Casero et al., 2013).  
Similarly, Kuckertz et al. (2016) analysed the impact of economic freedom 
(measured by the rule of law, limited government, regularity efficiency and open 
markets) on entrepreneurial activity for 63 countries, classified into three groups 
based on their respective development stage. The authors found that the effects of 
economic freedom on entrepreneurial activity depend on the development stage of an 
economy.  
To this end, entrepreneurship matters for emerging economies in which 
entrepreneurs can allocate resources more efficiently than governments, and that 
market is necessary to respond to these changes through consistent adjustments to 
“separate actions of different people” and “the conditions of supply of various factors 
of production” (Acs and Amorós, 2008, p. 310). Many countries have recognised the 
importance of the markets where entrepreneurs operate by focusing on improving 
their institutional environment, private sector development and small and medium 
enterprise policies (Djankov et al., 2002; Klapper et al., 2006; Acs and Amorós, 
2008). Therefore, it is necessary for emerging economies that need to move into the 
innovation-driven stage to develop favourable environmental conditions to increase 
“productive” entrepreneurship, and consequently contribute to economic growth and 
development. Few emerging economies have achieved this in the past decade; those 
that have include the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovak Republic (Schwab and 
Sala-i-Martín, 2014). The following section discusses the theoretical background of 





2.5 The Intersection between Entrepreneurship, Institutions and Economic 
Development  
2.5.1 Theoretical background 
As discussed in the previous sections, scholars have highlighted the importance of 
entrepreneurship in economic growth and development. However, this relationship is 
contingent upon the institutional environment. Where institutions are effective, 
entrepreneurs are more likely to undertake new ventures and focus their energies 
towards productive activities (Baumol, 1990).  
The pioneering work of Douglass North (1990, 2005) remains crucial to our 
understanding of the pivotal role of institutional structures for entrepreneurship and 
economic development and forms the foundation of this section. North (1990, 2005) 
stressed that organisations (i.e., entrepreneurs) are the main agents of change. He 
further argued that many incentives that drive entrepreneurial behaviour are based on 
the quality of institutions. Therefore, institutions can be defined as the “rules of the 
game in a society, or more formally, the constraints that shape human interaction” 
(North, 1990, p. 3). This definition has been widely appreciated and used in several 
studies related to entrepreneurship research (e.g., Acs et al., 2014a, b; Aparicio et al., 
2016; Urbano et al., 2018). Building on this definition, entrepreneurs, who set up 
organisations, adjust their activities and strategies to fit the market opportunities and 
limitations provided by the institutional environment (North, 1990; Gnyawali and 
Fogel, 1994; Manolova et al., 2008). Hence, improving entrepreneurship in a 
particular country depends on the business environment that provides positive or 
negative incentives for entrepreneurs (North, 1990). 
This idea was supported recently by Bjørnskov and Foss (2013), who found that the 
relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth is positively stronger in 
the presence of high-quality institutions, such as procedures or the time needed to 
create a new business, indicating that institutions reduce the uncertainty and 
transaction costs that entrepreneurs face. In this realm, Baumol and Strom (2007, p. 
263) suggested that:  
“These institutions and norms, through their impact on the activities of 
enterprising individuals—have a vital influence on the growth and innovation 
that characterize their economy, in good part by ensuring that inventions are 
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transformed into effectively used innovations. We, therefore, have an 
opportunity to modify these institutions in order to change the incentive 
structures that move people into productive entrepreneurship that encourages 
growth”.  
Therefore, institutional theory1 could be useful for understanding which institutional 
variables encourage entrepreneurial activity that contribute to economic growth in 
emerging economies (Veciana and Urbano, 2008; Bruton et al., 2010). 
Collectively, the prevalence of “productive” entrepreneurial activity that contributes 
positively to economic growth is mainly based on a strong incentive structure. In 
contrast, the prevalence of unproductive entrepreneurship that contributes 
destructively to economic growth is primarily based on a weak incentive structure. 
Eventually, entrepreneurs will determine which pathway to take based on the 
incentives in the business environment regarding formal and informal rules. Stated 
differently, different individuals are involved in productive, unproductive and 
destructive entrepreneurship based on different incentive structures provided by the 
institutional environment of a specific country (Baumol, 1990; North, 1990, 2005). 
In line with the discussion of this section, Urbano et al. (2018) suggested a 
conceptual framework that includes a causal chain running from institutions and 
entrepreneurship to economic development, as shown in Figure 2.3. 
In the context of emerging economies, Thurik (2009, p. 8) stated that:  
“The relevance for emerging countries lies in the idea that they have to create 
incentives for the knowledge embodied in their well-educated citizens to stay 
in the home country and exploit their knowledge in a (new) business instead 
of moving abroad. An example of a country which seems to be successful in 
doing so is India which houses numerous IT specialists doing work for clients 
across the globe, MBAs involved in number crunching for big investment 
banks in London and New York and so on. The opposite is true for a country 
like Poland which has seen a massive exodus of skilled workers which has 
actually forced local business to in-source labour from countries like 
Ukraine”.  
Having discussed the theoretical background of the institutional theory and its 
relationship to entrepreneurship and economic development, the next section 
                                               
1 Following Urbano et al. (2018), this study does not distinguish between institutional approach, 




describes the types of institutions and their interaction effect on the development of 
entrepreneurial activity. 
 
Figure 2.3: Linking institutions, entrepreneurship, and economic growth  
Source: Urbano et al. (2018) 
2.5.2 The interaction effect of formal and informal institutions on 
entrepreneurship  
Despite the importance of institutional theory, there has been little understanding of 
the role that the institutional environment plays in influencing entrepreneurship 
(Boettke and Coyne, 2009). Specifically, questions have been raised about the role of 
institutions in increasing entrepreneurship and the institutional dimensions that are 
most important for explaining entrepreneurial activity rates (Bruton et al., 2010; 
Levie and Autio, 2011). 
According to North (1990), institutions are classified into formal factors such as 
laws, contracts and regulations, and informal factors such as values, culture or social 
norms of a specific country. North (1990, 2005) contended that formal institutions 
exist to decrease the transactions costs caused by laws, while informal institutions 
intend to reduce the uncertainties involved in human interaction. Also, North (1990) 
argued that informal institutions that are culturally derived might constrain the 
changes and improvements of formal institutions and vice versa. Thus, the 
interactions between formal and informal institutions produce outcomes that have 
significant implications for increasing “productive” entrepreneurial activity (Baumol, 




In this respect, North (2005, p. 48) stated that:  
“All organised activity by humans entails a structure to define the “way the 
game is played,” whether it is a sporting activity or the working of an 
economy. That structure is made up of institutions—formal rules, informal 
norms, and their enforcement characteristics. Take professional football. The 
game is played within a set of formal rules, informal norms (such as not 
deliberately injuring a key player on the opposing team), and the use of 
referees and umpires to enforce the rules and norms. How the game is 
actually played depends not only on the formal rules defining the incentive 
structure for the players and the strength of the informal norms but also on the 
effectiveness of enforcement of the rules. Changing the formal rules will alter 
the way the game is played but also, as anyone who has watched professional 
football knows, it frequently pays to evade the rules (and deliberately injure 
the quarterback of the opposing team). So it is with the performance 
characteristics of an economy. To understand performance, we must explore 
in depth the way institutions “work,” looking at both the consequences of 
formal incentives and the frequently unanticipated results”.  
In line with the team sports illustration, one outcome from the interaction between 
formal and informal institutions on entrepreneurship was found by Baumol’s (1990) 
seminal work that described the development of entrepreneurship as a continuous 
process. He suggested that entrepreneurship comes in three different forms: 
productive entrepreneurship that generates economic prosperity through innovation 
and exploiting opportunities in the market, non-productive entrepreneurship, where 
entrepreneurial talent is not efficiently used by pursuing rents from government 
agencies such as preferential monopolistic positions, special tax or regulatory 
exemptions, and destructive entrepreneurship such as the illegal drug business or 
prostitution. 
Baumol (1990) further contended that the combination of incentives that are 
provided by different institutional structures, formal and informal, direct the 
behaviour of individuals to use their entrepreneurial talents to choose among 
different types of entrepreneurship in which they contribute to economic growth. 
Incentives that encourage productive entrepreneurship have a positive influence on 
economic growth, while unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship have a 
neutral or negative influence on economic growth (Baumol, 1990). An example of 
Baumol’s (1990) study can be seen when productive entrepreneurship created a new 
technology innovation in Silicon Valley. On the other hand, unproductive 
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entrepreneurship is viewed when an authoritarian government starts yet another 
bureaucratic regulation to increase its wealth (Acs et al., 2014b). 
Another outcome of the interaction between formal and informal institutions on 
entrepreneurship was discussed by North (1990), who argued that both formal and 
informal rules might survive for an extended period even if they are inefficient. In 
particular, Williamson (2000) contended that formal institutions take a relatively 
short period to change, while informal institutions take longer to change than formal 
ones. Williamson (2000) further argued that informal institutions might constrain or 
foster the changes of formal institutions and vice versa. In this regard, North (1990, 
p. 91) stated:  
“Perhaps, most important of all, the formal rules change, but the informal 
constraints do not. In consequence, there develops an on-going tension 
between informal constraints and the new formal rules, as many are 
inconsistent with each other. The informal constraints had gradually evolved 
as extensions of previous formal rules. An immediate tendency, as has been 
described, is to have new formal rules supplant the persisting informal 
constraints. Such change is sometimes possible, in particular in a partial 
equilibrium context, but it ignores the deep-seated cultural inheritance that 
underlies many informal constraints. Although a wholesale change in the 
formal rules may take place, at the same time there will be many informal 
constraints that have great survival tenacity because they still resolve basic 
exchange problems among the participants, be they social, political, or 
economic. The result over time tends to be a restructuring of the overall 
constraints – in both directions- to produce a new equilibrium that is far less 
revolutionary”.  
Therefore, building on North’s (1990) argument, the efficiency of formal institutions, 
such as new laws and regulations, could depend on the cultural values in a particular 
society. An example of this interaction could be seen in the case of enforcing traffic 
laws in a specific country. Although traffic laws are generally standard across 
countries, the effectiveness of these formal laws depends on to what extent large 
numbers of drivers voluntarily adopt and accept such rules through prolonged self-
commitment. Therefore, if the informal norms align with the formal rules, the cost of 
enforcing the formal laws will be relatively low as violations of traffic laws are rare 
(North, 1990; Boettke and Coyne, 2009). In other words, effective social norms such 
as honesty, hard work, and integrity can lower the cost of transactions and make 
productive outcomes possible (North, 1990). 
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This idea was examined recently by Krasniqi and Desai (2016), who examined the 
interaction effect of formal institutions (measured by tax administration, trade and 
custom regulations, tax rate, and business licensing/permits), and informal 
institutions (measured by functioning of the judiciary/courts, anti-competitive 
practices of competitors, policy uncertainty, and corruption) on the rates of high 
growth firms (HGFs) in 28 emerging economies. The authors found that the 
interaction effects between formal and informal institutions, rather than direct 
effects, positively impact the development of HGFs. In particular, informal 
institutions are positively associated with HGFs in emerging economies where 
formal institutions have slower reform conditions. This suggests that informal 
institutions have a slower rate of change and could hinder the development of formal 
institutions by greasing the wheels. On the other hand, when emerging economies 
have fast-reforming formal institutions, informal institutions have less influence on 
the facilitation of transactions (Krasniqi and Desai, 2016).  
In the same vein, using the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) surveys in 42 
countries (including both developed and developing countries) for 2001-2006, Estrin 
et al. (2013) found that higher levels of corruption (as an informal institution), 
weaker property rights and larger size of the government significantly hinder the 
rates of entrepreneurial growth. Simultaneously, local social networks (as an 
informal institution) alleviate the effects of some of these institutional deficiencies 
(Estrin et al., 2013). These findings (Estrin et al., 2013; Krasniqi and Desai, 2016) 
were in line with Thornton et al. (2011) and Aparicio et al. (2016), who contended 
that informal institutions, although they are less dynamic, could influence 
entrepreneurship rather than formal institutions. 
In the field of entrepreneurship reserach, a number of studies have postulated a 
convergence between the institutional theory and other approaches. Drawing from 
the psychological approach which suggests that individual factors or psychological 
traits determine entrepreneurial activity (Álvarez et al., 2014), Pathak et al. (2015) 
examined the moderating effect of corruption (as an informal institution) on 
individual-level attributes predicting entrepreneurial intentions in 12 transition 
economies. The authors found that individual attributes (i.e., self-efficacy, fear of 
failure and opportunity recognition) are significant determinants of entrepreneurial 
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intentions but that their effects decrease in the presence of corruption (Pathak et al., 
2015). 
Another convergence is based on the resource-based approach in which “scholars 
focus on the characteristics of the organization or specifically on the resources and 
capabilities of the new firm (e.g., human, physical, financial, technological, etc.) as 
the main determinant of the entrepreneurial process” (Álvarez et al., 2014, p. 446). 
For example, using individual and country-level data from multiple sources for 32 
developed and emerging economies, De Clercq et al. (2013) explored the cross-level 
interaction effects between individual-level resources and country-level institutions 
(formal and informal) on the possibility that a person starts a new business. The 
results, in general, showed that a country’s institutions moderate positively the effect 
of individual human capital (i.e., knowledge, skills, and experience) and social 
capital (i.e., exposure to entrepreneurial role models) on the likelihood to start a new 
business. However, different institutional settings do not have a significant impact on 
the relationship between individual financial capital and the decision to start a new 
business. 
To this end, the study of institutional environment’s dynamics with entrepreneurship 
is necessary to offer a better understanding of the various rates of entrepreneurial 
activity among emerging economies. The next section will discuss if emerging 
economies are able to develop a better institutional environment in encouraging 
productive entrepreneurship. 
2.5.3 Institutional change and stability  
Building appropriate institutions in emerging economies is challenging (Naudé, 
2011). This is because inefficient institutions in emerging economies are 
characterised by high transaction costs and uncertainty, and can be maintained for 
long periods of time and thus affect entrepreneurship’s productivity rates (Baumol, 
1990; North, 1990; Naudé, 2011). According to Acs et al. (2014b), there are a 
number of factors that complicate the development of the institutional design 
stemmed from the interaction between formal and informal institutions in a specific 
society. First, informal institutions that are culturally derived may continue to be 
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resistant when they clash with formal rules as informal institutions provide a sense of 
stability (Aidis et al., 2012). 
Second, informal institutions may not change instantly in response to changes in the 
formal institutions because of the impact of historical conditions (North, 1990). 
While the past cannot be used to precisely predict the future, existing incentive 
frameworks may help to understand the future role of institutions in entrepreneurship 
and economic development. This happens due to cultural traits that have “tenacious 
survival ability”, and because most cultural changes are usually incremental and 
rarely discontinuous; these include revolutions, military conquest or natural disasters 
(North, 1990). Therefore, history is important when unproductive pathways may 
continue. In this respect, North (1990, pp. 36-37) stated: 
 “What is most striking is the persistence of so many aspects of a society in 
spite of a total change in the rules. Japanese culture survived the U.S. 
occupation after World War II; the post-revolutionary U.S. society remained 
much as it had been in colonial times; Jews, Kurds, and endless other groups 
have persisted through centuries despite endless changes in their formal 
status. Even the Russian Revolution, perhaps the most complete formal 
transformation of a society we know, cannot be completely understood 
without exploring the survival and persistence of many informal constraints”.  
These informal constraints come from “socially transmitted information and are part 
of the heritage that we call culture” (North, 1990, p. 37). This understanding is 
particularly important when we discuss corruption as a part of the heritage in 
emerging economies and especially post-communist countries (Sections 3.4 and 4.2). 
Third, organisations that have improved during the presence of the existing 
institutions are obliged to continue working with the current institutions due to the 
supportive incentive structure. In particular, when the formal rules change, 
organisations that benefited from existing informal rules would lose their benefits if 
they adopt the new informal practices that complement changes to formal rules. 
Therefore, these organisations continue to practice out-dated informal rules in order 
to keep their positions of power in the market (Aidis et al., 2012). 
Finally, when there is a clash of institutions between new formal rules and existing 
informal rules, the prevalence of non-compliant behaviours increases and may result 
in the formation of an informal economy (Aidis et al., 2012). 
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Having discussed how the interaction effect between formal and informal institutions 
could lead to inefficient institutional outcomes and thus affect the rates of 
“productive” entrepreneurial activity, North (1990) suggested that a conceptual 
framework based on the interaction between formal and informal institutions may 
increase our understanding of the dynamics of the institutional environment and its 
effects on the economy. In this regard, North (1990, p. 43) argued that:  
“A transaction cost framework equally offers the promise of exploring 
informal constraints. Although the informal institutional constraints are not 
directly observable, the contracts that are written, and sometimes the actual 
costs of transacting, provide us with indirect evidence of changes in informal 
constraints. The striking decline in interest rates in the Dutch capital markets 
in the seventeenth century and the English capital market in the early 
eighteenth century provide evidence of the increasing security of property 
rights as a consequence of the effective interaction of a variety of both formal 
and informal institutional constraints. For example, the enforcement of 
contracts that evolved from merchant codes of behaviour included ostracism 
of those who violated agreements and the eventual encoding of customary 
practices into the formal law”.  
In that sense, this conceptual framework could be useful to empirically examine what 
forms of informal institutions (i.e., constraints) are most likely to produce 
cooperative behaviour to increase or decrease the rates of entrepreneurial activity in 
emerging economies. 
Building on North’s (1990) suggestion, Williamson (2000) designed a conceptual 
model and categorised institutions into a four-level hierarchy in which each level 
places constraints on those below. In this model, Williamson (2000) located informal 
institutions, such as religious norms, traditions, and customs, at the top of the 
hierarchy under the category of “social embeddedness” because these are “the 
deepest rooted and the slowest changing” Williamson (2000, p. 597). The second 
level down is concerned with formal institutions and is described as the “formal rules 
of the game” such as regulations and property rights. The third level of institutions is 
related to governance that “shapes the way that individuals interact, aligning the 
governance structure they adopt with the types of transactions” (Estrin et al., 2013, p. 
566). Finally, the three previous levels of institutions all affect the fourth level, 
which is about resource allocation, including occupational choices such as 
entrepreneurship (Estrin et al., 2013, p. 566). 
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Together these studies provide valuable insights into the institutional dynamics and 
their effect on entrepreneurship. The next section of this study will discuss the most 
common institutional framework models for entrepreneurship. 
2.5.4 Institutional framework models for entrepreneurship 
As discussed earlier, the changes in the entrepreneurial process can lead to different 
outcomes based on the incentive structure within a specific country. In particular, 
when institutions are functioning effectively, entrepreneurial activity increases 
towards productive entrepreneurship and ultimately contributes to economic growth 
and development (Baumol, 1990; North, 1990, 2005). Hence, it is essential to 
consider the effects of institutions as the rules of the game (such as quality of 
governance, access to finance and other resources) to show how entrepreneurs 
recognise opportunities in different stages of economic development (Aidis et al., 
2012). 
To date, our understanding of how these framework conditions and supporting 
institutions create a fertile environment for “productive” entrepreneurship remains 
relatively understudied (Aidis et al., 2012; Stenholm et al., 2013). Therefore, this 
study attempts to shed light on an entrepreneurial environment (i.e., institutional 
environment) that is conducive to entrepreneurship by reviewing recent research into 
the institutional factors that encourage entrepreneurial activity. In broad terms, the 
entrepreneurial environment refers to the “combination of factors that play a role in 
the development of entrepreneurship” (Gnyawali and Fogel, 1994, p. 44). 
In line with the previous literature, some attempts have been proposed to 
operationalise the institutional dimensions in the field of entrepreneurship for a 
particular country. In this regard, Busenitz et al. (2000) developed a three-
dimensional measure of the institutional environment by adopting Scott’s (1995) 
categorisation of institutions that could influence entrepreneurial activity in a specific 
country. In their institutional framework, the regulative dimension is defined as 
“laws, regulations and government policies relating to new business”. Also, the 
cognitive dimension is defined as “Knowledge and skills for establishing and 
operating a new business”, and a normative dimension is defined as the “degree of 
admiration of entrepreneurial activity, value creative and innovative thinking” 
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(Busenitz et al., 2000, p. 995). This approach was used to recognise broader socio-
cultural factors influencing entrepreneurship (Bruton et al., 2010). Moreover, 
Manolova et al. (2008) empirically validated Busenitz et al.’s (2000) instrument to 
measure a country’s institutional environment in the context of three emerging 
economies in Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Hungary and Latvia). Finally, several studies 
used Busenitz et al.’s (2000) approach to examine the influence of institutional 
dimensions on entrepreneurial activity in different countries (Stenholm et al., 2013; 
Urbano and Alvarez, 2014). However, Busenitz et al.’s (2000) approach did not 
adequately acknowledge the political/economic environment factors, such as 
economic growth, financial and non-financial assistance, in which they may offer 
different research findings (Bruton et al., 2010).  
In this regard, Gnyawali and Fogel (1994) suggested a conceptual framework that 
includes five dimensions of the entrepreneurial environment: government policies 
and procedures, social and economic factors, entrepreneurial and business skills, 
financial assistance to businesses, and non-financial support (see Table 2.5). 
According to Gnyawali and Fogel (1994), governmental policies and procedures 
include “governmental actions that can influence market mechanisms”. These 
policies and procedures can support the market work more efficiently by removing 
rigid administrative regulations and market imperfections. Social conditions can be 
defined as “social attitudes that are conducive to entrepreneurial activity, such as the 
presence of experienced entrepreneurs and successful role models”. Economic 
conditions are concerned with “the proportion of small businesses in a country and 
their dynamism, economic growth, and economic activity diversity”. Entrepreneurial 
and business skills are “the skills an individual needs to start a new company”. These 
skills can be learned through “training and education and may focus on skill 
improvement for business plan development or business management in general”. 
Entrepreneurs also need both financial assistance, such as “funding to launch their 
businesses and diversify the risk for start-up, growth, and expansion”, and non-
financial assistance, such as “support for market research, preparing business plans, 





Table 2.5: A framework for entrepreneurial environments 
Government Policies and Procedures 
Restrictions on imports and exports 
Provision of bankruptcy laws 
Entry barriers 
Procedural requirements for registration and 
licensing 
Number of institutions for entrepreneurs to report 
to 
Rules and regulations governing entrepreneurial 
activities 
Laws to protect proprietary rights 
Financial Assistance 
Venture capital 
Alternative sources of financing 
Low-cost loans 
Willingness of financial institutions to finance 
small entrepreneurs 
Credit guarantee programme for start-up 
enterprises 
Competition among financial institutions 
Socioeconomic conditions 
Public attitude towards entrepreneurship 
Presence of experienced entrepreneurs 
Successful role models 
Existence of persons with entrepreneurial 
characteristics 
Recognition of exemplary entrepreneurial 
performance 
Proportion of small firms in the population of 
firms 
Diversity of economic activities 
Extent of economic growth 
Non-financial Assistance 
Counselling and support services 
Entrepreneurial networks 
Incubator facilities 
Government procurement programmes for small 
businesses 
Government support for research and 
development 
Tax incentives and exemptions 
Local and international information networks 
Modem transport and communication facilities 
Entrepreneurial and Business Skills 
Technical and vocational education 
Business education 
Entrepreneurial training programmes 
Technical and vocational training programmes 
Availability of information 
 
Source: Gnyawali and Fogel (1994) 
In accordance with the previous dimensions, and in light of North’s (1990 and 2005) 
propositions, government policies and procedures, entrepreneurial and business 
skills, and financial and non-financial assistance to businesses are related to formal 
institutions, while social conditions are concerned with informal institutions (Álvarez 
and Urbano, 2011; Álvarez et al., 2014). In contrast to Busenitz et al. (2000) study, 
this institutional framework is clearly distinguishing between formal and informal 
institutions. Also, a more extensive range of political, economic and social 
perspectives had been acknowledged and explored to offer more in-depth analysis of 
an institutional framework (Bruton et al., 2010). Recent empirical studies used 
Gnyawali and Fogel’s (1994) framework to examine the influence of institutional 
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dimensions on entrepreneurial activity (Álvarez and Urbano, 2011; Fuentelsaz et al., 
2015; Aparicio et al., 2016). 
2.5.5 Emerging research gaps between institutions and entrepreneurship  
While previous studies have highlighted the relevance of entrepreneurship to 
economic growth and development, the academic literature about the relationship 
between institutions and entrepreneurship has seen the emergence of several key 
research themes in addressing the discrepancies in the literature. In this respect, 
Urbano et al. (2018) conducted a systematic literature review on the relationship 
between institutions, entrepreneurial activity and its impact on economic growth over 
the last 25 years (1992-2016). Based on their review, the authors suggested that 
entrepreneurship could be the missing link between the relationship between 
institutions and economic growth, and therefore future research should focus on what 
institutional variables are conducive to entrepreneurship, which in turn contributes to 
economic growth and development. Therefore, our investigation mainly relates to the 
theoretical and empirical research gaps that deal with institutional factors and their 
impact on the development of entrepreneurial activity and discuss how these gaps 
could be filled.  
Our literature review (see Appendix 1) reveals that there are several gaps in the 
understanding of the mechanisms that link institutions to entrepreneurship. Although 
institutions have been widely recognised as explaining the differences in 
entrepreneurial activity across countries (e.g., Acs et al., 2014a, b), what remains 
unclear is how different institutions (i.e., formal and informal) play an essential role 
in encouraging entrepreneurial activities at different stages of economic development 
(Bruton et al., 2008; Carlsson et al., 2013; Smallbone et al., 2014; Ahlstrom and 
Ding, 2014).  
The research in the field of entrepreneurship to date has tended to focus on formal 
rather than informal institutions (Carlos Díaz Casero et al., 2013; Castaño-Martínez 
et al., 2015; Fuentelsaz et al., 2015). In contrast, very little attention has been paid to 
the role of informal institutions in the entrepreneurial context (Bruton et al., 2010). 
In this realm, recent studies showed that these factors have more influence on 
entrepreneurship than formal ones (Urbano and Alvarez, 2014; Aparicio et al., 2016). 
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Moreover, much uncertainty still exists about the interactions outcomes between 
formal and informal institutions on the development of entrepreneurial activity 
(Bruton et al., 2008; Carlsson et al., 2013; Smallbone et al., 2014; Ahlstrom and 
Ding, 2014; Chowdhury et al., 2015b). For example, Aparicio et al. (2016) assumed 
in their institutional framework study that both types of formal and informal 
institutions do not interact with each other.  
In this respect, North (1990, p. 53) stated “Looking only at the formal rules 
themselves, therefore, gives us an inadequate and frequently misleading notion about 
the relationship between formal constraints and performance”. Therefore, despite the 
importance of the constant interaction between formal and informal institutions, there 
remains a paucity of evidence on such interaction effects that could be relevant to the 
theoretical discussion (North, 1990; Williamson, 2000; Ghura et al., 2017). In 
particular, there is an urgent need for an analysis of the effect of informal institutions 
that can impact (direct and indirectly) both formal institutions and the rates of 
entrepreneurial activity (Urbano et al., 2018). 
Concerning the empirical challenges, few studies have examined the impact of 
institutional variables on entrepreneurial activity using cross-national data. For 
example, De Clercq et al. (2010) included the institutional dimensions of regulative, 
normative and cognitive as moderating factors on the relationship between 
associational activity and the level of new business activity in the context of 
emerging economies. Similarly, Stenholm et al. (2013) examined these three 
dimensions in a cross-national comparison. Moreover, Bruton et al. (2010) argued 
that research consisting of multiple-country databases is the exception, not the rule 
when employing institutional theory to analyse the variation rates of entrepreneurial 
activity (Urbano and Alvarez, 2014).  
However, this cross-national analysis may not offer a clear picture of the evolution of 
institutional quality through a specific period (North, 1990; Williamson, 2000). 
Therefore, future studies would have been more useful if they had focused on 
longitudinal data for a group of countries (Levie and Autio, 2011; Stenholm et al., 
2013). For example, comparing two groups of countries that are located at different 
stages of development could have led to different insights on the effect of the 
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institutional environment on entrepreneurial activity (Bruton et al., 2010; Acs et al., 
2014a).  
In addition to focusing on longitudinal studies, Bjørnskov and Foss (2016) suggested 
that there are several shortcomings related partly to the theoretical challenges and 
empirical issues. One of these issues is concerned with how to identify and document 
causality. Several studies claimed that there is a bidirectional relationship between 
entrepreneurship and institutions, where entrepreneurship may not just be 
endogenous to institutions, but institutions may also be endogenous to 
entrepreneurship (Belitski et al., 2016; Bjørnskov and Foss, 2016; Urbano et al., 
2018). Also, given the fact that all studies risk suffering from omitted variable bias, 
which requires careful robustness analysis, most studies in the field of 
entrepreneurship have failed to include potentially influential factors and empirical 
alternatives (Bjørnskov and Foss 2016). Furthermore, previous studies have not 
explicitly dealt with the heterogeneity problem as they assume that the impact of 
institutional variables on entrepreneurship is approximately homogeneous across 
developed and developing countries. This critical assumption can be misleading to 
policymakers as it can create substantial measurement errors in cases where the 
actual effects of institutions are heterogeneous (Bjørnskov and Foss 2016). Because 
the conceptual model that consists of the interaction effect of formal and informal 
institutions on the development of entrepreneurial activity may lead to statistically 
biased results, Urbano et al. (2018) suggested, therefore, that it is worth considering 
the impact of the institutional variables (formal and informal) on entrepreneurial 
activity simultaneously. 
In the context of emerging economies, Smallbone et al. (2014) provided an 
introductory study to the special issue of the International Small Business Journal 
(ISBJ) that focused on the role of entrepreneurship and its contribution to economic 
and social development in emerging economies. The authors reviewed 20 papers and 
found that there is a need to explore the effectiveness of government policies in 
supporting entrepreneurial activities. Specifically, future research should focus on 
how policymakers and institutions can improve the well-being of entrepreneurs and 
increase their entrepreneurial outcomes (Smallbone et al., 2014). In addition, Bruton 
et al. (2008) examined the special issue of the Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 
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Journal (ETP) that focused on entrepreneurship in the emerging economies. The 
authors reviewed the accepted ten papers to this special issue and found that future 
research should focus on exploring the impact of different institutions in shaping 
entrepreneurial actions in emerging economies. 
In the same vein, Ahlstrom and Ding (2014) reviewed the special issue of the 
International Small Business Journal (ISBJ) that was entitled “Exploring 
Entrepreneurial Activity and Small Business Issues in the Chinese Economy”. The 
authors found that there is a need to explore the influence of different institutions 
(e.g., formal and informal) from the macro level (policy and regulation) to micro 
level (individual characteristics and attitude) in the success of entrepreneurs and 
entrepreneurship in China. 
The evidence reviewed here seems to suggest a relevant role for the institutional 
dynamics in promoting a higher quality of entrepreneurship. Thus, new insights 
could tackle the fact that the interplay between formal and informal institutions on 
the development of entrepreneurial activity may advance research in 
entrepreneurship and institutional fields. In this sense, there is a need to propose a 
model that permits the analysis of the interaction effect of formal and informal 
institutions on encouraging higher rates of entrepreneurial activity in emerging 
economies that are located at different stages of development. 
2.6 Summary and Conclusions 
As pointed out in this chapter, this thesis argues that the contribution of 
entrepreneurship to economic growth and development will be significantly affected 
by the quality of the institutional environment and the stage of economic 
development. There is growing research on this topic that has discussed the 
significant role of institutions that provide incentives for individuals to become 
entrepreneurs. In the same vein, the findings from reviewing the literature suggested 
that the impact of institutions (formal and informal) varies depending on the level of 
economic development. As a result, emerging economies that are interested in 
increasing economic and overall welfare through increasing entrepreneurial activity 
should consider the country’s level of economic development as well as its 
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institutional environment. In the next chapter, a new conceptual model is developed 
based on the current research gaps discussed in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER THREE: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Introduction 
Recent developments in entrepreneurship research have highlighted the need for 
understanding the variations of entrepreneurial activity through the lens of 
institutional theory (e.g., Acs et al., 2014a, b; Aparicio et al., 2016). However, the 
review of both the theoretical and empirical literature in the previous chapter has 
revealed that the vast majority of studies addressing the development of 
entrepreneurial activity have failed to consider the interaction effect of formal and 
informal institutions in emerging economies that are located at different stages of 
development (Acs et al., 2014a, b; Urbano et al., 2018). 
Therefore, in this chapter, we can present a new institutional framework that permits 
the development of entrepreneurial activity based on the interplay between formal 
and informal institutions. This thesis does not attempt to offer a complete 
institutional environment for entrepreneurship. It is hoped, however, that this study 
could contribute to the previous conceptual models of new business activity by 
developing a conceptual model that can help to explain the variation rates of 
entrepreneurship in emerging economies located at different stages of development.  
The generalised version of the conceptual model is discussed thoroughly in Section 
3.5, and illustrated diagrammatically in Figure 3.1. The developed model in this 
study consists of five institutional factors identified by the theoretical and empirical 
literature: (1) number of procedures, (2) education and training, (3) access to credit, 
and (4) technology absorption are considered as formal institutions, while (5) control 
of corruption is considered as an informal institution. By doing so, this study is able 
to extend the current literature, which only addresses these institutional variables 
separately (Stenholm et al., 2013; Fuentelsaz et al., 2015; Aparicio et al., 2016; 
among others). It does this by designing a model that can help to explain the 
differences of entrepreneurial activity in emerging economies. This study explicitly 
argues that the impact of formal institutions on the development of entrepreneurial 
activity is stronger in the presence of lower levels of corruption, and this impact may 




Figure 3.1: The developed conceptual framework of this study 
Source: Devised by author 
The next section will describe the criteria for developing the conceptual framework 
based on the literature review in Chapter 2. The remainder of this chapter will outline 
each of the institutional variables included in the conceptual model, describing and 
explaining their roles as determinants of increasing the rates of entrepreneurial 
activity in emerging economies. Hypotheses are presented in Section 3.5.  
3.2 Criteria for Developing the Study’s Institutional Framework for 
Entrepreneurship 
The criteria for developing the study’s institutional framework for entrepreneurship 
were as follows: first, to organise our discussion of the institutional factors included 
in our model, we rely on the model of Gnyawali and Fogel (1994). Gnyawali and 
Fogel (1994) suggested an entrepreneurial framework inclusive of five dimensions of 
the entrepreneurial environment: (1) government policies and procedures, (2) social 
and economic factors, (3) entrepreneurial and business skills, and (4) financial and 
(5) non-financial assistance to businesses. In this regard, recent empirical studies 
found Gnyawali and Fogel’s (1994) framework conducive in examining the impact 
61 
 
of institutional dimensions on entrepreneurial activity (Álvarez and Urbano, 2011; 
Fuentelsaz et al., 2015; Aparicio et al., 2016).  
Therefore, in the government policies and procedures dimension, this study focused 
specifically on whether and how government procedures affect new business start-
ups. Next, the entrepreneurial and business skills dimension is proxied by society’s 
education and training. As regards financial assistance, access to credit in an 
economy is discussed in this part. In addition, non-financial assistance is identified 
through the technology absorption by firms. Finally, social conditions are explained 
through the level of corruption in a specific country. The choice in selecting these 
institutional variables was informed by considerable evidence that these institutions 
are significant in shaping “productive” entrepreneurial activity (Álvarez and Urbano, 
2011; Stenholm et al., 2013; Aparicio et al., 2016). Moreover, in accordance with the 
model, economic development related to GDP growth, as well as GDP per capita 
(purchasing power parity) of a specific country, are included as control variables in 
this study (Álvarez and Urbano, 2011; Levie and Autio, 2011; Álvarez et al., 2014; 
Chowdhury et al., 2015b).  
Second, the interaction between formal and informal institutions was presented in the 
framework (North, 1990; Williamson, 2000). Williamson (2000) suggested a 
hierarchy of institutional frameworks to differentiate the level of formal and informal 
institutions. Thus, our conceptual framework extends North’s (1990, 2005) 
propositions on institutional dynamics, as well as Williamson’s (2000) concept of the 
hierarchy of institutions. Recent studies used the ideas of North (1990, 2005) and 
Williamson (2000) to offer a better understanding of the institutional dynamics and 
their effect on increasing entrepreneurship rates (Aidis et al., 2012; Estrin et al., 
2013). 
As a result, government procedures, education and training, access to credit and 
technology absorption are considered as formal institutions, whereas corruption is 
considered as an informal institution in this study. Moreover, considering that 
corruption is located in the highest level of the hierarchy of institutions, the study’s 
conceptual framework is designed to analyse the moderating effects of corruption on 
the relationship between formal institutions and entrepreneurial activity in emerging 
economies located at different stages of economic development. 
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Finally, this framework attempted to develop hypotheses worth pursuing to be tested 
empirically using panel (longitudinal) data analysis, as suggested by the literature 
(Bruton et al., 2008; Levie and Autio, 2011). 
3.3 Informal Institutions: Culture and Social Conditions for Entrepreneurship 
Concerning entrepreneurship, social conditions or culture can broadly be defined as 
how positively a given country’s residents encourage entrepreneurship and value 
innovation (Gnyawali and Fogel, 1994; Busenitz et al., 2000; Acs et al., 2014a). It 
encompasses the general status and attitude of society towards entrepreneurial 
behaviour (e.g., close social networks from family, relatives, or spouses), and 
appreciates successful role models to spur individuals to start a new business 
(Gnyawali and Fogel, 1994; Hayton and Cacciotti, 2013; Stenholm et al., 2013; 
Álvarez et al., 2014; Urbano and Álvarez, 2014). It is critical, therefore, to 
understand the influence of the institutional environment that could encourage (or 
not) the conditions in which a particular culture effectively stimulates the individuals 
towards entrepreneurship (Fernández-Serrano and Romero, 2014). 
In this respect, the link between entrepreneurship and different cultural 
characteristics has recently received considerable attention in the literature, such as 
social networks (De Clercq et al., 2010a; Estrin et al., 2013; Stenholm et al., 2013), 
cultural values (Hayton and Cacciotti, 2013; Liñán and Fernandez-Serrano, 2014; 
Fernández-Serrano and Romero, 2014; Sambharya and Musteen, 2014; Brancu et al., 
2015), role models (Álvarez and Urbano, 2011), media attention (Stenholm et al., 
2013), and social recognition (Stenholm et al., 2013; Urbano and Álvarez, 2014; 
Castaño-Martínez et al., 2015; Castaño et al., 2015).  
For example, in the national cultural dimension literature (e.g., individualism and 
power distance), findings provided evidence that culture plays a significant role for 
entrepreneurship. However, results showed that culture is a complex phenomenon 
that cannot be explained by focusing only on cultural values without interaction with 
other variables, such as other institutions and government policies. Moreover, culture 
should be considered in different contexts (e.g., emerging economies): previous 
studies used larger samples that led to uncertain findings (Busenitz et al., 2000; 
Hayton and Cacciotti, 2013; Liñán and Fernandez-Serrano, 2014).  
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Moreover, using the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor dataset, some cross-sectional 
studies of the normative dimension effect on entrepreneurship were inconsistent. 
Stenholm et al. (2013) contended that normative institutional arrangements 
(measured as high status and media attention) do not have a significant impact on 
opportunity entrepreneurship. However, other studies concluded that social 
recognition of entrepreneurial achievements is associated with the rate of 
entrepreneurial activity in a specific country (Urbano and Álvarez, 2014; Castaño-
Martínez et al., 2015). These findings may be somewhat limited by focussing on 
different samples from developed nations where institutional changes are relatively 
stable over time. It can thus be suggested that future studies should focus on 
developing nations by considering longitudinal changes of institutional dimensions 
over time (Stenholm et al., 2013). 
Building on previous suggestions, Fuentelsaz et al. (2018) examined the moderating 
role of informal institutions (measured by individualism/collectivism, and 
uncertainty avoidance) on the relationship between formal institutions (proxied 
through the six governance dimensions developed by Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI): Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption) and 
opportunity entrepreneurship. This study used an unbalanced panel dataset of 84 
countries including developed and developing countries over the years 2002-2015. 
The authors found some evidence that formal institutions have more influence on 
opportunity entrepreneurship in countries that are characterised by individualism and 
uncertainty avoidance (Fuentelsaz et al., 2018).  
The preceding discussion showed some evidence that broad cultural aspects are 
associated with the development of entrepreneurial activity. However, these 
relationships were inconsistent over time. Bruton et al. (2010) therefore suggested 
future research should consider the interaction effect of culture with other institutions 
to clear up the confusion.  
3.4 Informal Institution: Corruption and Entrepreneurship 
Based on the previous discussion, the extent to which specific cultural variables can 
be linked to entrepreneurship in a particular economy is not fully understood 
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(Fernández-Serrano and Romero, 2014). However, the interaction effect of 
corruption with other institutions is significantly underrepresented in the literature, 
albeit being purported to be among the most important negative indicators for 
entrepreneurship (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009; Aidis et al., 2012). 
Traditionally, corruption is defined as the abuse of public office or authority for 
private benefit. Because corruption becomes institutionally embedded, it has 
subscribed to the belief that it can play a significant role in addressing the issue of 
institutional quality (Aidis et al., 2012). In other words, it is considered as an 
informal institution that reflects the multidimensional impact of weak institutions in a 
specific country, such as high taxes, high level of government spending, complex 
regulations and the inefficient rule of law (Tanzi, 1998; Payne et al., 2013). 
When corruption is prevalent, it is turned into a consistent expectation from people, 
and a social norm of behaviour in that more entrepreneurs undermine confidence in 
the formal institutions that are necessary to start a new venture (Levie and Autio, 
2011). Furthermore, corruption responds slowly to formal institutional reforms and 
becomes difficult to change; it may therefore discourage individuals to take 
advantage of the entrepreneurial opportunities and start their own business as they 
suffer from additional costs and time to complete business activities (Anokhin and 
Schulze, 2009; Aidis et al., 2012). Therefore, control of corruption is necessary to 
reduce uncertainty from human interaction and motivate higher levels of 
entrepreneurial activity (Chowdhury et al., 2015a, b; Aparicio et al., 2016). 
This previous understanding of corruption was brought by North (1990), who argued 
that informal institutions (e.g., corruption) are considered as culturally embedded 
behaviour that may take a more extended period to change than formal institutions 
(e.g., regulations). Also, Williamson (2000) argued that informal institutions, such as 
corruption, are in the highest level of the institutional hierarchy and can constrain 
other institutional categories, such as property rights and regulatory institutions.  
However, North’s (1990) and Williamson’s (2000) theories were challenged by 
Djankov et al. (2002) who found that corruption levels and the complexity of entry 
regulations are positively correlated. This could suggest that inefficient institutions, 
such as strict business regulations set by the government, may create the conditions 
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in which corrupt practices increase, especially when officials are endowed with 
discretionary power. Therefore, corruption may be perceived as a result of 
inefficient, over-regulated environment. In contrast, Aidis et al. (2012) contended 
that the complexity of regulatory barriers could be determined by corruption when 
politicians are corrupt and rent seekers. Aidis’ et al.’s (2012) argument was 
supported by Shleifer and Vishny (1993, p. 616) who stated that corruption:  
“can also cause leaders of a country to maintain monopolies, to prevent entry, 
and to discourage innovation by outsiders if expanding the ranks of the elite 
can expose existing corruption practices”. 
3.4.1 Corruption effects on entrepreneurship and economic growth  
There are two different views when it comes to ascribing the role of corruption in 
entrepreneurial activity and economic growth (Dutta and Sobel, 2016). On the one 
hand, according to the ‘grease the wheel’ theory, it is suggested that corruption helps 
entrepreneurship by shortening the start-up process for aspiring entrepreneurs (Aidt, 
2009; Dreher and Gassebner, 2013; Krasniqi and Desai, 2016). On the other hand, a 
more substantial body of research posited that corruption has a negative overall 
impact on economic development in the long run, due to continuous rent-seeking 
from entrepreneurs by corrupt officials (Aidt, 2009; Anokhin and Schulze, 2009; 
Aidis et al., 2012; Avnimelech et al., 2014; Aparicio et al., 2016; Dutta and Sobel, 
2016). 
In this regard, corruption hurts entrepreneurship in many ways. First, it may divert 
entrepreneurial energy away from productive activities, such as the development of 
innovations, and towards destructive (e.g., drugs) or unproductive (rent-seeking) 
forms of entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1990; Baumol et al., 2007). For instance, El 
Harbi and Anderson (2010) found that corruption may encourage self-employment 
(i.e., necessity entrepreneurship) but discourages innovation as opportunity 
entrepreneurs will be unwilling to operate in a corrupt and weak rule of law 
environment because they are worried about the protection of their innovation. As a 
result, expectations of such behaviour may create a negative societal attitude towards 
entrepreneurship, as the “opportunity cost” of losing the productive services of these 
potential entrepreneurs is perhaps the highest cost coming from corruption (Baumol 
et al., 2007; Aidis et al., 2012). 
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Second, while corruption is often associated with a high degree of uncertainty, the 
cost of doing business is higher. Therefore, it may discourage local and foreign 
investment from funding new start-ups that are usually associated with expensive, 
uncertain and risky innovations (Baumol et al., 2007; El Harbi and Anderson, 2010). 
Nofsinger and Wang (2011) contended that countries with a better legal environment 
to protect investors, including high levels of corruption protection, property rights, 
and contract enforcement, help initial start-ups to increase the access of different 
external financing sources. Similarly, Payne et al. (2013) argued that Initial Public 
Offering (IPO) investors tend to actively seek out more information about an 
organisation’s ethical issues and perceived value when these firms come from more 
highly corrupt countries (i.e., emerging economies). Hence, Payne et al. (2013) 
found that the performance of foreign IPOs for entrepreneurial firms is dependent on 
the level of perceived corruption for each IPO firm’s home country.  
Lastly, a corrupt environment may prevent businesses from growing, as 
entrepreneurs tend to avoid corruption obstacles, such as the number of bribes paid, 
the percentage of senior management’s time spent with regulators, and corruption of 
tax administration and bank officials (Beck et al., 2005; Aidis et al., 2012). 
Similarly, Estrin et al. (2013) argued that when high growth entrepreneurs expand 
their businesses, they reach a point after which the new venture will begin to attract 
unwelcome attention from corrupt officials, leading to a decrease in their returns. 
In general:  
“corruption is considered like a heavy tax that bleeds resources away from 
productive entrepreneurs. Resources “invested” in bribing politicians and 
bureaucrats cannot be invested in machinery and equipment, thus reducing 
productivity”.  
Moreover:  
“Corrupt government officials will also harass entrepreneurs, creating 
excessive rules and regulations that force entrepreneurs to pay them to stop 




3.4.2 Empirical findings between corruption and entrepreneurship 
Existing research recognised the critical role played by the corrupt environment on 
entrepreneurship. For example, Djankov et al. (2005) found that the perception of 
low corruption, combined with a favourable attitude of the population and 
government towards entrepreneurship, increases the probability of people in Russia 
starting and growing their businesses.  
Another study by Beck et al. (2005) found that smallest firms’ growth is consistently 
the most adversely affected by higher levels of corruption in a poor financial and 
legal infrastructure compared to countries with less corruption. Also, Aidis et al. 
(2012, p. 119) analysed the impact of government size, freedom from corruption, and 
“market freedom”, which is defined as “a cluster of variables related to the protection 
of property rights and regulation”, on the decision to become an entrepreneur. The 
authors found that entrepreneurial entry is higher when the corruption level is lower, 
especially when the high-income countries were removed from the sample. 
There is a growing body of literature that recognises the adverse effect of corruption 
on “productive” entrepreneurship and innovation. Avnimelech et al. (2014) explored 
the link between corruption and productive entrepreneurship by using data from 176 
countries collected from a professional website (LinkedIn members with high-level 
managerial and entrepreneurial positions). The findings showed that countries with 
higher levels of corruption have a lower level of productive entrepreneurship.  
Moreover, Anokhin and Schulze (2009) used data from 64 countries to investigate 
the link between corruption, innovation and entrepreneurship. The authors found that 
better control of corruption contributes to an increase in innovation (measured by the 
number of patent applications and rate of realised innovation) and entrepreneurship 
(measured by TEA from GEM). Similarly, El Harbi and Anderson (2010) found that 
when entrepreneurs and experts perceive that the business environment becomes 
cleaner through a decrease in corruption, the corruption-free environment is 
positively associated with innovation (i.e., opportunity entrepreneurship), and 
negatively related to self-employment (i.e., necessity entrepreneurship).  
Contrary to previous empirical studies, Dreher and Gassebner (2013) found that 
corruption facilitated firm entry in 43 highly regulated economies over the period 
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2003-2005. For instance, corruption may mitigate the negative impact of regulations 
that mean it takes around 50 days to start a new business. Thus, the results provided 
evidence that corruption can indeed be viewed as being beneficial rather than 
harmful to entrepreneurship (Dreher and Gassebner, 2013). Moreover, Krasniqi and 
Desai (2016) found that informal institutions, such as corruption, can grease the 
wheels for businesses in transition economies, where it is used by entrepreneurs to 
facilitate growth-oriented transactions. Similarly, Aidis et al. (2012) found that 
country-level fixed-effects regression models did not confirm the impact of control of 
corruption on entrepreneurial entry.  
A more recent study by Chowdhury et al. (2015a) suggested that corruption could 
play a dual role, serving as both grease and sand for nascent international 
entrepreneurship (i.e., entrepreneurial activity across national borders) in 44 
countries derived from GEM data. In particular, the study findings suggested that:  
“…corruption plays a greasing role when indirect taxes are high, but 
corruption plays a sanding role when are document requirement for export, 
cost of export and corporate tax are high” (Chowdhury et al., 2015a, p. 976). 
In summary, the findings from reviewing the empirical studies were inconclusive 
regarding the impact of corruption on the development of entrepreneurial activity. 
Therefore, there is a need to examine corruption in different mechanisms, such as a 
moderator with other formal institutions, in order to clear up this misunderstanding 
(Bruton et al., 2010). Also, this relationship could be different when we consider the 
level of economic development in a specific economy (Smallbone et al., 2014). The 
latter assumption is discussed in the following section. 
3.4.3 Corruption, entrepreneurship and a country’s level of economic 
development 
The preceding discussion showed that a country’s level of economic development 
should be taken into consideration when focusing on the relationship between 
corruption and entrepreneurship (Smallbone et al., 2014). Countries with higher 
levels of corruption and political instability are at lower stages of economic 
development, and consequently have higher rates of unproductive entrepreneurship 
(e.g., necessity entrepreneurship). In contrast, countries that move forward in 
economic development are characterised by higher levels of political stability and 
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freedom from corruption, and in turn have higher rates of productive 
entrepreneurship (Álvarez and Urbano, 2011; Bruton et al., 2013).  
Naudé (2011) further argued that in less developed countries with a high prevalence 
of corruption, complex business regulations could be a source of rent to corrupt 
officials. In this case, these barriers may not screen out unproductive or destructive 
entrepreneurs, and it will be challenging to make reforms or remove these barriers. In 
contrast, the effect of entry regulation improvements was seen mainly in developed 
countries or countries where there is less corruption (Klapper et al., 2006). 
Therefore, the effectiveness of business regulations is contingent on the ability of 
government to control corruption to achieve higher rates of productive 
entrepreneurship (Naudé, 2008).  
On the one hand, a corrupt environment may distort entrepreneurial opportunities 
and appropriate returns by acting as a barrier that hinders the entry or growth of 
businesses; at the same time, it becomes a fertile environment for entrepreneurs to 
engage in self-employment (necessity entrepreneurship) or corrupt practices. On the 
other hand, countries with a more corrupt free environment often support 
entrepreneurs with a variety of possible, merit-based business opportunities and 
international growth potential (El Harbi and Anderson, 2010; Aidis et al., 2012; 
Estrin et al. 2013; Chowdhury et al., 2015b).  
This argument was supported by Klapper et al. (2010, p. 132) who stated that:  
“…because of burdensome regulations, high marginal tax rates, the absence 
of monitoring and compliance (of both registration and tax regulations), and 
other weaknesses in the business environment, many firms might find it 
optimal to evade regulations and operate in the informal sector”.  
However: 
“Firms that choose to stay small and informal might be unable to realise their 
full growth potential”  




These advantages may include:  
“police and judicial protection (and less vulnerability to corruption and the 
demand for bribes), access to formal credit institutions, the ability to use 
formal labour contracts, and greater access to foreign markets”. 
3.5 Corruption as a Moderator between Formal Institutions and 
Entrepreneurship (Hypotheses) 
Based on the previous discussions in this chapter, the current literature is discrepant 
when it comes to ascribing the role of corruption in entrepreneurial activity 
(Chowdhury et al., 2015a; Dutta and Sobel, 2016). Therefore, in light of the current 
discrepancy, the hypotheses formed in this section aim to expand the understanding 
of the indirect effect of corruption as a moderator between formal institutions and 
entrepreneurial activity (Pathak et al., 2015). Consistent with assertions of the 
signalling theory (Spence, 1973), formal institutions (e.g., business regulations) are 
likely to have a better effect on entrepreneurial activity in a corruption-free 
environment (Levie and Autio, 2011). In other words, if corruption is low, formal 
institutions are likely to have a better impact on entrepreneurial activity. However, if 
corruption is high, entrepreneurs may undermine confidence in the reform of formal 
institutions and, therefore, it will affect their decisions to start and grow their 
ventures (Levie and Autio, 2011).  
This previous understanding of the interaction between formal and informal 
institutions may lead to different forms of entrepreneurship that do not necessarily 
benefit society in the context of emerging economies. Specifically, corruption and 
weak legal institutions may contribute to unproductive and destructive 
entrepreneurial activities that eliminate productive entrepreneurship (Bruton et al., 
2013).  
The relative importance of corruption and the rule of law on entrepreneurship have 
been subject to considerable discussion. While Tonoyan et al. (2010) assumed that 
corruption has a direct effect on entrepreneurship, Levie and Autio (2011) argued 
that corruption is considered as one of several relevant consequences of a weak rule 
of law in which the credibility of government signal (i.e., regulations reforms) on 
entrepreneurship is contingent on the strength of the legal system of policing, trial 
and punishment. Therefore, the authors employed the rule of law rather than 
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corruption as a predictor of regulations and strategic (i.e., productive) 
entrepreneurship. Levie and Autio’s (2011) findings suggested that lighter business 
regulations have more influence on productive entrepreneurship while a strong rule 
of law moderates this relationship. 
Although corruption is highly correlated with the rule of law that differentiates 
developed from emerging economies (Payne et al., 2013), legal (i.e., formal) 
institutions that enforce the rule of law may not offer a better understanding of the 
interaction between formal and informal institutions (North, 1990). In particular, De 
Clercq et al. (2010a) suggested that Western conceptualisations about the “need” for 
a strong rule of law may not be useful in emerging economies; this is because it 
underestimates the power of local cultures and traditions that could be more effective 
in maintaining close business relationships. Moreover, corruption is considered as an 
interdisciplinary and complex phenomenon that includes political, economic and 
socio-cultural backgrounds, and consequences whereby it is not limited to essential 
effects of a weak rule of law (Judge et al., 2011). Corruption is therefore categorised 
in the highest level of the institutional hierarchy, may take a more extended period to 
change, and could hinder other formal institutional reforms (North, 1990; 
Williamson, 2000).  
As a result, corruption is probably the most important (negative) indicator of an 
informal institution that is likely to influence entrepreneurial activity through the 
interaction with other formal institutions; this is because it “undermines the 
foundations of institutional trust that are needed for the development of trade and 
entrepreneurial and innovative activity” (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009, p. 1). This 
argument is supported by Griffiths et al. (2009, p. 627), who stated that “few studies 
have investigated how macro-environmental variables augment the individual-level 
perceptions of culture on influencing individual intentionality”. Moreover, Pathak et 
al. (2015) contended that there is a need to test corruption as a moderator as most 
previous studies treated corruption merely as a control variable.  
In the following sections, therefore, this study proposes that corruption may have a 
moderating effect on the relationship between formal institutions (i.e., number of 
business procedures, education and training, access to credit, and firm-level 
technology absorption) and entrepreneurial activity in the context of emerging 
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economies located at different stages of economic development (Payne et al., 2013). 
A number of hypotheses are developed in the following sections.  
3.5.1 Corruption as a moderator of the number of procedures effects 
Governmental policies and procedures consist of legislative proceedings that can 
affect market mechanisms. These policies and procedures can encourage the market 
to function more efficiently throughout the life of the business by minimising market 
barriers and the rigid application of strict regulations (Gnyawali and Fogel, 1994; 
Álvarez et al., 2014).  
The literature on governmental policies and procedures has highlighted several 
aspects related to entrepreneurial activity, such as business regulations (e.g., Stephen 
et al., 2009; Aidis et al., 2012), labour regulations (e.g., McMullen et al., 2008; 
Levie and Autio, 2011), government spending (e.g., Aidis et al., 2012; Estrin et al., 
2013), fiscal freedom (e.g., McMullen et al., 2008; Estrin et al., 2013), property 
rights (e.g., Estrin et al., 2013; Stenholm et al., 2013), and openness to trade (e.g., 
Castaño et al. 2015; Chowdhury et al., 2015b). In the following paragraphs, this 
framework considers the effects of the number of business regulations and 
procedures on entrepreneurship.  
In their theoretical framework, Gnyawali and Fogel (1994) suggested that 
governmental regulations, such as the number of procedures, costs and taxes, among 
other factors, that are associated with starting a business have a negative connotation 
for potential entrepreneurs. For example, entrepreneurs in Australia spend two days 
to start-up a new venture while in Brazil it may take up to 152 days to establish an 
enterprise due to stringent regulations and the extended length of time needed to 
acquire necessary permits and licenses (Klapper et al., 2006). Hence, these extensive 
business procedures may distract entrepreneurs from investing their resources in 
“productive” activities (Baumol, 1990; Chowdhury et al., 2015b).  
Theories have long debated the impact of business regulations on the creation and 
diffusion of entrepreneurial activity. The public interest theory argued that 
entrepreneurs who function in unregulated markets tend to have more failures 
ranging from monopoly power to externalities (e.g., pollution). Therefore, it is the 
government’s role to reduce market failures by screening the new entrants in order to 
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offer consumers high-quality products or services from “desirable” firms. As a 
corollary, public interest theory suggested that stricter entry regulation is associated 
with higher consumer welfare (Djankov et al., 2002). 
In contrast, the public choice theory argued that government regulations are used as a 
tool to create rents for bureaucrats or existing firms. This theory comes in two 
strands. The regulatory capture theory suggests that existing firms may acquire 
stricter regulations of entry to keep new competitors out of the market. As a result, 
incumbent firms may increase their market power and profits, which may lead to a 
decrease in competition and be of benefit to consumers (Stigler, 1971; Djankov et 
al., 2002).  
While the capture theory emphasised the benefits to industry, the toll booth theory 
pursued the benefit to politicians and bureaucrats. Djankov et al. (2002) draw an 
analogy to toll booths on a highway where toll collectors may block alternative 
routes to force traffic onto the toll road. Similarly, the regulators may offer stringent 
regulations to collect bribes from potential entrepreneurs and serve no social 
purpose. As a result, inefficient regulations by politicians may be associated with 
higher levels of corruption and a higher relative size of the informal economy 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Djankov et al., 2002). 
Based on the signalling theory (Spence, 1973), Levie and Autio (2011) contended 
that if regulation of administrative requirements and entry demands are complicated, 
the signal sent by the government to potential entrepreneurs is that starting new 
enterprises is exposed to penalties. Such signals could be more important for 
strategic (i.e., productive) entrepreneurs among other types, such as necessity 
entrepreneurs and the self-employed (Fuentelsaz et al., 2015). In particular, necessity 
entrepreneurs are more concerned with entry barrier survival, either by fulfilling 
them or avoiding compliance with them, while productive entrepreneurs are more 
concerned with trade-offs and high opportunity costs that are linked to business 
growth (Cassar, 2006). Therefore, the signal sent by strict entry regulations is 
significant to productive entrepreneurs as they have more incentives to comply with 
formal regulations to benefit from the limited liability that non-registered businesses 
lack. However, strict entry regulations are less critical for necessity entrepreneurs as 
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they do not need to formally register in many countries and, therefore, they can pass 
the rigid administrative regulations (Levie and Autio, 2011).  
Several empirical studies have examined the relationship between government 
regulations and entrepreneurial activity (Djankov et al., 2002; van Stel et al., 2007; 
Aparicio et al., 2016). Van Stel et al. (2007) found that time and cost to register did 
not affect general entry. In contrast, Djankov et al. (2002) found that countries with 
strict entry regulations have more corruption and larger informal economies in which 
many businesses prefer to function; by doing this, they do not have to register and 
avoid costly regulations. Also, by analysing a six-year panel data of 54 countries, 
Levie and Autio (2011) found that the lighter burden of regulation is associated with 
a higher rate and relative prevalence of entrepreneurial activity. To this end, a variety 
of empirical research has established that simpler procedures and regulations to start 
a business increase the creation of new firms, especially those based on opportunity 
(Urbano and Álvarez, 2014; Castaño-Martínez et al., 2015; Chowdhury et al., 2015b; 
Fuentelsaz et al., 2015; Aparicio et al., 2016).  
In line with the above-mentioned empirical evidence, the Doing Business project at 
the World Bank advocates for regulation reduction, suggesting that simpler 
procedures further stimulate entrepreneurs to start new ventures. For example, 
“simplifying the formalities of registration was the most popular reform during the 
years 2007 and 2008, implemented in 49 countries” (Álvarez and Urbano, 2011, p. 
35). 
The above observations about the impact of procedures on entrepreneurship are 
particularly crucial in the context of emerging economies, since aspiring 
entrepreneurs in such economies must tackle issues such as volatile or ineffective 
regulations (Aidis et al., 2008). This argument is further applicable in the context of 
post-communist countries that are characterised by higher levels of corruption 
(Smallbone and Welter, 2001; Tonoyan et al., 2010). 
In this realm, Klapper and Love (2010) found that government policy reforms in 
regards to reducing the number of procedures are more effective in countries with a 
better business environment. Conversely, the authors contended that improvements 
in procedures need much work in countries with a less favourable business 
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environment. In accordance with Klapper and Love’s (2010) findings, lower levels of 
corruption are one factor that could be beneficial to society regarding the promotion 
of greater trust in government reform policies and, as such, encourage aspiring 
entrepreneurs to formally register their ventures (Aparicio et al., 2016).  
However, different studies suggested that the effect of government policy reforms 
varies based on the country’s level of development (Acs and Szerb, 2007; Naudé, 
2008). Emerging economies that have managed to reach the innovation stage have 
relatively more transparent rules and regulations, and their enforcement is less 
uncertain than in less developed economies (Ahlstrom et al., 2008). Because less 
developed emerging economies generally exhibit high levels of corruption, strict 
entry procedures could be a source of rents to corrupt officials (Aidis et al., 2008). 
Therefore, it will be difficult for the government to make reforms for or abolishment 
of these complex procedures; this may, therefore, discourage entrepreneurs from 
entering the market (Naudé, 2008). Consequently, the impact of a lower number of 
procedures may have relatively more favourable effects in more developed emerging 
countries, where sources of rent-seeking and unproductive activities could be 
removed and more aspiring entrepreneurs could start new ventures (Naudé, 2008; 
Aparicio et al., 2016). Accordingly, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H1a: The negative relationship between the number of procedures and 
entrepreneurship within an emerging economy is moderated by the 
country’s level of corruption, such that this negative relationship is 
stronger at lower levels of corruption.  
H1b: The hypothesised moderator effect will be stronger in more 
developed than in less developed emerging economies. 
3.5.2 Corruption as a moderator of education and training effects 
Education and training for entrepreneurship have been widely recognised and studied 
to ameliorate entrepreneurial activity (Gnyawali and Fogel, 1994; Levie and Autio, 
2008; Fuentelsaz et al., 2015). From an economic perspective, Leibenstein (1968, pp. 
82-83) highlighted the importance of education to entrepreneurship, stating that: 
“[…] training can do something to increase the supply of entrepreneurship”. He 
further contended that:  
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“[…] since entrepreneurship requires a combination of capacities, some of 
which may be important gaps in carrying out the input-completing aspect of 
the entrepreneurial role, training can eliminate some of these gaps. For 
example, it may be difficult to train people to spot economic opportunities, 
but it is possible to train them to assess such opportunities once perceived” 
Leibenstein (1968, pp. 82-83). 
In the same vein, Levie and Autio (2008) suggested that entrepreneurship specific 
training and education are likely to encourage the supply of entrepreneurship through 
two primary mechanisms. First, through enhancing the cognitive ability of 
individuals and, therefore, enabling them to better recognise and exploit the 
opportunities in the market. Also, Shane and Venkataraman (2000) contended that an 
individual’s ability to identify opportunities could be determined through the 
possession of the necessary experience, and the cognitive ability to analyse 
information in which it originates from the social interactions in the market. In 
particular, entrepreneurs with a higher level of education are more capable of 
identifying opportunities in the market. This is because they have the ability to 
understand and analyse the information received from social and economic 
interactions, and use this information to create new products and services that add a 
value or fill a gap in the economy (Levie and Autio, 2008). 
The second mechanism to increase entrepreneurial activity is through providing 
entrepreneurs with the necessary skills and competencies required to start up and 
grow a new firm (Levie and Autio, 2008). Historically, Schumpeter (1947, p. 152) 
contended that inventors create new ideas, while entrepreneurs “get things done”. To 
get things done, entrepreneurs need to be sufficiently skilled, not only in their 
specific domain but also in a number of business areas such as management and 
leadership skills; they use these skills to bring and combine the resources necessary 
for starting and growing a successful business. Therefore, entrepreneurs who are 
“jacks of all trades” tend to have more balanced talents that span many different skill 
sets (Lazear, 2005). 
Based on the previous argument, some studies have highlighted the importance of 
focusing on a specific rather than general education; this specific education should 
include entrepreneurial skills used to operate the venture (Bowen and De Clercq, 
2008; Jiménez et al., 2015). Therefore, an educational system that is 
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entrepreneurship focused is more likely to teach entrepreneurs the necessary skills 
for their businesses in the areas of market analysis, product and service development, 
business and financial literacy, and international growth strategies (Bowen and De 
Clercq, 2008; Levie and Autio, 2008; Danis et al., 2011; Jiménez et al., 2015). As a 
result, the positive impact of this broad skill set will increase individuals’ self-
confidence and reduce perceived risk to better seek and exploit entrepreneurial 
opportunities in the market (Levie and Autio, 2008; Jiménez et al., 2015). 
Several empirical studies have proposed a convergence between education and 
training with entrepreneurship (Castaño-Martínez et al., 2015; Chowdhury et al., 
2015b; Fuentelsaz et al., 2015; Aparicio et al., 2016). Individuals with a higher level 
of education and business skills have a greater sense of self-confidence, as well as 
the entrepreneurial skills required to exploit market opportunities and create a new 
venture (Castaño-Martínez et al., 2015; Fuentelsaz et al., 2015; Aparicio et al., 
2016). Therefore, education and training services that focus on entrepreneurial skills 
are particularly important in developing countries to ensure manpower efficiency and 
encourage firms to design growth strategies in their businesses (Gnyawali and Fogel, 
1994; Carlos Díaz Casero et al., 2013; Castaño-Martínez et al., 2015; Fuentelsaz et 
al., 2015). 
In the context of emerging economies, the literature suggested that an educated 
workforce is an essential ingredient for higher rates of entrepreneurship (Baumol et 
al., 2007; Aidis et al., 2008; Valliere and Peterson, 2009). However, educated 
entrepreneurs may not react similarly to opportunities in all contexts, but rather their 
reactions may be conditioned by the institutional environment, especially in the 
context of emerging economies (Baumol et al., 2007; Autio and Acs, 2010; Danis et 
al., 2011; Acs et al., 2014b). For example, Manolova et al. (2008) found that some 
emerging economies, such as Bulgaria, Hungary and Latvia have higher levels of 
education. However, these countries tend to exhibit lower rates of entrepreneurship 
due to the entrepreneur’s lack of confidence and the required skills to start new 
businesses (Manolova et al., 2008). Apart from the fact that this low confidence 
could be explained by political and social transition (Manolova et al., 2008), the 
literature suggested that improving education would be more effective in increasing 
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entrepreneurial activity levels if it is accompanied by lower levels of corruption 
(Álvarez and Urbano, 2011; Aparicio et al., 2016).  
In this realm, Aparicio et al. (2016) contended that control of corruption increases 
trust in the system and, as such, will create a better alliance between government 
policies and the education system. Moreover, Álvarez and Urbano (2011) suggested 
that control of corruption could allow future entrepreneurs to gain a more significant 
share of their generated revenue and, therefore, propel higher levels of 
entrepreneurial activity. Moreover, control of corruption would allow an increase in 
the amount of budget allocated to the education infrastructure and research and 
development (R&D), which are extra variables in the support of entrepreneurial 
activity (Aparicio et al., 2016). Therefore, lower levels of corruption could result in 
more opportunities for new venture creation (Aidis et al., 2008), based on technology 
and with higher added value (Aparicio et al., 2016).  
However, a comparison across emerging economies may lead to different 
conclusions. Entrepreneurs in less developed countries usually acquire their skills 
through workplace trial and error in relatively simple business activities, while in 
more developed countries entrepreneurs acquire their skills through formal education 
and training. Thus, education, especially post-secondary education, plays a vital role 
in teaching and developing entrepreneurial skills (Acs et al., 2014b). 
Therefore, the primary challenge for policymakers in emerging economies is to 
overcome the high levels of corruption to improve the tertiary education effects on 
entrepreneurial activity (Acs et al., 2014a; Castaño et al., 2015; Aparicio et al., 
2016). In particular, emerging economies that are located in lower stages of 
economic development must educate the workforce and increase their production 
efficiency in order to adapt to the following technological development stage (Acs 
and Amoros, 2008; Acs et al., 2008a; Acs and Szerb, 2010). Consequently, education 
and training could play a more critical role for entrepreneurship in emerging 
economies that are located in the innovation-driven stage (Acs et al., 2008a). As a 
result, this study proposes the following hypotheses: 
H2a: The positive relationship between education and training and 
entrepreneurship within an emerging economy is moderated by the 
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country’s level of corruption, such that this positive relationship is 
stronger at lower levels of corruption.  
H2b: The hypothesised moderator effect will be stronger in more 
developed than in less developed emerging economies. 
3.5.3 Corruption as a moderator of access to credit effects 
As mentioned earlier, financial support availability is among the most important 
pillars for entrepreneurs to start and grow their ventures (Gnyawali and Fogel, 1994). 
Van Auken and Neely (1999) underscored that inadequacy in financial structure 
poses a significant obstacle to venture creation; this is because, with no access to 
credit, individuals are unable to materialise their ideas, and as a result, the 
entrepreneurial activity decreases.  
In the beginning, entrepreneurs tend to obtain financial resources from family and 
friends, but soon need additional resources, such as venture capital funds, angel 
investors and corporate investors, to finance the growth of their businesses (Denis, 
2004; Bowen and De Clercq, 2008). Whereas venture capital funds refer to “limited 
partnerships in which the managing partners invest on behalf of the limited partners”, 
angel investors refer to “high net worth individuals that invest their own funds in a 
small set of companies”. In addition, the term corporation investors refer to those 
“corporations [who] invest on behalf of their shareholders, for financial and/or 
strategic reasons” (Denis, 2004, p. 304). 
Although new businesses may depend on personal funds received from informal 
investors, such as family and social networks (Ho and Wong, 2007; Szerb et al., 
2007), financial resources such as venture capital and bank loans are integral for 
aspiring entrepreneurs who seek to expand their businesses, either locally or in 
foreign markets (Bowen and De Clercq, 2008; Korosteleva and Mickiewicz, 2011; 
Stenholm et al., 2013; Fuentelsaz et al., 2015; Aparicio et al., 2016). In this regard, 
Beck et al. (2005) found that entrepreneurs who face financial constraints, such as 
high-interest rates, collateral requirements or lack of money in the banking system, 
or who face the need for special bank connections, are less likely to exhibit venture 
growth rates. Conversely, Beck et al. (2008) found that small firms that obtain 
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formal financing have better performance in comparison with similar firms that 
depend on informal funding.  
This issue of funding distinguishes established firms from start-ups due to the high 
risk associated with entrepreneurs, such as lack of credit history and of credible 
reputation, as well as having less information about the potential value of a new 
innovation (Denis, 2004; Bowen and De Clercq, 2008; Korosteleva and Mickiewicz, 
2011; Fuentelsaz et al., 2015). In addition, financial institutions, such as bankers, 
may hesitate to finance new start-ups as they find it costly to monitor small 
businesses; this is despite improvements in technology (e.g., credit scoring and risk-
rating tools) that can handle entrepreneurial finance better than in the past (Gnyawali 
and Fogel, 1994; de la Torre et al., 2010). 
Therefore, in order to promote entrepreneurship, several studies have shown that 
policies for increasing access to bank credit should focus on decreasing capital 
requirements, creating investment companies, promoting low-interest loans and loan 
guarantee systems for small business financing (Gnyawali and Fogel, 1994; Castaño-
Martínez et al., 2015; Fuentelsaz et al., 2015; Aparicio et al., 2016). In particular, 
access to credit could be a priority for entrepreneurs with higher growth aspirations 
to expand their businesses or seek opportunities in foreign markets (Fuentelsaz et al., 
2015; Aparicio et al., 2016). 
Concerning the relationship with corruption, prior research suggested that higher 
levels of corruption and bribery adversely impact the development of a country’s 
financial infrastructure (La Porta et al., 1999), and this uncertainty caused by 
corruption could generate distrust among entrepreneurs in the financial system, 
preventing its maturity (Aparicio et al., 2016). On the contrary, the prevalence of 
trust has been found to positively influence entrepreneurs to engage in high-growth 
business activities (Bowen and De Clercq, 2008). This suggests a potential 
interaction effect between a country’s level of corruption and financial development 
on the one hand, and the new firm start-ups rates within its borders on the other 
(Bowen and De Clercq, 2008; Chowdhury et al., 2015b). 
In this respect, Johnson et al. (2002) analysed entrepreneurship in post-communist 
countries and found that extra-legal payments (bribes) hinder entrepreneurial activity 
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more than the lack of financing. Therefore, corruption (as well as other deficiencies 
in the governance of a country) may increase transaction costs while limiting the 
income of entrepreneurs (Álvarez and Urbano, 2011). In turn, lower levels of 
corruption may motivate increased entrepreneurial activity by allowing entrepreneurs 
to retain a more significant share of their generated revenue (Álvarez and Urbano, 
2011). Accordingly, this study extends this argument by hypothesising that the 
presence of lower levels of corruption can leverage the financial system towards 
entrepreneurship (Korosteleva and Mickiewicz, 2011; Nofsinger and Wang, 2011; 
Aparicio et al., 2016).  
However, the extent to which the financial system supports entrepreneurial activity 
regarding the provision of resources to start and grow the business varies 
substantially due to the country’s level of economic development (Levie and Autio, 
2008; Korosteleva and Mickiewicz, 2011; Chowdhury et al., 2015b). Emerging 
economies that are located in lower stages of development lack the development of 
the financial institution, and thus, the availability of financial resources is limited 
(Aidis et al., 2008; Acs and Correa, 2014). Therefore, entrepreneurs in these 
countries rely mainly on social networks and family connections as the existing 
financial institutions are less likely to support their start-ups (Leibenstein, 1968; 
Chowdhury et al., 2015b). In this way, access to credit is more difficult in less 
developed than in more developed emerging economies (Chowdhury et al., 2015b).  
Based on the previous discussion, it is more likely that emerging economies that are 
characterised with lower levels of corruption and a more developed financial system 
can provide higher availability of financial resources for entrepreneurs to pursue their 
ambitions towards new ventures. Accordingly, this reasoning leads to the proposition 
of the following hypotheses: 
H3a: The positive relationship between access to credit and 
entrepreneurship within an emerging economy is moderated by the 
country’s level of corruption, such that this positive relationship is 
stronger at lower levels of corruption.  
H3b: The hypothesised moderator effect will be stronger in more 
developed than in less developed emerging economies. 
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3.5.4 Corruption as a moderator of technology absorption effects 
The last formal institution analysed in this study is technology absorption (Gnyawali 
and Fogel, 1994). The diffusion of new technology, as well as the capacity for firms 
to absorb it, is an essential factor for innovation and high growth ventures (Stenholm 
et al., 2013; Acs et al., 2014b). The World Bank (2007) suggested that the dimension 
of technological infrastructure is among the most critical factors for developing 
countries to move towards the knowledge-based economy (i.e., the innovation-driven 
stage). In this regard, the World Bank (2007, p. 24) stated:  
“A modern and adequate information infrastructure will facilitate the 
effective communication, dissemination, and processing of information and 
knowledge. Information and communication technologies (ICTs)—including 
telephone, television, and radio networks—are the essential infrastructure of 
the global, information-based economies of our time, as railways, roads, and 
utilities were in the industrial era. They can considerably reduce transaction 
costs by providing ready access to information. ICT-related policies cover 
telecommunications regulation as well as the investments needed to build and 
exploit ICTs throughout the economy and society through various “e-
applications”—e-government, e-business, e-learning, etc. Low-income 
countries should focus first on the basic ICT infrastructure before promoting 
advanced technologies and applications”. 
Although the literature that links technology innovation to entrepreneurship in 
emerging economies remain sparse, a few studies have highlighted that 
improvements in information and communication technology (ICT) via the Internet 
(e.g., cloud computing, social media, Internet of Things, cell phone applications and 
big data analytics) may motivate individuals in emerging economies to start and 
grow their businesses internationally. This is due to the potential for higher returns in 
terms of better exchange information, fewer expenses and being less time consuming 
(Acs. 2006; Acs et al., 2008a).  
In this respect, Kiss et al. (2012, p. 267) critically evaluated international 
entrepreneurship research in emerging economies by conducting a systematic 
literature review for 88 articles published over the past 20 years. In this study, Kiss et 
al. (2012, p. 267) defined international entrepreneurship as “the discovery, 
enactment, evaluation, and exploitation of opportunities—across national borders—
to create future goods and services”. The authors revealed that entrepreneurs in 
emerging economies face more difficulties accessing technology than advanced 
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economies due to the lack of technological infrastructure. However, entrepreneurs in 
some emerging economies, such as India, have managed to overcome these 
challenges and develop new industries, such as medical tourism and IT services that 
compete effectively with other entrepreneurs in developed economies. These new 
industries have become globally competitive by offering cheap and up-to-date 
technology, as well as a highly skilled labour force to attract customers and 
businesses around the world (Kiss et al., 2012).  
Therefore, questions have been raised about the role of governments in emerging 
economies to alter their public policies towards providing an adequate technological 
infrastructure. They do this by facilitating awareness of importing foreign 
technologies that can lead, in turn, to more entrepreneurial activity and more 
innovation (Acs and Szerb, 2007; Audretsch and Belitski, 2016). In this respect, Acs 
and Szerb (2007, p. 113) stated: “One of the worst economic mistakes any business 
or country can make is to adopt the “not invented here” syndrome: The refusal to 
embrace something developed and used elsewhere”. Indeed, some countries, such as 
the USA, managed to overcome this syndrome when the American manufacturing 
sector imported the technology of “Just In Time” production systems or “quality 
circles” from Japan (Acs and Szerb, 2007). 
However, as suggested by the literature, it is essential to remove barriers that hinder 
the development of technological infrastructure policies in the context of emerging 
economies (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Pathak et al., 2015; Audretsch and 
Belitski, 2016). In particular, these barriers may point to efforts by the political elite 
to block technological and institutional development to protect their benefits under 
the status quo system (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). Thus, corrupt countries tend 
to benefit less from Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) by high tech companies, which 
are uncertain about expanding their businesses in markets that are characterised by 
higher potential costs of corruption (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009). Commenting on 
the link between technology and corruption, Anokhin and Schulze (2009, p. 4) 
argued that:  
“Firms with better technologies, human capital, training programs, and so 
forth are understandably reluctant to enter markets where gains may be more 
than offset by the potential costs of corruption. Corrupt nations are thus less 
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likely to benefit from investment by high-quality companies that employ 
sophisticated technologies”.  
As a result, it is believed that corruption and access to foreign technology interact to 
produce significant outcomes for the rates of entrepreneurial activity in emerging 
economies. In particular, emerging economies that have lower levels of corruption 
may facilitate the transformation of technical knowledge through FDI that ultimately 
fosters innovation and higher rates of entrepreneurial productivity (Audretsch et al., 
2008; Anokhin and Schulze, 2009; Pathak et al., 2015).  
Regarding the stages of economic development, control of corruption is more 
important for the effect of technology absorption on entrepreneurial activity in 
emerging economies that are in the innovation-driven stage. As emerging economies 
move into the innovation-driven stage, there is an increase in knowledge, and thus 
entrepreneurs can initiate new start-ups based on technology (Romer, 1990; Acs, 
2006). Therefore, this study proposes the following hypotheses:  
H4a: The positive relationship between technology absorption and 
entrepreneurship within an emerging economy is moderated by the 
country’s level of corruption, such that this positive relationship is 
stronger at lower levels of corruption.  
H4b: The hypothesised moderator effect will be stronger in more 
developed than in less developed emerging economies. 
3.6 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter developed a conceptual framework to suggest that emerging economies 
can encourage higher levels of entrepreneurial activity through enhancing the 
institutional environment. The review of the literature advanced the existing theory 
in the field of entrepreneurship and institutional theory. In particular, the developed 
model extends Gnyawali and Fogel’s (1994) conceptual framework by making a 
clear distinction between formal and informal institutions (North, 1990). Moreover, 
this study was among the first to suggest the moderating effect of corruption on the 
relationship between formal institutions and entrepreneurial activity (Williamson, 
2000). This interplay between formal and informal institutions may offer different 
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implications to entrepreneurship in emerging economies that are at different stages of 
development. The next chapter goes on to describe the research methodology to test 




CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
4.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the primary aim of this thesis is to examine the interaction 
impact of formal and informal institutions on the development of entrepreneurial 
activity in emerging economies that are located at different stages of development. 
This chapter presents the development of the research methodology for this thesis: it 
provides a discussion of the researcher’s primary philosophical and methodological 
approaches. This study embraces a positivist stance and makes use of a deductive 
approach. Moreover, it embraces panel (longitudinal) analysis to offer a more in-
depth analysis of the empirical data collected.  
The nature of research requires different approaches to data collection. In order to 
accomplish the identified research aims and objectives, this chapter will arrange a 
blueprint and explanation for the methods and approaches selected for this thesis.  
The discussion in this chapter has been separated into 12 sections. The first section 
was the introduction and the second section presents the research context and 
justification. Section 3 outlines the research philosophy and the rationale for using 
the deductive approach in the thesis. Sections 4 and 5 present the study hypotheses 
and provide a detailed description of the research design. Section 6 describes the data 
sources used in the research. Sections 7, 8 and 9 justify the validation of the 
measures used for the independent, dependent and control variables. Sections 10 and 
11 offer a detailed discussion about the justification for choosing a panel data 
approach in this study, particularly the most appropriate models used in panel data 
analysis. The last section concludes with a brief discussion of the chapter. 
4.2 Research Context and Justification 
Emerging economies are fast becoming key players in the new global economy. In 
this regard, Kiss et al. (2012, p. 266) stated that:  
“The largest of these economies (i.e., China, India, Russia, Brazil, Mexico, 
South Korea, Turkey, Indonesia, and Poland) now comprise over a third of 
the world's 25 largest economies and are growing at around three times the 
pace of the advanced ones”.  
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With this in mind, and with the significant role of entrepreneurship in contributing to 
prosperity and economic development in emerging economies, there is a strong need 
to develop a better understanding of the effect of the institutional environment on the 
success of new businesses in emerging economies (Bruton et al., 2008). 
Most studies that link entrepreneurship and institutions have focused on developed 
economies, which are often characterised by a mature and stable institutional 
environment (Estrin et al., 2013; Sambharya and Musteen, 2014; Castaño-Martínez 
et al., 2015). While these studies provided exciting insights into the field, researchers 
have suggested more elaboration and examination of the theory within the context of 
emerging economies (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Ahlstrom et al., 2008; Bruton et al., 
2008; Bruton et al., 2009; Hoskisson et al., 2011).  
Little is known about entrepreneurship dynamics in emerging economies: 
“economies that are increasingly moving to market orientation and seeking to rapidly 
advance economically” (Bruton et al., 2008, p. 1). While emerging economies are 
different from developed economies in that they lack well-developed institutions, 
often resulting in lower entrepreneurial activity (Ahlstrom et al., 2008; Bruton et al., 
2008; Bruton et al., 2009), some emerging economies, such as Estonia, Slovenia, and 
Slovakia, have managed to close this gap and appear in the top 30 of the Global 
Entrepreneurship Index (Acs et al., 2014b).  
Shedding light on the varying degree to which emerging countries have achieved 
entrepreneurial development, it is, therefore, imperative to understand the role of 
institutions (formal and informal) that have resulted in a better performing 
entrepreneurial environment in the countries mentioned above. This is of particular 
importance as while reforming formal institutions (e.g., government regulations and 
education) is integral to overall institutional effectiveness, such improvements do not 
necessarily guarantee increased entrepreneurial activity (Bruton et al., 2013). This 
phenomenon is evident in the case of former communist emerging economies; on the 
surface, they have laws and regulations similar to those seen in developed 
economies, however, as commercial laws that affect entrepreneurship are not 
efficiently implemented, these institutions are not conducive to entrepreneurial 
activity (Feige, 1997; Smallbone and Welter, 2001; Aidis et al., 2008; Tonoyan et 
al., 2010; Smallbone et al., 2014).  
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In general, the countries mentioned earlier share common legacies concerning their 
shared histories of absent or immature institutions and centralised economic control 
(Smallbone and Welter, 2001; De Clercq et al., 2010a; Tonoyan et al., 2010). 
Therefore, differences in the pace and extent of institutional development and 
economic liberalisation can offer a useful context for a comprehensive theoretical 
understanding of the role of institutions (formal and informal) on entrepreneurship, 
and whether an improved institutional environment has helped these countries 
increase their level of entrepreneurial activity (Bruton et al., 2008; Bruton et al., 
2009). Essentially, due to the prevalence of corruption in these countries’ 
institutions, there is a need to test corruption as a moderator in order to have a better 
understanding of institutional dynamics; this is because most previous studies have 
treated corruption merely as a control variable (Bruton et al., 2008; Bruton et al., 
2013; Pathak et al., 2015).  
While previous studies mainly used cross-sectional data to test the impact of 
institutions on entrepreneurship (De Clercq et al., 2010a; Danis et al., 2011; 
Stenholm et al., 2013), this thesis advances our understanding of institutional 
dynamics by using panel (longitudinal) data over the period 2006-2014. Because the 
development of institutions may take an extended period (Hoskisson et al., 2000; 
Williamson, 2000), this type of analysis is necessary for testing the interaction effect 
of informal and formal institutions on the development of entrepreneurial activity in 
emerging economies (Estrin et al., 2013).  
In this regard, Bruton et al. (2009, p. 775) stated that:  
“Typically, institutions are viewed as static, and only changing very slowly 
over time. However, the evidence presented here suggests that, in the fast-
changing environment of emerging economies, new institutions are 
developing and actors in the environment can shape existing institutions. 
These new institutions are evolving to meet the shift to market orientation and 
the increasing economic activity. Future research should expand this 
understanding by pursuing a longitudinal study of institution building and 
change so that the manner in which these activities occur and their change 




In the same vein, Kiss et al. (2012, p.275) argued that:  
“…this failing [of using longitudinal approaches] is especially problematic in 
the context of emerging economies since these countries are in a state of 
institutional flux. Consequently, the dynamic interconnections between 
entrepreneurial behaviour and institutional context, which are vitally 
important in emerging economies, cannot be adequately understood via the 
static approaches employed in most international entrepreneurship research to 
date”.  
Similar to other studies (De Clercq et al., 2010a; Danis et al., 2011), the research 
population for this thesis consisted of all possible emerging countries that fit the 
characterisations of emerging economies, as suggested by Hoskisson et al. (2000). In 
this sense, the selection criteria for emerging economies considers transition 
economies, such as post-communist countries, that are characterised by the 
encouragement of private enterprise and increasing liberalisation, as well as 
developing countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa that have gone through the 
adoption of a free-market system and economic liberalisation (Hoskisson et al., 
2000).  
Significantly, some emerging economies, such as Estonia, Slovenia, and the Czech 
Republic, have experienced an extraordinary transformation regarding economic 
growth, institutional development and knowledge creation (Hoskisson et al., 2000; 
De Clercq et al., 2010a). At the same time, countries such as the Kyrgyz Republic, 
Ghana, and Georgia have been less successful in improving economic development 
compared to other emerging economies (Schwab and Sala-i-Martín, 2014). 
Therefore, there is a need to understand the effects of institutional factors on 
entrepreneurial activity in the context of emerging economies. In particular, there is 
an emerging interest in how emerging economies at the factor and the efficiency-
driven stage could increase exports and develop more value-added industries to 
diversify their economies and reach the innovation-driven stage (i.e., a knowledge-
based economy). 
Based on the availability of published data of entrepreneurship and institutional 
variables related to the thesis framework, the final sample consisted of a balanced 
panel of 44 countries over the years 2006 to 2014 (9 years). Also, the data were 
grouped by country and year, resulting in 396 country-year observations. Table 4.1 
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below shows the sample of countries and their respective stage of economic 
development at the time of sampling. 
To compare between emerging economies at different levels of development, this 
study considers country-level stages of economic development (factor-driven, 
efficiency-driven, and innovation-driven economies) as suggested by the Global 
Competitiveness Report (GCR) (Schwab and Sala-i-Martín, 2014). As discussed in 
Chapter 2 (Section 2.4.5), this comparison was developed as it was suggested that the 
institutional factors impact entrepreneurial activity differently based on the stage of 
economic development (Bowen and De Clercq, 2008; Carlos Díaz Casero et al., 
2013; Acs et al., 2014a; Schwab and Sala-i-Martín, 2014). 



























































Source: Schwab and Sala-i-Martin (2014) 
As shown in Table 4.1, it is worth mentioning that only six countries were classified 
as factor-driven by GCR (see Section 5.5 for more details). Therefore, following 
Anokhin and Wincent’s (2012) approach, the sample of emerging economies was 
divided into more developed and less developed emerging economies to distinguish 
the country-level stage of development for the study. Based on GCR, more 
developed emerging economies are characterised as being at the innovation stage or 
in the transition to innovation stage, while less developed emerging economies are 
91 
 
located at lower stages of development, as shown in Table 4.2 (Schwab and Sala-i-
Martín, 2014).  
For the purpose of this study, we acknowledge that the sample of emerging 
economies includes a diverse range of countries regarding both geography and stage 
of development. In particular, while the Czech Republic, Estonia, Israel, Korea 
Republic, Portugal, Slovak Republic and Slovenia are located in the 2014 GCR as 
innovation-driven economies, these countries were considered emerging economies 
since they are often recognised in academic studies. Moreover, their classification as 
innovation-driven economies is if any of these countries have recently entered the 
innovation-driven level, or if they are still a matter of scholarly debate (Hoskisson et 
al., 2000; Valliere and Peterson, 2009; Kiss et al., 2012). 
Table 4.2: Emerging countries: more developed and less developed emerging 
countries classification 
 More developed emerging countries  Less developed emerging countries 
1 Argentina Albania 
2 Brazil Armenia 
3 Chile Azerbaijan 
4 Croatia Botswana 
5 Czech Republic Bulgaria 
6 Estonia Colombia 
7 Hungary Ghana 
8 Israel Georgia 
9 Kazakhstan India 
10 Korea Republic Indonesia 
11 Latvia Jamaica 
12 Lithuania Jordan 
13 Malaysia Kyrgyz Republic 
14 Mauritius Macedonia, FYR 
15 Mexico Morocco 
16 Portugal Nigeria 
17 Russian Federation Pakistan 
18 Slovak Republic Philippines 
19 Slovenia Peru 
20 Turkey Romania 
21  South Africa 
22  Tajikistan 
23  Thailand 
24  Tunisia 





4.3 Research Paradigms 
The research paradigm is “a framework that guides how research should be 
conducted based on people’s philosophies and their assumptions about the world and 
the nature of knowledge” (Collis and Hussey, 2014, p. 41). In this regard, Burrell and 
Morgan (1979, p. 24) contended that “to be located in a particular paradigm is to 
view the world in a particular way”. Therefore, selecting which research paradigm 
should be used in this study is essential to offer meaningful insights to the research 
deign in terms of data collection, analysis and interpretations (Creswell, 2009; 
Easterby-Smith et al., 2012).  
Two, largely opposing, schools of thought exist, each of which is related to a 
different research paradigm: positivism (i.e., realism) and interpretivism (i.e., 
idealism) (Saunders et al., 2009; Collis and Hussey, 2014). Positivism rests on the 
assumption that “social reality is singular and objective, and is not affected the act of 
investigating it” (Collis and Hussey, 2014, p. 43). The research includes “a detective 
process with a view to providing explanatory theories to understand social 
phenomena” (Collis and Hussey, 2014, p. 43). In contrast, interpretivism rests on the 
assumption that “social reality is in our minds, and is subjective and multiple” (Collis 
and Hussey, 2014, p. 44). Hence, social reality is influenced by the act of 
investigating it. Interpretivism research comprises “an inductive process with a view 
to providing interpretive understanding of social phenomena with a particular 
context” (Collis and Hussey, 2014, p. 44). It is noteworthy, however, that some terms 
have emerged over the years that describe different approaches within the two main 
paradigms. The most common approaches are described in Table 4.3. 










4.3.1 Assumptions of Positivisms and Interpretivism 
Before we design the study, it is necessary to take into account the research 
assumptions that support positivism and interpretivism research in order to decide 
whether this study is broadly positivist or broadly interpretivist.  
As summarised in Table 4.4, concerning the ontological assumption, positivists 
believe that social reality is stable and concrete. The researcher can describe and 
examine the phenomenon objectively without the act of affecting it (Saunders et al., 
2009). Thus, everybody has the same sense of reality as there is only one social 
reality (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). In the opposite school of thought, interpretivists 
hold the belief that reality is subjective because it is “socially constructed”. Hence, 
there are different realities as every person has his or her own sense of reality 
(Saunders et al., 2009; Collis and Hussey, 2014). 
Regarding the epistemological assumption, researchers that use the positivism 
approach believe that knowledge can be valid only if phenomena are observable and 
measurable, and they attempt to keep an independent and objective stance (Saunders 
et al., 2009). In contrast, researchers that practice an interpretivism approach attempt 
to minimise the gap and become closer to the research subject by trying to be 
involved in different methods of participative analysis (Saunders et al., 2009; Collis 
and Hussey, 2014).  
Concerning the axiological assumption, positivists consider the phenomena under 
research as objects and regard that they are independent and detached from what they 
are investigating. Also, positivists believe that these objects were existent before they 
became interested in studying the correlation between the objects, and that these 
objects will not be affected during or after their investigation activities. Therefore, 
positivists hold the belief that the process of investigation is “value-free” (Johnson 
and Duberley, 2011). On the other hand, interpretivists assume that the research 
investigators are biased in their values, “even if they have not been made explicit”. 
These values guide the researcher to identify what is perceived as facts and the 
interpretations and explanations drawn from these facts. As a result, most scholars 
who use the interpretivism approach believe that the researcher is involved with that 
which is being studied (Saunders et al., 2009; Collis and Hussey, 2014). 
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(the nature of reality) 
“Social reality is objective and 
singular, separate from the 
researcher” 
“There only one reality” 
“Social reality is subjective and 
socially constructed” 





“Knowledge comes from objective 
evidence about observable and 
measurable phenomena” 
“The researcher is distant from 
phenomena under study” 
“Knowledge comes from 
subjective evidence from 
participants” 
“The researcher interacts with 
phenomena under study” 
Axiological 
assumption  
(the role of values) 
“The researcher is independent from 
phenomena under study and the 
results are value-free and unbiased” 
“The researcher acknowledges that 
research is subjective and the 




(the language of 
research) 
“The researcher writes in a formal style 
and uses the passive voice, accepted 
quantitative terms and set definitions” 
“The researcher writes in an 
informal style and uses the 
personal voice, accepted 




 (the process of 
research) 
“The researcher takes a deductive 
approach” 
“The researcher studies cause and 
effect and uses a static design where 
categories are identified in advance” 
“Generalizations lead to predictions, 
explanations and understanding” 
“Results are accurate and reliable 
through validity and reliability” 
“The researcher takes an inductive 
approach”  
“The researcher studies the topic 
within its context and uses an 
emerging design where 
categories are identified during 
the process” 
“Patterns and theories are 
developed for understanding” 
“Findings are accurate and reliable 
through verification”  
Source: Collis and Hussey (2014) 
In a positivist study, the language of research should be written in a formal style 
using the passive voice, while the situation is less evident in an interpretivist 
approach. Also, the process of research in a positivism approach should be focused 
on assuring that any variables used can be operationalised; to be precise, defined in 
such a way that they can be measured. Conversely, the interpretivist approach 
examines a small sample, probably over a period of time. In this respect, the 
researcher employs a number of study methods to receive various viewpoints of the 
phenomena. Moreover, in the process of analysing these perspectives, the examiner 
will be looking for understanding what is happening in a particular condition and 
seeking patterns that could be replicated in other similar circumstances (Collis and 
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Hussey, 2014). Building on the research philosophy discussed in this part, the next 
section looks in greater detail at the study approach taken in this thesis. 
4.3.2 Rationale for choosing a positivism paradigm 
According to Collis and Hussey (2014), choosing the appropriate paradigm is partly 
determined by the research assumptions. Also, it will be affected by the dominant 
paradigm in the research field and the nature of the research problem we are 
investigating. Table 4.5 compares the main characteristics of the two paradigms. 
Table 4.5: Features of the two main paradigms 
Positivism tends to: Interpretevisim tends to: 
“Use large samples” “Use small samples” 
“Have an artificial location” “Have a natural location” 
“Be concerned with hypothesis testing”  “Be concerned with generating theories” 
“Produce precise, objective, quantitative data” “Produce “rich”, subjective, qualitative data” 
“Produce results with high reliability but low 
validity” 
“Produce findings with low reliability but high 
validity” 
“Allow results to be generalised from the sample 
to the population” 
“Allow findings to be generalised to one setting 
to another similar setting” 
Source: Collis and Hussey (2014) 
In line with the discussion in the previous section, this thesis follows a generally 
positivist philosophy. This is more suitable for this thesis as it aims to examine the 
moderating effect of control of corruption of the relationship between formal 
institutions and the development of entrepreneurial activity. It does this by 
conducting a number of study hypotheses that can be empirically verified using the 
positivism research tools (Saunders et al., 2009). 
As a result, the primary approach that this thesis adopts is deductive since the 
researcher is building the hypotheses from theory and these need to test the causal 
relationships between the study variables (Saunders et al., 2009). The appropriate 
approach utilised by this thesis is, therefore, a quantitative method, in which the 
researcher uses a panel (longitudinal) data tool for data collection (in this case, 
secondary data from different sources). Such panel data analysis is worth pursuing to 
enhance the reliability and validity of the research (for more details, see Section 
4.10). In this context, reliability refers to “the accuracy and precision of the 
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measurement and absence of differences in the results if the research was repeated”, 
while validity refers to “the extent to which a test measures what the researcher 
wants it to measure and the results reflect the phenomena under study” (Collis and 
Hussey, 2014, pp. 52-53). Because the development of institutions may take an 
extended period (North, 1990; Williamson, 2000), this type of analysis is necessary 
for testing the interaction effect of informal and formal institutions on the 
development of entrepreneurial activity in emerging economies (Estrin et al., 2013). 
To this end, it is appropriate that this study follows a quantitative data collection 
method, employing deductive methods to answer the research question,  
Do formal institutions affect entrepreneurial activity levels in the same way 
under both conditions of endemic corruption and freedom from it? 
The detail on how this is applied in this study is given in the later section, Research 
Design (Section 4.5). The next section outlines the hypotheses that have been 
developed from the theory in Section 3.5. 
4.4 Study Hypotheses 
The study hypotheses are formulated in null form as follows: 
H1a: The negative relationship between the number of procedures and 
entrepreneurship within an emerging economy is moderated by the country’s 
level of corruption, such that this negative relationship is stronger at lower 
levels of corruption.  
H1b: The hypothesised moderator effect will be stronger in more developed 
than in less developed emerging economies. 
H2a: The positive relationship between education and training and 
entrepreneurship within an emerging economy is moderated by the country’s 
level of corruption, such that this positive relationship is stronger at lower 
levels of corruption.  
H2b: The hypothesised moderator effect will be stronger in more developed 
than in less developed emerging economies. 
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H3a: The positive relationship between access to credit and entrepreneurship 
within an emerging economy is moderated by the country’s level of 
corruption, such that this positive relationship is stronger at lower levels of 
corruption.  
H3b: The hypothesised moderator effect will be stronger in more developed 
than in less developed emerging economies. 
H4a: The positive relationship between technology absorption and 
entrepreneurship within an emerging economy is moderated by the country’s 
level of corruption, such that this positive relationship is stronger at lower 
levels of corruption.  
H4b: The hypothesised moderator effect will be stronger in more developed 
than in less developed emerging economies. 
4.5   Research Design 
While the research paradigm is a philosophical framework, it also guides how 
research should be conducted. Hence, since this study adopted the positivism 
paradigm, it should be closely linked to the research design, which refers to choosing 
the most appropriate methodology and methods that will be used to address the 
research question (Collis and Hussey, 2014). In this realm, the methodology is “an 
approach to the process of the research, encompassing a body of methods”, while a 
method is “a technique for collecting and/or analysing data” (Collis and Hussey, 
2014, p. 59).  
Different methodologies are associated with a positivism approach, such as 
experimental studies, surveys, cross-section studies and panel (longitudinal) studies. 
To test the study’s hypotheses, this thesis relies on a quantitative approach with 
underlying panel regression analysis. The novelty of the study’s approach is that it 
considers the institutional variables (formal and informal) as interaction variables, 
not as independent indicators. The interaction variables approach is used in 
regression analysis, where two independent variables are multiplied by each other to 
show their combined impact on the dependent variable. 
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Indeed, as revealed by our review of the literature in the previous chapters, there 
have been a substantial number of studies incorporating the institutional variables as 
independent factors to address the variations of entrepreneurial activity. However, 
our review of the empirical and theoretical literature identified that, whereas formal 
and informal institutional variables are entered independently, informal institutions 
become more dominant factors in emerging economies. In particular, formal 
institutional factors favour developed countries while informal institutions favour 
emerging countries. Moreover, it is quite apparent that the theoretical and empirical 
literature has mainly ignored and failed to address the impact of informal institutions 
on the development of formal institutions that focused on entrepreneurial activity 
(e.g., Fuentelsaz et al., 2015; Aparicio et al., 2016). Therefore, the applied 
interaction method appears to offer an appropriate balance for these opposing 
development effects of institutions. 
In order to address shortcomings mentioned above, we put forward a theoretical 
framework in Chapter 3. This framework seeks to explain the moderating effect of 
control of corruption as an informal institution on the relationship between formal 
institutions and entrepreneurial activity. Briefly, our study argues that the impact of 
formal institutions on the development of entrepreneurial activity will be stronger in 
the presence of lower levels of corruption. Hence, for the first time, our study can 
contribute by extending the current literature, which only addresses the independent 
effect of formal and informal institutions, to include a model that can help explain 
the determinants of entrepreneurial activity in emerging economies that are located at 
different stages of economic development. 
The generalised version of the theoretical framework and research hypotheses 
outlined in Figure 3.1 consisted of five primary factors identified by the theoretical 
and empirical literature: (1) the number of procedures, (2) education and training, (3) 
access to credit, (4) technology absorption, and (5) control of corruption. The 
theoretical framework drawn from Chapter 3 was developed into an empirical model 
in Chapter 5. Specifically, the robustness of the model specification and estimation 
issues was discussed in Section 5.4. 
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The following sections define the dependent variable and independent variables 
employed as proxies for those variables outlined in our conceptual framework 
(Sections 3.1 and 3.5) regarding the data sources and methods used. 
4.6 Data Sources 
To gather country-level secondary data about the variables included in the conceptual 
framework, this study relied on different sources. First, the dependent variable 
related to entrepreneurial activity was derived from the New Entry Rate (NER) of the 
World Bank entrepreneurship dataset (Acs et al., 2008b).  
Regarding the informal institutions, the data of control of corruption (CC) as the 
independent variable, was obtained from the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) project. Moreover, the source of data for the independent variables of formal 
institutions, such as procedures for starting a business (PRO), was taken from the 
World Bank’s Doing Business (DB) project. The second independent variable for 
business and entrepreneurial skills (TEDU) was obtained from the UNESCO 
database (Álvarez and Urbano, 2011; Chowdhury et al., 2015b). The third 
independent variable for access to credit (AC) was selected from the Domestic Credit 
Indicator (Álvarez and Urbano, 2011). Lastly, the independent variable for the 
availability of the latest technologies in a country (TA) was taken from the Global 
Competitiveness Report (Acs et al., 2008b; Stenholm et al., 2013). 
The data sources of control variables of GDP growth (GDPg) and GDP per capita 
purchasing power parity (GDPpc) were obtained from the World Bank (Bowen and 
De Clercq, 2008; Levie and Autio, 2011; Fuentelsaz et al., 2015). 
Table 4.6 presents a list of dependent and independent variables used in this study, 
including their sources. Our final sample consisted of a balanced panel (i.e., an equal 
number of time periods per country) with data on 396 observations and 44 countries 
(see Appendix 2 for a list of emerging economies with their mean values). The 
following sections offer a brief description of the data sources used in this study. 
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Table 4.6: Description of variables and their sources 
Variable Abbreviation Description Data source and availability 
Dependant 
variable 
New Entry Rate 
(NER) 
“The number of newly registered firms with limited liability per 1,000 working-age people (ages 
15-64) per calendar year.” 








“Control of corruption (CC) – capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
“capture” of the state by elites and private interests. The values are between -2.5 and 2.5 with 









starting a business 
(PRO) 
“The number of procedures required to legally operate a commercial or industrial firm are 
recorded, including interactions to obtain necessary permits and licenses and to complete all 
inscriptions, verifications, and notifications for starting operations. Data are for limited 
liability companies with certain standardized characteristics in order to facilitate comparisons 
between economies.” 
Doing Business 2006 to 2014 
https://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/doing-business-database 
 Tertiary Education 
(TEDU) 
“Total enrolment in tertiary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the total 
population of the five-year age group following on from secondary school leaving.” 
UIS 2006 to 2014 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR?view=chart 
 Access to Credit 
(AC) 
“Domestic credit to private sector by banks refers to financial resources provided to the private 
sector by other depository corporations (deposit taking corporations except central banks), 
such as through loans, purchases of non-equity securities, and trade credits and other accounts 
receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. For some countries these claims include 
credit to public enterprises.” 





To what extent do businesses in your country absorb new technology? [1 = not at all; 7 = 
aggressively absorb] 
Global Competitiveness Report 2006 to 2014 
http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2015-
2016/downloads/ 
Control variable GDP Growth 
(GDPg) 
“Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. 
Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value.” 
World Bank 2006 to 2014 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?view=chart 
 GDP Per Capita 
PPP (GDPpc) 
“GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic product 
converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates.”  
World Bank 2006 to 2014 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD 
Source: Devised by author 
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4.6.1 The Doing Business Project (DB) 
The World Bank established the Doing Business (DB) report in 2004. It is conducted 
annually to provide objective measures of business regulations affecting domestic 
small and medium-size firms located in the largest business city of each economy. 
Over the past 15 years, the project has developed 11 areas (see Table 4.7) of business 
regulations and expanded to 190 economies (Doing Business, 2004, 2018).  
The Doing Business project depends on gathering and analysing extensive 
quantitative data to compare between economies concerning their business 
environments over time. Hence, this project aims to encourage countries to compete 
towards more efficient regulations, offer measurable benchmarks for reform, and 
serve as a resource for governments, researchers, international organisations and 
think tanks to guide policies, develop new indexes and conduct research (Doing 
Business, 2018). 
Table 4.7: Doing Business measures of business regulation 
Indicator set What is measured 
1. Starting a business “Procedures, time, cost and paid-in minimum capital to start a limited 
liability company” 
2. Dealing with 
construction permits 
“Procedures, time and cost to complete all formalities to build a warehouse 
and the quality control and safety mechanisms in the construction 
permitting system” 
3. Getting electricity “Procedures, time and cost to get connected to the electrical grid, the 
reliability of the electricity supply and the transparency of tariffs” 
4. Registering 
property 
“Procedures, time and cost to transfer a property and the quality of the land 
administration system” 
5. Getting credit “Movable collateral laws and credit information systems” 
6. Protecting minority 
investors 
“Minority shareholders’ rights in related-party transactions and in corporate 
governance” 
7. Paying taxes “Payments, time and total tax and contribution rate for a firm to comply with 
all tax regulations as well as post-filing processes” 
8. Trading across 
borders 
“Time and cost to export the product of comparative advantage and import 
auto parts” 




“Time, cost, outcome and recovery rate for a commercial insolvency and the 
strength of the legal framework for insolvency” 
11. Labour market 
regulation 
“Flexibility in employment regulation and aspects of job quality” 
Source: Doing Business report (2018) 
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To offer reliable results, the methodology followed for each indicator is 
straightforward and easy to replicate, as shown in Figure 4.1. Researchers can follow 
the methodology and build the same measures as benchmarks for foreign companies 
and sole proprietorships. Different assumptions are employed to make the business 
comparable across nations. The business is:  
“a limited-liability company (If there is more than one type of limited-
liability company in the country, the type most popular among domestic firms 
is chosen.); operates in the country’s most populous city; is 100 per cent 
domestically owned and has five founders, none of whom is a legal entity; 
has start-up capital of 10 times income per capita, paid in cash; performs 
general industrial or commercial activities, such as the production and sale of 
products or services to the public; leases the commercial plant and offices; 
does not qualify for investment incentives or any special benefits; has up to 
50 employees one month after the start of operations, all of them nationals; 
has turnover of at least 100 times income per capita; and has a company deed 
10 pages long” (Doing Business, 2004, p. 3). 
 
Figure 4.1: Doing Business methodology for collecting and verifying the data 
Source: Doing Business report (2018) 
Although the DB methodology is considered to be an easily replicable way to 
benchmark particular factors of business regulation, it is crucial to understand the 
advantages and limitations when using the data (Table 4.8). In this realm, the DB 
dataset is unable to cover informal entrepreneurship where this type of business is 




Table 4.8: Advantages and limitations of the Doing Business methodology 




“Makes data comparable across 
economies and methodology 
transparent” 
“Reduces scope of data; only regulatory 
reforms in areas measured can be 
systematically tracked” 
Focus on largest 
business city 
“Makes data collection manageable 
(cost-effective) and data 
comparable” 
“Reduces representativeness of data for 
an economy if there are significant 




“Keeps attention on formal sector 
where regulations are relevant and 
firms are most productive” 
“Unable to reflect reality for informal 
sector or for foreign firms facing a 




“Ensures that data reflect knowledge 
of those with most experience in 
conducting types of transactions 
measured” 
“Indicators less able to capture variation 
in experiences among entrepreneurs” 
Focus on the law “Makes indicators “actionable” 
because the law is what policy 
makers can change” 
“Where systematic compliance with the 
law is lacking, regulatory changes will 
not achieve full results desired” 
Source: Doing Business report (2018) 
4.6.2 World Government Indicators (WGI) 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) is a research project produced by the 
World Bank to capture the quality of governance in over 200 countries. In this 
respect, governance consists of:  
“the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. 
This includes (a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored 
and replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and 
implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and the state for the 
institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them” 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010, p. 4).  
The indicators measured six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability, 
political stability and lack of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
rule of law, and control of corruption between 1996 and 2016 (Table 4.9). The source 
data underlying the WGI come from nearly 40 data sources, produced by over 30 
organisations worldwide and updated annually since 2002. The data reflect the 
perceptions on governance of the public sector, the private sector, NGO sector 




Table 4.9: The six dimensions of World Governance Indicators (WGI) 
Indicator What is measured 
Voice and 
Accountability 
“measuring the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and a free media” 
Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence 
“measuring perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
domestic violence and terrorism” 
Government 
Effectiveness 
“measuring the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and 
the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies” 
Regulatory Quality “measuring the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development” 
Rule of Law “measuring the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” 
Control of Corruption “measuring the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of 
the state by elites and private interests” 
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2007) 
To make the data comparable across countries, each of six aggregate WGI measures 
is created by averaging together data from the primary sources that relate to the 
definition of governance being measured. This approach is made in the three phases. 
First, individual questions from the underlying sources are placed to each of the six 
aggregate measures. Second, the questions derived from the individual data sources 
are first rescaled to run from 0 to 1, with higher values representing better outcomes. 
The last step uses the Unobserved Components Model (UCM) to build a weighted 
average of the individual indicators for each source. The UCM was justified by 
Kaufmann et al. (2010, p. 10), who argued that:  
“since “true” governance is difficult to observe and we can observe only 
imperfect indicators of it, how can we best extract a “signal” of unobserved 
governance from the observed data? Under this view, all individual indicators 
of corruption, for example, should be viewed as noisy or imperfect proxies 
for corruption. Aggregating these together can result in a more informative 
signal of corruption. However, even these aggregate measures are imperfect, 
and this imperfection is usually summarised by the standard errors and 
confidence intervals generated by the UCM”. 
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Although WGI has significant problems in their methodology, such as the 
complexity of combining different data sources and choosing arbitrary data sources 
to reflect each indicator, it still offers a useful snapshot of some views of a country’s 
quality of governance (Kaufmann et al., 2007, 2010). 
4.6.3 UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) 
The United Nations, Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) 
Institute for Statistics (UIS) was established in 1999 to offer comparable data used to 
monitor progress towards the Sustainable Development Goal for education (SDG 4), 
and key targets related to science and culture. The UIS has the mandate to “work 
with partners to develop new indicators, statistical approaches and monitoring tools 
to better assess progress across targets related to UNESCO’s mandate” (UNESCO-
UIS, 2017, p. 2).  
Concerning formal education, the UIS releases data on its website twice a year. The 
UIS collects education statistics in a comprehensive form from official 
administrative sources at the national level. Collected information includes data on: 
 “educational programmes, access, participation, progression, completion, 
literacy, educational attainment and human and financial resources”.  
These statistics cover:  
“formal education in public (or state) and private institutions (early childhood 
education, primary and secondary schools, and colleges, universities and 
other tertiary education institutions), and special needs education (both in 
regular and special schools)”.  
These data are gathered annually by the UIS and its partner agencies through three 
significant surveys: UIS survey of formal education, UOE (UNESCO-UIS, the 
OECD and Eurostat) survey of formal education, and Literacy and Attainment 
Survey2. 
                                               
2 Background Information on Education Statistics in the UIS Database, UNESCO Institute for 




Figure 4.2: Quality assurance in UIS data collection, processing and validation 
Source: UNESCO-UIS (2017) 
To ensure that the data gathered are reliable and valid, they go through a series of 
checks, as shown in Figure 4.2. UIS data experts review the data to make sure that 
data cover the entire national education system and comply with international 
standards and definitions. Also, the statistical experts compare data across several 
sources, when possible, such as “household survey data and any available time series 
and national statistical yearbooks or databases. Reported data are also compared to 
other countries in the same region or income group” (UNESCO-UIS, 2017, p. 38). 
4.6.4 World Development Indicators (WDI) 
World Development Indicators (WDI) is conducted annually from the primary World 
Bank collection of development indicators and compiled from officially recognised 
international sources. It shows the most current and accurate global development 
data available and consists of regional, national and global estimates. WDI organises 
the data into six thematic areas and presents highlights from each one. These are:  
• poverty and shared prosperity (progress toward the World Bank Group’s 
primary goals); 
• people (gender, health and employment); 
• environment (natural resources and environmental changes); 
• economy (new opportunities for growth); 
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• states and markets (elements of good investment climate); and  
• global links (evidence of globalisation).  
These six thematic areas include over 800 indicators covering more than 200 
economies (World Bank, 2017). 
4.6.5 Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) 
The Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) is a yearly report published by the World 
Economic Forum (WEF) since 2004. It provides an appropriate portrait of a 
country’s economic environment and its capacity to accomplish sustained levels of 
economic growth and prosperity. For a portrayal that represents reliable and valid 
data, the WEF uses statistical data from two sources: international recognised 
organisations such as UNESCO, IMF and the World Bank, and its own Executive 
Opinion Survey (Survey) (Schwab and Sala-i-Martín, 2014).  
The WEF has conducted its annual Survey for over 30 years; it captures the opinion 
of business executives for which data sources are scarce or not available around the 
world. Those business leaders are asked a set of standardised questions to draw their 
opinions about various aspects of the business environment of a specific economy 
where their firm operates. The survey targets firms that usually have more than 100 
employees; they are randomly nominated based on the classification of firms (e.g., 
primary, secondary and tertiary sectors), based on the input of each industry sector to 
a country’s GDP. The 2014 version of the survey has extended the size of its sample, 
reaching a record of over 14,000 surveys from 148 countries. Therefore, this survey 
offers an understanding of each country’s economic and business environment as 
well as internationally comparable statistical data. Each year, the data collected from 
respondents are subject to a careful review by the WEF’s experts to evaluate the 
quality and reliability of the response data by evaluating them with data from 
published sources (Schwab and Sala-i-Martín, 2014). The following sections discuss 




4.7 Dependant Variable: Entrepreneurial Activity 
In an attempt to explain the causes of entrepreneurial activity in emerging 
economies, there are five explanatory variables consistent with the study hypotheses 
outlined in our conceptual framework developed in Chapter 3.  
In practice, institutions are difficult to measure and may lead to serious specification 
dilemmas because the available indicators are usually highly correlated with each 
other (Aidis et al., 2012). In this respect, North (1990, p. 107) stated “We cannot see, 
feel, touch or even measure institutions; they are constructs of the human mind”. 
Therefore, this study employed different statistical tools described in the next chapter 
(e.g., Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) computations) to ensure robustness of the 
findings.  
4.7.1 Existing entrepreneurship measures 
To date, several attempts have been developed and introduced to measure different 
types of entrepreneurial activity at the country-level (Acs et al., 2008b; Acs and 
Szerb, 2010; Desai, 2011; Acs et al., 2014a). In their review, Acs et al. (2014a) 
identified three broad approaches currently being adopted in research into measuring 
entrepreneurial activity; these are output, attitude, and framework indicators.  
Output measures 
Output indicators “track the emergence or registration of new self-employment or 
new firms within a given population” (Acs et al., 2014a, p. 479). In other words, 
entrepreneurship is measured at the national level based on the number of 
registrations of new businesses, self-employment registries or survey data.  
Based on primary survey data, the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) has been 
widely used to measure entrepreneurship by offering uniform definitions and data 
collection that can be comparable across countries (Sternberg and Wennekers, 2005; 
Acs et al., 2008b; Valliere and Peterson, 2009; Liñán and Fernandez-Serrano, 2014). 
According to GEM’s (2015) report, the GEM index is an annual assessment of the 
national level of entrepreneurial activity. The index has expanded from 10 countries 
in 1999 to 73 countries in the year 2014, representing 72.4% of the world’s 
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population, 90% of the world’s GDP and includes both developed and developing 
countries (Acs et al., 2008b; Singer et al., 2015).  
The GEM index uses different separate indices to measure Total Entrepreneurial 
Activity (TEA). These indices include both nascent entrepreneurship rate and gazelle 
firms. The nascent entrepreneurship rate is “the number of people actively involved 
in starting a new venture, as a percentage of the adult population (18-64 years of 
age)” (Wennekers et al., 2005, p. 297). Gazelle firms are “all start-ups and newly 
formed businesses (less than 42 months old) which expect to employ at least 20 
employees in 5 years” (Valliere and Peterson, 2009, p. 461). The GEM data also 
distinguish between opportunity and necessity of nascent entrepreneurial activity 
based on why individuals participate in entrepreneurial activities. Opportunity 
entrepreneurs are those who recognise a business opportunity (i.e. they choose to 
start a venture as one of several possible career alternatives), while necessity 
entrepreneurs are those who realise entrepreneurship as their last option (i.e. they feel 
obliged to start their own business because all other work alternatives are either 
absent or insufficient) (Wennekers et al., 2005; Valliere and Peterson, 2009; Singer 
et al., 2015).  
Although the GEM index is considered to be the most commonly used in different 
studies, the nascent rate may not accurately measure the actual firm formation 
(Desai, 2011). In particular, Desai (2011) contended that the survey’s respondents 
might be considered nascent entrepreneurs if they have taken initial steps to form a 
business. However, this new venture may not appear for several years, or it may 
never do so. Other authors (see Acs et al., 2008b; Sautet, 2013) argued that the 
central dilemma of the GEM index is the incapability to compare between 
entrepreneurial activity in developed and developing countries effectively. 
Specifically, GEM measures fail to separate business’s roles and impacts between 
traditional agricultural businesses in African countries compared to Internet-related 
businesses in the USA (Acs and Szerb, 2010). Moreover, the GEM index does not 
attempt to consider the interaction between the contextual factors, such as the 




While the GEM index uses random survey data of the adult population to measure 
entrepreneurial activity, the World Bank Index is more concerned with data from 
national business registries. The OECD data rely on business registries from the 
chamber of commerce and other public registries to conduct an index to measure 
high growth firms’ prevalence concerning the overall population of registered firms. 
According to the OECD-Eurostat (2007) report, a high-growth firm refers to:  
“a registered firm (trade registry, employment registry, or such) that has 
achieved at least 60% employment growth during a period of two years, with 
at least 20% annual growth in each, and which employed at least 10 
employees at the beginning of the period” (Acs et al., 2014a, p. 479).  
Hence, based on the OECD index, entrepreneurial activity can be measured through 
the prevalence rate of firms that show high employment growth against new start-
ups. Acs et al. (2014a) contended that the OECD approach failed to be comparable 
across countries due to differences in registration practices. Also, this approach may 
not capture the number of new businesses that did not register for any reason. 
In the same vein, the data of World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Survey (WBEGS) 
depend on the birth of new business registries in the public sectors. The WBEGS 
index is designed to measure entrepreneurial activity by collecting data on the 
number of formal sector companies with limited liability (LLCs) in order to be 
comparable across countries. In this survey, entrepreneurship is defined as “the 
activities of an individual or a group aimed at initiating economic activities in the 
formal sector under a legal form of business” (Klapper et al., 2010).  
Desai (2011) highlighted that the WBEGS approach offers a high level of 
comparability across countries with different legal origins and political systems. 
However, the author questioned the usefulness of such an approach in the context of 
developing countries where informal entrepreneurship is considered an essential key 
driver to economic growth. She further argued that entrepreneurship might take 
different types in addition to LLCs in these developing economies. 
Together these output indicators provide essential insights into considering a country 
to be entrepreneurial if it has a high number of new businesses registries or its 
individuals are trying to start new ventures. Acs et al. (2014a) suggested that the 
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strength of survey data is that it separates the type of entrepreneurship entries (e.g., 
necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs), records the number of individuals who 
have taken initial steps to be entrepreneurs, and can be comparable across countries. 
The authors further argued that the advantage of registry data is that it records formal 
entrepreneurs who are supposed to be active in the market. However, all the previous 
measures on entrepreneurship must be interpreted with caution as they may provide 
different interpretations (Acs et al., 2014a). 
Attitude measures 
The second category of entrepreneurship indicators attempts to measure the 
country’s attitudes and opinions towards entrepreneurship. There are a large number 
of published surveys (e.g., the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP, 1997); 
GEM survey and Euro-barometer survey (Gallup, 2009), that describe a country’s 
attitude toward entrepreneurship. Acs et al. (2014a) contended that the Euro-
barometer survey is probably the most critical index in this category as it has an 
extensive survey to measure a country’s attitude towards entrepreneurship. 
These survey-based indicators track a variety of attitudes relating to 
entrepreneurship. These include:  
“preference for being self-employed; reasons for preferring self-employment 
(or not); attitudes towards entrepreneurs (including success and failure); and 
self-efficacy perceptions. Combined, such measures provide valuable 
evidence on the feasibility, desirability, and legitimacy considerations 
associated with the decision to become self-employed.” (Acs et al., 2014a, p. 
480).  
Collectively, these attitude indicators suggest that entrepreneurial countries tend to 
have a more positive attitude climate towards entrepreneurship, or perceive self-
employment as an opportunity career in the market. However, such attitude surveys 
remain narrow in focus, dealing only with the country’s opinion environment or 
entrepreneurial culture, as these indicators do not accurately reflect the actual 
entrepreneurial activity (Acs et al., 2014a). 
Framework measures 
A third category of measuring entrepreneurial activity, reviewed by Acs et al. 
(2014a), is based on the framework conditions for entrepreneurship. Three primary 
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approaches of framework measures exist. One approach is the GEM index, where 
national experts are asked to fill out a questionnaire survey that reflects the 
entrepreneurial framework conditions of each country (Reynolds et al., 2005). 
Another approach is adopted by the World Bank “Ease of Doing Business” (EDB) 
index, which measures business regulations based on a questionnaire survey for new 
business entries (Djankov et al., 2002). Building on the work of the EDB index, the 
third approach is the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) entrepreneurship index, which has developed a more comprehensive 
framework measure to differentiate between framework conditions, entrepreneurial 
performance, and economic factors (Ahmad and Hoffmann, 2008). 
According to Djankov et al. (2002), the EDB index is built on collecting data from 
the registration of new LLCs to measure the framework conditions of each country. 
Thus, these framework indicators are highly related to the regulatory environment. 
Building on the work of Djankov et al. (2002), Acs et al. (2014a, p. 480) illustrated 
some of these framework indicators such as:  
“the number of procedures required to register a new business; the number of 
days required to complete a new business registration; minimum capital 
requirement for new limited liability companies (as % of GDP per capita); 
procedures and cost to build a warehouse; creditor recovery rate in 
bankruptcy events; and so on”. 
However, this approach of measuring entrepreneurial activity has a number of 
limitations. Djankov et al. (2002) argued that the EDB index makes no attempt to 
provide information on new firm creation activity. Also, the EDB index dataset 
suffers from a restricted range of entrepreneurship types as it includes only registered 
companies that employ 5-50 employees within the first month of operation and have 
sales turnover of up to 10 times venture capital (Djankov et al., 2002). Hence, the 
EDB index framework conditions may or may not represent 90% of the new 
entrepreneurial activity in a particular country (Acs et al., 2014a).  
The OECD entrepreneurship index initiated the Entrepreneurship Indicators 
Programme (EIP) in order to assess the framework conditions that enhance 
entrepreneurial performance (i.e., the registration and growth of new limited liability 
companies), and ultimately its impact on different economic factors (i.e., job 
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creation, economic growth, formalising the informal sector and poverty reduction) 
(Ahmad and Hoffmann, 2008). The EIP is built on different existing initiatives, 
including the Danish government and policy research think tank – FORA, the World 
Bank Ease of Doing Business index, the World Bank Entrepreneurship Survey, and 
the OECD’s efforts to track various forms of new business registrations and exits 
(Hoffmann et al., 2006; Ahmad and Hoffmann, 2008).  
Acs et al. (2014a), however, argued that the link between entrepreneurial 
performance and framework conditions remain an assumption rather than empirical-
based evidence. Thus, Acs et al. (2014a) further argued that establishing a statistical 
relationship may be challenging among the different variables in the EIP model 
(Ahmad and Hoffmann, 2008). 
In summary, framework indicators provide valuable insight into evaluating the 
institutional and regulatory conditions that exist in a country. However, Acs et al. 
(2014a) contended that difficulties arise when an attempt is made to link framework 
conditions and individual entrepreneurial activity. In that sense, a country is 
considered to be entrepreneurial when the institutional conditions and regulations are 
supportive, regardless of their link to different types of entrepreneurship. Also, these 
framework indicators neglect to measure the types of informal entrepreneurship in 
which they are essential in the context of developing countries (Acs et al., 2014a). 
This section has reviewed the three key indicators of measuring entrepreneurship at 
the country level; output, attitude, and framework indicators. Although all the 
previously mentioned measurement approaches have their own advantages, these 
approaches suffer from some severe limitations. Acs et al. (2014a) argued that output 
indicators tend to ignore the institutional context at the country level (i.e., new firm 
formations are the same, regardless of the national context). Moreover, the authors 
contended that it is possible that the results of positive attitude measures may not be 
interpreted as real active entrepreneurial behaviour. Acs et al. (2014a) further argued 
that framework indicators failed to offer adequate longitudinal data to explain the 
interaction effects between institutional conditions and entrepreneurial productivity. 
Finally, Acs et al. (2014a) suggested that all the approaches reviewed so far, have 
failed to focus on the processes that drive those output indicators (e.g., how and 
when entrepreneurs’ attitudes drive into productive behaviours). As a result, none of 
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the reviewed measures fully capture the systemic character of entrepreneurial activity 
at the country-level. 
Acs et al. (2014a), therefore, suggested that there is a need for a new measure that 
tackles the limitations of the previous indicators in which an ecosystem of 
entrepreneurship is required within each country. Acs et al. (2014a) further argued 
that each government at the national-level should focus on the systems of 
entrepreneurship that provide incentives to entrepreneurs who pursue new 
opportunities in the market. In addition, Acs et al. (2014a) contended that an 
entrepreneurial country is characterised by the ecosystem of entrepreneurship in 
which there is constant interaction between individual-level actions and institutional 
framework (e.g., the government, education system, financial infrastructure, 
productive sectors, and civil society) in order to achieve higher levels of productive 
entrepreneurship and ultimately contribute to economic growth (Aparicio et al., 
2016).  
In consideration of previous discussions, Acs et al. (2014a, b) initiated the Global 
Entrepreneurship Index (GEI), which is a complex measure to capture the multi-
faceted nature of entrepreneurial activity at the country level. Moreover, GEI 
provides an appropriate contextualisation in which it allows for interactions between 
the institutional conditions and the individual level variables. Therefore, GEI is of 
great significance as it marks the first attempt to assess entrepreneurial activity by 
measuring the broader impact of the interactions between institution conditions and 
individual level variables (see Section 7.3.5 for more details about GEI 
methodology).  
However, this approach suffers from multiple design flaws. Limited data availability 
has constrained the design of GEI pillars. In addition, several possible institutional 
variables may interact significantly with each individual level variable as the current 
model is limited to one institutional variable. In this sense, the existing model of 
interactions between an institution’s conditions and individual level variables may 
not suit all countries and contexts where these countries are at different stages of 
economic development (Acs et al., 2014a). Therefore, this thesis may provide a 
better understanding of such interactions between institutional conditions and 
individual level variables in the context of emerging economies. 
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4.7.2 New Entry Rate (NER) for measuring entrepreneurial activity  
Based on the previous discussion, this study used the new entry rate (NER) as an 
indicator of entrepreneurial activity. This measure tracks the entry rate of firms that 
have been newly registered with government authorities, and calculates the density 
(i.e., population prevalence) of new limited liability companies (LLCs) established 
per 1,000 working-age population (18-64 years old) in a country (Acs et al., 2008b). 
This data is derived from the WBEGS that defines the unit of measurement of 
entrepreneurship as:  
“Any economic unit of the formal sector incorporated as a legal entity and 
registered in a public registry, which is capable, in its own right, of incurring 
liabilities and of engaging in economic activities and transactions with other 
entities” (Acs et al., 2008b, p. 267).  
This index is commonly used in the literature to compare entrepreneurial activity 
across countries (Acs et al., 2008b; Dau and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014; Autio and Fu, 
2015; Belitski et al., 2016). However, this measure does not consider other forms of 
businesses activities, such as a sole proprietorship, a partnership, a cooperative, a 
corporation, or a joint stock company. Private limited companies, however, are the 
most prevalent business type around the world. In the context of emerging 
economies, such as Latvia’s, LLCs account for 62% of all registered businesses and 
93% of output (Doing Business, 2004, 2018). 
Therefore, this measure is particularly useful in accounting for “productive” 
entrepreneurship, as aspiring entrepreneurs tend to register their ventures in order to 
benefit from the potential advantages of participating in the formal economy (e.g., 
investors are encouraged to invest in LLCs due to limited potential losses to their 
capital investment) (Baumol, 1990; Doing Business, 2004; Klapper et al., 2010; 
Levie and Autio, 2011; Ghura et al., 2017).  
Also, Acs et al. (2008b) found that these new start-up rates correlate positively to 
economic growth measured by GDP. In contrast, GEM TEA data has a U-shaped 
relationship with economic development (Sternberg and Wennekers, 2005; 
Wennekers et al., 2005). This latter result could mislead policy-makers in emerging 
economies as it indicates that entrepreneurial activity may not contribute 
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significantly to economic growth and development for countries at the efficiency-
driven stage. 
In the same vein, GEM data measure the potential for entrepreneurial activity. 
However, WBEGS data measure the actual entrepreneurial activity, albeit at a formal 
level (Acs et al., 2008b). Therefore, studies that used WBEGS and GEM data offered 
different findings. Acs et al. (2008b) suggested that these contradictory results in 
empirical entrepreneurship research are due to the differences in what the data 
capture. In particular, while GEM data do not relate to administrative barriers to 
entrepreneurial activity, a significant adverse effect exists with WBEGS data 
(Klapper and Delgado, 2007; van Stel et al., 2007). 
Considering that this study is examining the variations of entrepreneurial activity 
based on the institutional environment, Desai (2011) argued that nascent 
entrepreneurs in GEM data do not experience any regulation barriers. Therefore, 
nascent entrepreneurs have often not yet registered their new ventures because there 
is no formalisation condition. However, since the WBEGS dataset measures 
registered businesses, respondents would have experienced regulation obstacles. In 
other words, respondents in the GEM dataset do not report on regulation problems 
since they do not encounter them, not because they are not a barrier (Belitski et al., 
2016).  
In this sense, the WBEGS dataset could be more valid for this study to measure 
entrepreneurial activity than other measures such as TEA or self-employment. This is 
because it measures new formal firms that, rationally, would be more sensitive to 
institution barriers, such as complex regulations and corruption. 
4.8 Independent Variables 
4.8.1 Control of Corruption (CC) 
As discussed in Chapters 3, corruption is described as an illegal/informal activity 
used by public officials for private gain (Aidis et al., 2012). Therefore, it is 
challenging for researchers to use objective measures of corruption (Tonoyan et al., 
2010). The solution was then assayed for corruption using subjective measures. 
Although critics have argued that subjective measures provide an inaccurate measure 
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of corruption in the sense that “the rankings of corruption index are perhaps, based 
on common press depictions of countries or conventional notions about what 
institutions or cultures are conducive to corruption” (Fan et al., 2009; Lau et al., 
2013, p. 2), research contended that this method is an acceptable alternative for 
measuring corruption (Tanzi, 1998; Kaufmann et al., 2010; Hamilton and Hammer, 
2018).  
There are a number of instruments available for measuring corruption. However, 
Judge et al. (2011) found that the two most common measures of corruption used 
were, (1) the Corruptions Perception Index (CPI), developed annually by 
Transparency International (TI), and (2) the Control of Corruption Index (CCI), 
reported by the World Bank. Moreover, more studies have tested the reliability and 
validity of these measures (Bowen and De Clercq, 2008; Tonoyan et al., 2010; Payne 
et al., 2013; Hamilton and Hammer, 2018). For example, Tonoyan et al. (2010) 
found very high correlation values between the above-mentioned measures, ranging 
from 0.81 to 0.84, between 2000 and 2008, thus indicating a high validity of these 
two measures. 
While the results of CPI are only comparing year on year since 20123, the alternative 
measure of corruption in this study is control of corruption (CC) derived from the 
CCI. Control of corruption (CC):  
“captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
“capture” of the state by elites and private interests” (Kaufmann et al., 2007, 
p. 4).  
The CCI is updated annually for countries throughout the world. Indicators include 
such things as, (1) frequency of additional payments required to get things done, (2) 
effects of corruption on the general business environment, and (3) the tendency of 
elites to control the state. The component indicators are assessed by international 
organisations, political and business risk rating agencies, international think tanks, 
and relevant non-governmental organisations. The scores in this database lie between 
-2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes of the institutions 
                                               
3 Corruption Perceptions Index, 2017, “Technical Methodology Note”, Transparency International, 




(Kaufmann et al., 2007). Different studies in entrepreneurship research have recently 
used this measure (Álvarez and Urbano, 2011; Aparicio et al., 2016; Belitski et al., 
2016).  
To this end, Hamilton and Hammer (2018, p. 27) commented on using the measures 
mentioned earlier that:  
“Using an extensive literature review, correlations, and factor analysis, this 
paper has shown that while both objective and subjective indicators of 
corruption meet these criteria, the most appropriate indicators are the 
composite subjective indicators: the CPI and the CC. This set of findings 
shows that it is possible to use robust subjective indicators of rent-extraction 
to measure underlying levels of corruption – an outcome that will be 
invaluable for measuring and monitoring progress against the Sustainable 
Development Goals”. 
4.8.2 Number of Procedures (PRO) 
Concerning the formal institutions, this study measures the dimension of the number 
of procedures (PRO) as “the number of procedures that are officially required for an 
entrepreneur to start up and formally operate an industrial or commercial business” 
produced by the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business project (Doing business, 
2004, p. 3).  
Djankov et al. (2002) developed several assumptions for measuring the number of 
procedures and making them comparable across countries. First, a procedure is 
described as “any interaction of the business founder with external parties (e.g., 
government agencies, lawyers, auditors, notaries)”. Additionally, the authors stated 
that the “interactions between company founders or company officers and employees 
are not considered separate procedures”. Second, entrepreneurs “complete all 
procedures themselves, without facilitators, accountants, or lawyers, unless the use of 
such third parties is required”. Third, procedures are ignored if the law does not 
require them for starting the new venture. For example, “obtaining exclusive rights 
over the company name is not counted in a country where businesses are allowed to 
use a number as identification”. Fourth, the shortcuts of procedures are recorded if 
they satisfied three requirements: “they are not illegal, they are available to the 
general public, and avoiding them causes substantial delays”. Fifth, procedures are 
recorded if all businesses require them. For instance, procedures to meet the terms of 
119 
 
environmental regulations are not counted unless they are needed for all companies. 
Lastly, procedures that the entrepreneur goes through to get services, such as water, 
electricity, gas, and waste disposal, are excluded unless they are legally required to 
start operating the company (all quotes from Doing Business, 2004, p. 4). 
To make this measure comparable across countries, these data are for limited liability 
companies with specific standardised characteristics (Djankov et al., 2002, p. 6; 
Klapper and Love, 2010). Djankov et al. (2002) suggested a list of typical procedures 
associated with setting up a firm as shown in Table 4.10. These procedures are 
further separated based on their function: screening (a residual category, which 
generally aims to keep out “unattractive” projects or entrepreneurs), health and 
safety, labour, taxes, and environment. 
The process of collecting data from the start-up procedures is as follows: the data are 
first collected from government publications such as the government web pages on 
the Internet. Then, the relevant government agencies should be contacted to check 
the accuracy of the data. Lastly, to eliminate any data conflict, at least one 
independent local law firm is employed in each country to confirm the results of the 
government officials. In case of discrepancy between the government officials’ 
estimates and the law firm, the median estimates are taken (Djankov et al., 2002). 
To validate the Doing Business dataset, Djankov et al. (2002) found that the number 
of procedures is highly correlated with two other measures of entry regulations (i.e., 
the official time required to complete the process of registering a new business, and 
its official cost). Moreover, Danis et al. (2011) found a positive correlation between 
one of the entry regulations variables (i.e., the time required to register a new 
business with the government), and GEM’s Expert Questionnaire about the reliability 
and effectiveness of a country’s regulations for new and growing firms. Recently, 
several studies used the Ease of Doing Business dataset to measure the number of 
procedures in emerging economies (Álvarez and Urbano, 2011; Chowdhury et al., 





Table 4.10: A list of common procedures required for starting up a firm 
1. Screening procedures 
• Certify business competence 
• Certify a clean criminal record 
• Certify marital status 
• Check the name for uniqueness 
• Notarize company deeds 
• Notarize registration certificate 
• File with the Statistical Bureau 
• File with the Ministry of Industry and Trade, Ministry of the Economy, or the respective ministries by line of 
business 
• Notify municipality of start-up date 
• Obtain certificate of compliance with the company law 
• Obtain business license (operations permit) 
• Obtain permit to play music to the public (irrespective of line of business) 
• Open a bank account and deposit start-up capital 
• Perform an of official audit at start-up 
• Publish notice of company foundation 
• Register at the Companies Registry 
• Sign up for membership in the Chamber of Commerce or Industry or the Regional Trade Association 
2. Tax-related requirements 
• Arrange automatic withdrawal of the employees’ income tax from the company payroll funds 
• Designate a bondsman for tax purposes 
• File with the Ministry of Finance 
• Issue notice of start of activity to the Tax Authorities 
• Register for corporate income tax 
• Register for VAT 
• Register for state taxes 
• Register the company by laws with the Tax Authorities 
• Seal, validate, rubricate accounting books 
3. Labor/social security-related requirements 
• File with the Ministry of Labor 
• Issue employment declarations for all employees 
• Notarize the labor contract 
• Pass inspections by social security officials 
• Register for accident and labor risk insurance 
• Register for health and medical insurance 
• Register with pension funds 
• Register for Social Security 
• Register for unemployment insurance 
• Register with the housing fund 
4. Safety and health requirements 
• Notify the health and safety authorities and obtain authorization to operate from the Health 
Ministry 
• Pass inspections and obtain certificates related to work safety, building, fire, sanitation, and 
hygiene 
5. Environment-related requirements 
• Issue environmental declaration 
• Obtain environment certificate 
• Obtain sewer approval 
• Obtain zoning approval 
• Pass inspections from environmental officials 
• Register with the water management and water discharge authorities 





4.8.3 Education and Training (TEDU) 
The second formal institution for the education and training variable (TEDU) was 
measured as the percentage of the population with tertiary education in the country, 
as obtained from the UIS database. UIS defined the tertiary education measure as 
the:  
“total enrolment in tertiary education (ISCED 5 to 8), regardless of age, 
expressed as a percentage of the total population of the five-year age group 
following on from secondary school leaving”4.  
Acs et al. (2017) suggested that this indicator is useful to measure the country’s level 
of education and found that it is related positively to a higher quality of 
entrepreneurial activity.  
This study followed Bowen and De Clercq (2008) to validate our measures, and 
calculated its correlation with the following question asked in the World Economic 
Forum’s (WEF) Executive Opinion Survey: “How would you assess the quality of 
scientific research institutions in your country?” (1 = very poor; 7 = the best in their 
field internationally) over the period 2006-2014. A relatively low but significant 
correlation of 0.37 (p < 0.001) was found. Different studies used the study’s measure 
to estimate the start-up skills in a certain country (Álvarez and Urbano, 2011; Acs et 
al., 2014a, b; Chowdhury et al., 2015b). 
4.8.4 Access to Credit (AC) 
The third formal institution for access to credit (AC) was measured from the overall 
domestic credit to the private sector provided by banks as a share of GDP; it comes 
from the WDI dataset.  
Domestic credit to the private sector by banks refers to:  
“financial resources provided to the private sector by other depository 
corporations (deposit-taking corporations except for central banks), such as 
through loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and trade credits and other 
                                               
4 “Background Information on Education Statistics in the UIS Database”, UNESCO Institute for 
statistics, available at: http://uis.unesco.org/en/methodology#slideoutmenu. 
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accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. For some countries 
these claims include credit to public enterprises”5. 
The data on domestic credit provided to the private sector by banks as a share of 
GDP are taken from the financial corporation survey of the International Monetary 
Fund’s (IMF) International Financial Statistics or, when these are unavailable, from 
its depository corporation survey. The financial corporation survey includes 
monetary authorities (the central bank), deposit money banks, and other banking 
institutions, such as finance companies, development banks, and savings and loan 
institutions6. 
In this respect, Khaltarkhuu and Sun (2014) argued in the World Bank data blog that 
the credit data by banks are almost the same as the data for total private credit in the 
context of developing economies. Thus, these countries are still at an early stage of 
financial development. The authors further contended that:  
“banks are the dominant component of the financial sector, especially in 
places where there's a nascent or still-in-the-works stock market. On the other 
hand, financial deepening (the expansion of financial services) and the 
corresponding changes in financial landscapes have changed this scenario in a 
growing number of countries, such as Thailand, Indonesia, Bolivia, Mexico, 
and Romania. As a result, private credit provided by other financial 
institutions is increasing” Khaltarkhuu and Sun (2014). 
This study followed Bowen and De Clercq (2008) to validate our measure and 
calculated its correlation with the following question asked in the WEF’s Executive 
Opinion Survey: “in your country, how easy is it for entrepreneurs with innovative 
but risky projects to find venture capital?” (1 = very difficult; 7 = very easy) over the 
period 2006-2014. A relatively low but significant correlation of 0.35 (p < 0.001) 
was found. Several studies used the same measure in the field of entrepreneurship 
(Álvarez and Urbano, 2011; Chowdhury et al., 2015b). 
 











4.8.5 Technology Absorption (TA) 
A final dimension of the formal institution is the availability of the latest 
technologies in a country (TA). This variable was measured from how favourable the 
environment is for the diffusion of technological change, and was obtained from the 
Global Competitiveness Report (GCR). In the GCR, firm-level technology 
absorption was calculated with the following question asked in the WEF’s Executive 
Opinion Survey: “To what extent do businesses in your country absorb new 
technology?” (1 = not at all; 7 = aggressively absorb).  
To validate our measure, its correlation was calculated with another question asked 
in the WEF’s Executive Opinion Survey: “To what extent are the latest technologies 
available in your country?” (1 = not available; 7 = widely available) over the period 
2006-2014. A value of 0.69 (p < 0.001) was obtained. A number of studies, including 
Stenholm et al. (2013) and Acs et al. (2014a, b), used the same measure to examine 
how aspiring entrepreneurs seek the development of new products and open new 
markets based on technology absorption. 
4.9 Control Variables (GDPg and GDPpc) 
Finally, given that the level of economic development of countries is considered a 
critical factor in explaining entrepreneurial activity (Wennekers et al., 2005; Acs et 
al., 2014a), this study controlled several macroeconomic factors, such as the 
country’s annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices (GDPg), and the 
country’s level of GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) (GDPpc). 
In line with other studies, these data sources were obtained from the World Bank 
(Bowen and De Clercq, 2008; Levie and Autio, 2011; Fuentelsaz et al., 2015). 
The literature suggested including other control variables, such as the size of the 
working-age population (millions), and the annual growth rate of the country’s 
population (Levie and Autio, 2011). However, this study did not control for such 
variables because they are correlated strongly with GDP per capita as the latter 
captures the joint effect of the GDP level and the population size indirectly.  
To this end, the variables mentioned earlier are the indicators used to test our model 
of entrepreneurial activity. As discussed earlier, their selection reflects both the 
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availability of suitable data and the reviewed literature concerning their significant 
impact on entrepreneurial activity in emerging economies. The next section will 
explain the econometric methods used to test the country’s variation in rates of 
entrepreneurial activity. 
4.10 Rationale for Using Panel Data  
Most studies that examined the relationship between institutions and 
entrepreneurship have used regression analysis as the primary approach of analysis; 
they do this in order to estimate causality between independent (institutions) and 
dependent (entrepreneurial activity) variables (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009; De 
Clercq et al., 2010a; Aidis et al., 2012; Estrin et al., 2013; Chowdhury et al., 2015b: 
Aparicio et al., 2016; Dutta and Sobel, 2016; among others). Adopting the same 
method in this thesis allows us to compare the study’s results with the previous 
research.  
Due to the availability of secondary data in recent years, more studies in the field of 
entrepreneurship have increasingly used panel data (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009; 
Aidis et al., 2012; Aparicio et al., 2016, among others). In this regard, panel data 
refer to “the pooling of observations on a cross-section of households, countries, 
firms, etc. over several time periods” (Baltagi, 2005, p. 1). As shown in Table 4.11 
below, there are several benefits of using panel data over time series and cross-
section studies (Baltagi, 2005).  
First, unlike time series and cross-section data, panel data can control the risk of 
obtaining biased results and therefore offer more trustworthy and reliable estimates 
(Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen, 2017). For example, Baltagi (2005) suggested that 
cigarette consumption across 46 American states for the years 1962-1988 was 
contingent on the variables of price and income. Although this relationship may vary 
with states and time, several other variables are effectively time-invariant within a 
given state (e.g., religion or culture) that may influence cigarette demand. Therefore, 
panel data analysis is used for this study to control for the “unobserved explanatory 
variables” and avoid the “omission of unobserved heterogeneity”; cross-section 
studies and time-series studies cannot do this (Baltagi, 2005, p. 5; Mehmetoglu and 
Jakobsen, 2017, p. 229).  
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Second, pooling cross-sectional countries with time series data generates a more 
substantial number of observations. Therefore, the parameter estimates (coefficients) 
are more efficient as a result of minimising the potential problems associated with 
collinearity and smaller standard errors among the variables (Baltagi, 2005).  
Third, panel data is able to analyse change over time (dynamics of change); they 
therefore provide a more accurate estimate of the effect of the independent variable 
(Gujarati, 2004; Baltagi, 2005; Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen, 2017). This latter 
advantage is significant to the study’s objective, to offer more in-depth analysis of 
the impact of institutional dynamics on entrepreneurial activity. While panel surveys 
and cross-section yield data on changes for entrepreneur’s behaviour at one point in 
time, panel data enables us to study how the entrepreneur’s behaviour changes during 
the development process of the institutional environment over time (Gujarati, 2004; 
Baltagi, 2005). In particular, this analysis allows us to observe whether the 
interaction between informal (i.e., corruption) and formal institution reforms would 
affect the entrepreneur’s behaviour in starting new ventures for a specified period. 
Although using panel data has several benefits, some limitations should be 
considered whenever panel data analysis is used (see Table 4.11). The primary 
concern related to the study’s aim is about the validity and availability of the data 
collected to measure the variables. Also, panel data findings are more useful when 
they are over long time periods, such as five years or even longer (Baltagi, 2005). 
Therefore, the data selected to measure the study’s variables are based on previous 
literature (see Sections 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9) to produce reliable results over a nine-year 
period (2006-2014). The following section reviews the alternative panel regression 
models, their fundamental assumptions, and their appropriateness for analysing the 
impact of the institutional environment on the development of entrepreneurial 







Table 4.11: Advantages and disadvantages of using panel data 
Advantages Disadvantages 
“Controlling for individual heterogeneity” “Design and data collection problems” 
“Panel data give more informative data, more 
variability, less collinearity among the 
variables, more degrees of freedom and more 
efficiency” 
“Distortions of measurement errors” 






“Panel data are better able to identify and 
measure effects that are simply not detectable 
in pure cross-section or pure time-series data” 
“Short time-series dimension” 
“Panel data models allow us to construct and test 
more complicated behavioural models than 
purely cross-section or time-series data” 
“Cross-section dependence” 
“Micro panel data gathered on individuals, firms 
and households may be more accurately 
measured than similar variables measured at 
the macro level” 
 
“Macro panel data on the other hand have a 
longer time series” 
 
Source: Baltagi (2005) 
4.11 Panel Models 
This section discusses how panel data models examine individual effects in order to 
deal with heterogeneity or cross-section variation that may or may not be observed. 
These are either fixed or random effects. Choosing the right panel data model is 
important to ensure the validity of the research findings. Park (2011, p. 1) stated 
there is:  
“A common misunderstanding is that fixed and/or random effect models 
should always be employed whenever your data are arranged in the panel data 
format. The problems of panel data modelling, by and large, come from 1) 
panel data themselves, 2) modelling process, and 3) interpretation and 
presentation of the result. Some studies analyse poorly organised panel data 
(in fact, they are not longitudinal in a strong econometric sense), and some 
others mechanically apply fixed and/or random effect models in haste without 
consideration of the relevance of such models. Careless researchers often fail 
to interpret the results correctly and to present them appropriately”.  
The remainder of this section reviews the different panel data models available and 




4.11.1 The pooled panel model 
The nature of panel data is that the number of observations is given by multiplying i 
(units) by t (time points). The basic ordinary least squares (OLS) pooled panel model 
can be expressed as:  
)1.4(0 ititit XY  ++=  
Where (i) indicates the individual country and (t) indicates time. The error term 
(unexplained variance) is written simply as ( it ). The pooled OLS model assumes 
that the errors ( it ) are both independent of each other and normally distributed. 
However, in most cases, the error term of panel data will be correlated over time (t) 
for a given unit (i) (autocorrelation). Therefore, regular OLS regression may produce 
false-positive findings on the dependent variable (𝑌) (invalid statistical significant 
results) by underestimating the standard errors, and the (t-) and (F-statistics) will be 
inflated. Moreover, this correlation between errors can also lead to the correlation 
between the explanatory (i.e., independent or predictor) (X) variables and variance of 
the error term (heteroscedasticity). Therefore, there is a need to account for the 
correlation of the error terms for each unit (i). To this end, panel data can be 
regularly estimated using OLS if the model is correctly specified and the explanatory 
(X) variables are uncorrelated with the error term and its variance (Mehmetoglu and 
Jakobsen, 2017). 
4.11.2 The fixed effect model 
When performing OLS regression, we face the problem that we cannot be confident 
what type of effect we are measuring. For example, suppose that we are investigating 
the effect of income level on happiness in 30 countries for years 2006-2014. If one of 
these countries (who has the highest income levels) has some cultural and social 
issues such as gender inequality (an unobserved time-invariant variable), that makes 
this country generally more unhappy compared to others. The OLS regression would 
be biased as the income variable also catches the effect of these social issues for this 
specific country (Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen, 2017). This is where the fixed effects 
(regression) model (FEM) becomes useful. FEM only compares the effect of income 
levels on happiness within a particular economy. For this reason, it is also referred to 
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as the “within” estimator. It considers the “individuality” of each country by 
allowing the intercept to vary for each country, but still assumes that the slope 
coefficients are constant across countries (Gujarati, 2004, p. 642). The FEM can be 
written as: 
)2.4(11 ititiit XY  ++=  
It is noteworthy that we have placed the subscript (i) on the intercept term (  ) to 
suggest that the intercepts of the countries may be different due to special 
characteristics of each country, such as political, economic, or social conditions 
(Gujarati, 2004, p. 642). 
In this regard, Gujarati (2004, p. 642) stated that:  
“The term “fixed effects” is due to the fact that, although the intercept may 
differ across individuals [here countries], each individual’s intercept does not 
vary over time; that is, it is time invariant”.  
Therefore, if the intercept was written as ( it ), it would indicate that the intercept of 
each country is time variant. As a result, the FEM equation given in (4.2) assumes 
that the (slope) coefficients of the independent variables (𝑋) do not vary across 
countries or over time (Gujarati, 2004). 
To this end, FEM is very useful when we are interested in the effect of variables that 
vary over time. This estimator helps to examine the relationship between the 
dependent and the predictor variables within a unit (e.g., person, company, country). 
Each unit (here country) has its own individual characteristics that may or may not 
impact the independent variables. However, because the time-invariant variables are 
omitted in FEM, it is challenging to investigate the effect of time-invariant variables 
such as gender, political institutions, and geographic variables. For example, to 
compare between oil-based economies, it is interesting to investigate why Norway 
was better able to cope with the financial crisis than other oil-based economies, and 
simply conclude that it did so because it is Norway (as we would in FEM) 
(Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen, 2017). As a result, FEM could be more effective in 
examining the changes within a country rather than differences across countries. 
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4.11.3 The random effect model 
The random effects model (REM) is to be used if the study theoretically assumes that 
both variations within units (here countries) (FEM) and between units (between 
effects) have some influence on the dependent variable (Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen, 
2017). REM is a combination of the between and within estimators and can be 
written as: 
)3.4(110 itiitit uXY  +++=  
The REM equation has two error terms, ( iu ), which is the unit specific (rather time-
specific) error term, and ( it ), which is the combined time series and cross-section 
error component.  
While in FEM each cross-sectional unit (e.g., country) has its own (fixed) intercept 
value, the intercept ( 0 ) of REM shows:  
“the mean value of all the (cross-sectional) intercepts and the error 
component [ iu ] shows the (random) deviation of individual intercept from 
this mean value”.  
Nevertheless, the error component iu is not directly observable; it is what is known 
as an “unobservable, or latent, variable” (Gujarati, 2004, p. 648). 
As a result, the REM requires all of the same assumptions as the FEM plus the 
additional assumption that the individual effect is uncorrelated with “all explanatory 
variables in all time periods” (Wooldridge, 2012, p. 492). This is the key assumption 
that eliminates any correlation between the individual effect and the explanatory 
variables. Moreover, because it is assumed that the individual effect is uncorrelated 
with the explanatory variables, time-invariant explanatory variables can be 
comprised in the REM, and estimates are more efficient. Comparing with FEM, the 
main drawback of REM is the additional, and often implausible, assumption that the 





4.11.4 Selecting a fixed or random effect model 
Since FEM allows an arbitrary correlation between the individual effect and the itX , 
and REM does not, FEM is “widely thought to be a more convincing tool for 
estimating ceteris paribus effects” (Wooldridge, 2012, p. 495). However, REM is 
used in specific situations. In particular, if the key independent variable is constant 
over time, FEM cannot be used to estimate its effect on the dependent variable 
(Wooldridge, 2012, p. 496). 
To solve this problem, researchers commonly use both REM and FEM, and then 
formally examine for statistically significant differences in the coefficients on the 
time-varying independent variables. This test was first proposed by Hausman (1978), 
who suggested comparing FEM and REM estimates, and then selecting the more 
efficient REM if the estimates are similar, but FEM if they are different. The null 
hypothesis is that the researcher uses the random effects estimates unless the 
Hausman test rejects it. In this respect, Wooldridge (2012, p. 496) argued that:  
“In practice, a failure to reject means either that the [REM] and [FEM] 
estimates are sufficiently close so that it does not matter which is used, or the 
sampling variation is so large in the [FEM] estimates that one cannot 
conclude practically significant differences are statistically significant”.  
However, Wooldridge (2012) further contended that in some applications of panel 
data analysis, the study sample cannot be treated as a random sample from a large 
population, particularly when the unit of observation is a large geographical unit 
(e.g., regions or countries). In this case, it often makes sense to think of each iu  as a 
separate intercept to estimate for each cross-sectional unit (here country). In relation 
to the study context, using FEM might be more appropriate as it mechanically allows 
a different intercept for each country. To this end, Wooldridge (2012, p. 496) stated 
that:  
“whether or not we engage in the philosophical debate about the nature of 
[the data], [FEM] is almost always much more convincing than REM for 






This chapter started by explaining the rationale for choosing the study context. This 
was followed by discussing the research paradigm to be used in this study, and then 
provided a full justification for the choice of quantitative analysis. The chapter then 
presented the study’s hypotheses, followed by providing a thorough description of 
the research design, data sources and the measures of the study’s variables. Finally, 
this chapter presented a justification for using panel data and the alternative models 
for using it.  
The following chapter will examine the results of the research in order to discuss 






CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS  
5.1 Introduction 
This thesis aims to examine the interaction effect of informal and formal institutions 
on the development of entrepreneurial activity in the context of emerging economies. 
In particular, it sets out to answer the question:  
Do formal institutions affect the development of entrepreneurial activity in 
the same way under conditions of both endemic corruption and freedom from 
that corruption?  
It was, therefore, necessary to examine the moderating effect of corruption (as an 
informal institution) on the relationship between formal institutions and 
entrepreneurial activity. As discussed in Chapter 4, secondary panel data from 
different sources such as from World Bank UNESCO and GCR databases were used, 
as shown in Section 4.6. 
In this chapter, the results of the Hausman test supported the use of a fixed effects 
model for the regression model. This specification model enables us to study the 
impact of variables that vary over time. In particular, it allows us to examine the 
interaction effect of formal and informal institutions on the development of 
entrepreneurial activity within each emerging economy. To meet the objective of the 
study, different panel data techniques were used to test the moderating effect of 
corruption on the relationship between formal institutions and entrepreneurial 
activity summarised in Table 5.11. The results of the panel data analysis were 
conducted using the STATA version 15 software package. 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics and Dynamics among Variables 
The summary statistics of the variables included in our baseline model are listed in 
Table 5.1. Across the 44 emerging economies covered in our sample for years 2006-
2014, the average value of the entrepreneurship rate was 3%; it ranged from a 




Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables  
   Emerging economies 
  Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
 1. New Entry Rate (NER) 375 3.00 3.00 0.03 16.26 
Informal 2. Control of corruption (CC) 396 -0.10 0.63 -1.27 1.57 
Formal 3. Procedures for starting a business (PRO) 396 7.65 2.85 2.00 16.00 
 4. Business and entrepreneurial skills 
(TEDU) 
360 46.36 22.47 4.99 99.66 
 5. Access to credit (AC) 394 51.26 31.90 6.17 159.76 
 6. Firm-level technology absorption (TA) 392 4.76 0.59 3.11 6.16 
Control 7. GDP growth (GDPg) 396 3.93 4.50 -14.81 34.50 
 8. GDP per capita PPP (GDPpc)  396 14735.23 8107.89 1641.04 34929.32 
Source: Own calculations 
Based on the data analysis in Figure 5.1, the dynamics of the entrepreneurial activity 
showed that the indicator rate was on an upward trend. However, it slowed because 
of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009. Afterwards, emerging economies in our 
selected sample started to recover and the growth of entrepreneurial activity 
resumed. Therefore, in recent years, individuals are more likely to start their 
businesses in emerging economies. 
 
Figure 5.1: The dynamics of entrepreneurship rates in the selected emerging 
economies 
Source: Own calculations based on data from NER and GDPg values. 
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Concerning the variable related to informal institutions, the level of corruption varies 
significantly among emerging economies, where the lowest level of corruption was 
1.57 (Chile in 2012), and the highest level was -1.27 (the Kyrgyz Republic in 2006). 
According to Figure 5.2, the selected sample of emerging economies suffers 
relatively from high levels of corruption as the average value of corruption was -
0.10. This result is consistent with other studies that showed that emerging 
economies (especially post-communist countries) inherited high levels of corruption 
(Aidis et al., 2008; Tonoyan et al., 2010; Smallbone et al., 2014). 
 
Figure 5.2: The dynamics of corruption levels in the selected emerging economies 
Source: Own calculations based on data from CC values 
Among the formal institutions’ variables, the number of procedures to start a 
business showed a large disparity, where the most efficient regarding the number of 
procedures was Jamaica (2 procedures in 2014), and the lowest was Brazil (16 
procedures in 2007 and 2008). This indicates significant differences between 
countries regarding the policy reforms of the number of procedures. However, the 
efficiency of the number of procedures was improved if we consider the average 




Figure 5.3: The dynamics of number of procedures in the selected emerging 
economies 
Source: Own calculations based on data from PRO values 
Another formal institution with a high standard deviation is the percentage of the 
gross enrolment ratio of tertiary education, which ranged from 4.99% (Pakistan in 
2006) to 99.6% (the Korean Republic in 2010). Nevertheless, there is an upward 
trend in the average rate of tertiary education among the selected sample of emerging 
economies (Figure 5.4). 
 
Figure 5.4: The dynamics of tertiary education rates in the selected emerging 
economies 
Source: Own calculations based on data from TEDU values 
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Domestic credit to the private sector by banks as a share of GDP showed the most 
substantial discrepancy, ranging from 6.17% (the Kyrgyz Republic in 2007) to 
159.76% (Portugal in 2009). This indicates significant differences among emerging 
economies regarding financial development. According to Figure 5.5, the average 
domestic credit to the private sector by banks as a share of GDP has increased by a 
small amount among the selected sample of emerging economies. 
 
Figure 5.5: The dynamics of access to credit rates in the selected emerging 
economies 
Source: Own calculations based on data from AC values 
The last formal institution is the average survey response to the question: “to what 
extent do businesses in your country absorb new technology?” (measured on a 7-
point Likert scale). This formal institution showed the lowest standard deviation 
(0.59). The lowest value was 3.11 (the Kyrgyz Republic in 2006), and the highest 
value was 6.17 (Israel in 2012). Based on Figure 5.6, the average rate of the firm-
level of technology absorption has not improved significantly among the selected 




Figure 5.6: The dynamics of technology absorption rates in the selected emerging 
economies 
Source: Own calculations based on data from TA values 
With regard to the control variables, GDP growth also had significant variations, 
from -14.81 (Lithuania in 2009) to 34.5 (Azerbaijan in 2006). Another 
macroeconomic variable with a high standard deviation is GDP per capita based on 
purchasing power parity (PPP), which ranged from $1,641 (Tajikistan in 2006) to 
$34,929 (Israel in 2014). 
5.3 The Correlation among Variables  
The correlation matrix (Table 5.2) reports the correlation coefficients of the variables 
used in this thesis. While the correlation matrix does not inform us about causal 
relationships between these variables, it could be a useful estimate for the hypothesis 
testing in the next sections as it demonstrates the strength and direction of any 
relationship between variables. Also, it allows for the analysis of potential 
multicollinearity problems in the data. The results shown in Table 5.2 are discussed 




Table 5.2: Correlation matrix between the variables included in the baseline model 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. NER 1        
2. CC 0.567*** 1       
3. PRO -0.346*** -0.232*** 1      
4. TEDU 0.336*** 0.432*** -0.277*** 1     
5. AC 0.270*** 0.593*** -0.261*** 0.465*** 1    
6. TA 0.035 0.523*** -0.044 0.233*** 0.584*** 1   
7. GDPg -0.113* -0.179*** 0.248*** -0.282*** -0.248*** -0.052 1  
8. GDPpc 0.431*** 0.600*** -0.273*** 0.759*** 0.564*** 0.477*** -0.262*** 1 
*** p < 0.001; * p < 0.05. 
Source: Own calculations 
5.4 Model Specification and Estimation Issues 
As the study’s dataset deal with a relatively substantial number of cross-sectional 
units (44 emerging economies) that have various characterisations (e.g., cultural 
values, religions, social norms, and using different currencies), it is more likely to 
have heterogeneity in panel data (Wooldridge, 2012). Therefore, it is essential to 
consider this heterogeneity when determining the specification of the econometric 
model and to select the most appropriate estimation technique. 
In this regard, after performing a REM, the Lagrange multiplier (LM) test was used 
for the REM. This test was established by Breusch and Pagan (1980) and developed 
by Baltagi and Li (1990), so it can be used for unbalanced panels. The LM test 
guides choice between the OLS and the REM. The result of testing the null 
hypothesis was rejected; this stated that the variance of the unobserved fixed effects 
is not statistically different from zero. Therefore, the study’s result indicated that 
pooled OLS is not the most suitable model. This conclusion was supported by the 
results of the F test of heterogeneity of effects at the panel-unit level, provided after 
performing an FEM. The null hypothesis was rejected; this stated that the constant 
terms are equal among units (i.e., countries), suggesting that pooled OLS could show 
unreliable estimates. 
To select between FEM and REM, the Hausman test was used. The result of the null 
hypothesis was rejected (p value = 0.0078); this stated that the coefficients estimated 
by the REM do not differ substantially from those estimated by the FEM 
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(Wooldridge, 2012). In other words, the REM is inconsistent and the FEM is more 
suitable for this study. Therefore, this research applied the FEM, which allows 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity across countries that is fixed over time. 
Based on the previous results, this study proposed the general model given below for 
the hypotheses analyses; this indicated that an FEM provided a better fit for our data. 
However, this study takes into account that the FEM uses only within-country 
variation, which impacts the interpretation of the results (Aidis et al., 2012). 
)1.5(4321 ititititititiit FIIICVFIIINER  +++++=  
Where: 
i     : country specific fixed effect 
itII   : matrix of informal institutions in country i in year t 
itFI  : matrix of formal institutions in country i in year t 
itCV : matrix of the control variable in country i in year t 
5.4.1 Absence of multicollinearity 
This assumption indicates that two explanatory variables in the same model cannot 
be perfectly correlated with one another. The results from including such variables 
that measure the same phenomenon can conduct too low standard errors, and the 
coefficients provide imprecise estimates. Also, because the variables will steal 
explanatory power from each other, it will be difficult to assess the relative 
importance of the different explanatory variables. Therefore, the absence of 
multicollinearity is necessary for the regression model to separate those explanatory 
variables that have a significant impact on the dependent variable. The best solution 
to the problem of multicollinearity is to exclude one of the highly correlated 
explanatory variables (Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen, 2017). 
In this realm, Gujarati (2004) suggested a rule of thumb that all correlation 
coefficients should be below (0.8). Therefore, after computing the correlation matrix, 
the results in Table 5.2 showed that there was no strong correlation across the 
independent variables. However, these results also found relatively high correlations, 
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and so it remains possible that some of the groups of variables might be highly 
correlated (e.g., control of corruption with the number of procedures, tertiary 
education, and access to credit). Therefore, the problem of multicollinearity was 
tested, which could influence the significance of the main parameters in the 
regressions by computing the variance inflation factors (VIFs). The results (Table 
5.3) showed that multicollinearity is not going to pose a problem in this study as the 
highly correlated variables were below the threshold of 5 (the mean VIF was 2.11), 
and the tolerance value (1/VIF) was not below 0.2. It is noteworthy that the previous 
conditions are not included for models including interaction terms (Mehmetoglu and 
Jakobsen, 2017). The absence of multicollinearity in the interaction terms is 
discussed in Section 5.4.6. 
Table 5.3: Results of VIF analysis for the independent variables 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Control of corruption (CC) 1.99 0.50 
Procedures for starting a business (PRO) 1.18 0.84 
Business and entrepreneurial skills (TEDU) 2.63 0.38 
Access to credit (AC) 2.09 0.47 
Firm-level technology absorption (TA) 2.02 0.49 
GDP growth (GDPg) 1.13 0.88 
GDP per capita PPP (GDPpc)  3.70 0.27 
Mean VIF 2.11 0.54 
Source: Own calculations 
5.4.2 Endogeneity 
As discussed earlier in Chapters 2 and 3, entrepreneurial activity is affected by 
environmental factors measured through informal and formal institutions. However, 
reverse causality is a distinct danger when formal institutions, corruption, and 
entrepreneurship are included in one model (Bjørnskov and Foss, 2016). For 
example, corruption levels could increase when entrepreneurs keep practising 
“grease the wheels” to minimise administrative barriers, or rent-seeker entrepreneurs 
could form lobbying to influence the policies of formal institutions, such as offering 
complex regulations to protect their benefits (Belitski et al., 2016). Moreover, 
because particular time-varying factors may affect both formal and informal 
141 
 
institutions at the same time as entrepreneurship (such as revolution and conquest) 
(North, 1990), then that would impose omitted variable bias on regression results. 
One way to deal with the possible endogeneity of the independent variables, 
simultaneity bias, reverse causality and omitted variables is to consider panel unit 
root test and panel cointegration using Windmeijer (2005) system general method of 
moment (SGMM) estimator, with the two-step finite-sample correction. Although the 
use of GMM estimation can overcome the endogeneity bias, and control the fixed 
effects model (FEM), time effects, and multiple endogenous variables, SGMM is 
better because the conventional dynamic GMM coefficients will be biased for small 
samples if the series is near unit root processes and the instrument variables are weak 
(Windmeijer, 2005). 
Since the time series of this study is relatively small (nine years), another way to deal 
with the potential reverse-causality and endogeneity issues is to include lagged 
values of institutional variables. In this regard, we ran the instrumental variable (IV) 
regressions of a model (including the interaction terms) and instrumented the 
informal and formal institution variables with their lags (first and second). Following 
Roman et al. (2018), the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity was applied to 
conclude whether IV and OLS estimates are close enough. The test result failed to 
reject the null; this stated that the variables are exogenous, at the significance level of 
5%. Also, to offer more robust results, the control variables were lagged by one 
period, and the results remained the same. The Hausman test results indicated that 
the current values of the dependent variable (NER) could not influence the past 
values of the independent variables (formal and informal institutions). Therefore, 
endogeneity is not a problem in the study’s analysis. 
This result may be explained by the nature of the independent variable (NER), which 
captures the early stage of becoming an entrepreneur. It is concerned with the 
entrepreneurship process of starting a new business activity, while the effects of 
entrepreneurship on the development of institutions tend to take time after the 
business was formed. Therefore, even though entrepreneurship could affect the 
development of institutions, these effects are unlikely to occur instantaneously 
(North, 1990; Roman et al., 2018). To this end, confidence in the unbiased findings 




Analysing panel data consists of different statistical challenges. One of these 
frequent problems is known as “groupwise heteroskedasticity” (Baum, 2001, p. 101). 
According to Baum (2001, p. 101), the error process may be homoscedastic within 
cross-sectional units (i.e., countries). However, its variance may differ across units 
(i.e., non-constant variance). To examine this condition, Baum (2001) suggested 
performing the modified Wald test for “groupwise heteroskedasticity” in the FEM. 
This test was also adopted recently by Roman et al., (2018). The result of the null 
hypothesis was rejected; this stated that 𝜀𝑖
2 = 𝜀2 (for all i). Therefore, we concluded 
that the errors are heteroscedastic.  
In addition, the presence of heteroscedasticity in the data was confirmed by drawing 
a plot of the standardised residuals against the fitted residuals (see Figures 5.7 to 
5.11). In all five graphs, the spread of the residuals clearly differs across the range of 
the independent variable. The approach to dealing with the presence of heterogeneity 
is addressed in the next section. 
 
Figure 5.7: Homoscedastic scatterplot of standardised residuals against predicted 
values of corruption 




Figure 5.8: Homoscedastic scatterplot of standardised residuals against predicted 
values of procedures 
Source: Devised by author 
 
Figure 5.9: Homoscedastic scatterplot of standardised residuals against predicted 
values of tertiary education 
Source: Devised by author 
 
Figure 5.10: Homoscedastic scatterplot of standardised residuals against predicted 
values of access to credit 




Figure 5.11: Homoscedastic scatterplot of standardised residuals against predicted 
values of technology 
Source: Devised by author 
5.4.4 Autocorrelation 
In panel data models, there is a standard assumption that the error terms are not 
correlated, both in time and across cross-sectional units (i.e., countries). In this 
regard, we used the Wooldridge (2002) test for serial correlation in linear panel-data 
models to test for serial correlation (i.e., autocorrelation) in the idiosyncratic errors. 
The null hypothesis was rejected; this stated that there is no first-order 
autocorrelation in the error terms. 
In addition, we examined for the existence of contemporaneous correlation and ran a 
Pesaran (2004) test for the cross-section dependence. The null hypothesis was 
rejected; this stated that there is no contemporaneous correlation. We therefore 
conclude that the impact of shocks in one country could affect another country when 
both countries belong in the panel dataset. 
In summary, the study results found that the error structure was heteroscedastic, 
autocorrelated, cross-sectional dependence and correlated among the panels. As a 
result, following Roman et al. (2018, p. 517), this study used Driscoll and Kraay’s 
(1998) “standard errors for the coefficients estimated by the within-group regression, 





5.4.5 Missing values and data imputations 
Many missing values are likely to lower the quality of panel data. The extent of the 
missing data problem in the dataset can be seen in the “Observations” column in 
Table 5.1. Listwise deletion is the most common approach for dealing with missing 
values when an entire record is eliminated from analysis if any single value of a 
variable is missing. However, this approach can introduce bias into estimates if the 
data are not missing at random, and reduces the number of observations used in a 
model, weakening the statistical power of any test (Park, 2011). 
Table 5.4: Imputed values for emerging countries 
Variable Complete Incomplete Imputed Total 
New Entry Rate (NER) 375 21 21 396 
Tertiary education (TEDU) 360 36 36 396 
Access to credit (AC) 394 2 2 396 
Firm-level technology absorption (TA) 392 4 4 396 
Source: Own calculations 
To deal with missing values in the study’s dataset, we implemented multiple 
imputation techniques to replace the missing values, as shown in Table 5.4 above. 
The strength of multiple imputation techniques among other techniques used for 
replacing missing values is that “it can restore observations and statistical power, and 
at the same time reduce the likelihood of biased coefficients” (Mehmetoglu and 
Jakobsen, 2017, p. 342). In contrast, other missing data techniques, such as listwise 
deletion or country average estimates, may lead to results that will be less efficient 
(wider confidence intervals, larger standard errors, and less power) than multiple 
imputations results (Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen, 2017). 
5.4.6 Interaction analysis  
Finally, to analyse the interaction effect of formal and informal institutions on 
entrepreneurial activity, this study used the product-term approach, which is the most 
commonly used to examine statistical interaction (also called moderation) effects 
using linear regression (Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen, 2017). In this approach, the 
interaction/moderation effect occurs when a third variable (moderator) affects the 
relationship between an independent variable and a dependent variable. This can be 
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demonstrated when a new variable is created (X3) by multiplying two independent 
variables (X1xX2) and then entering this new variable (X3) into the regression 
model together with its component terms X1 and X2 (Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen, 
2017). 
As a result, we multiplied informal institution variable (CC) with formal institutions 
(PRO, TEDU, AC and TA) to produce new variables (CCxPRO, CCxTEDU, 
CCxAC and CCxTA), as shown in equation 5.17. From a statistical point of view, 
both informal and formal institutions can be treated as a moderator variable 
(Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen, 2017). In practice, however, informal institution (i.e., 
corruption) is treated as the moderator between formal institutions and 
entrepreneurship based on the study’s hypotheses (Williamson, 2000). 
)1.5(4321 ititititititiit FIIICVFIIINER  +++++=  
Nevertheless, the VIF result of the interaction terms showed that there is a problem 
of multicollinearity (see Table 5.5). To solve this issue, and to avoid dropping any 
variable from the regression model, we followed Aiken and West’s (1991) 
procedures to assess the interaction effects; we formed interaction terms by 
multiplying the mean-centred values of the interacting variables, then include these 
terms in one regression equation. This approach was adopted in different studies to 
minimise the possibility of multicollinearity (De Clercq et al., 2010a, b; Danis et al., 
2011). As a result, the VIF scores shown in Table 5.6 are below the cut-off value of 
5, and thus multicollinearity is not a concern in the analysis (Mehmetoglu and 
Jakobsen, 2017).  
In order to better understand the interpretation of the results from the moderation 
effect model with a product term, this study first recalls how to interpret the 
coefficients without the moderation effect of the new product term (Mehmetoglu and 
Jakobsen, 2017). While some studies tended to analyse the moderation hypotheses by 
suggesting the direct and indirect effect in the hypotheses (De Clercq et al, 2010a; 
Levie and Autio, 2011; Turro et al., 2014), other studies analysed the moderation 
hypotheses directly without including a direct effects hypothesis but still model the 
direct effects (Valliere and Peterson, 2009; De Clercq et al, 2010b; Pathak et al., 
                                               
7 Equation repeated here for ease of reading. 
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2015). Because the direct effects hypotheses of formal institutions on 
entrepreneurship was discussed in the literature, as explained in Chapter 3, this study 
is more concerned with the interaction effect hypotheses of informal and formal 
institutions on entrepreneurship. Therefore, this study followed the latter approach by 
creating several models to test the hypotheses, as discussed in the next section.  
Table 5.5: Results of VIF analysis including the interaction terms 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Control of corruption (CC) 120.65 0.00 
Procedures for starting a business (PRO) 1.49 0.67 
Business and entrepreneurial skills (TEDU) 2.84 0.35 
Access to credit (AC) 2.45 0.40 
Firm-level technology absorption (TA) 2.28 0.43 
GDP growth (GDPg) 1.14 0.87 
GDP per capita PPP (GDPpc)  3.79 0.26 
CC x PRO 12.01 0.08 
CC x TEDU 9.60 0.10 
CC x AC 8.36 0.11 
CC x TA 114.77 0.00 
Source: Own calculations 
Table 5.6: Results of VIF analysis with Aiken and West’s (1991) approach 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Control of corruption (CC) 2.06 0.48 
Procedures for starting a business (PRO) 1.30 0.76 
Business and entrepreneurial skills (TEDU) 2.92 0.34 
Access to credit (AC) 2.81 0.35 
Firm-level technology absorption (TA) 2.31 0.43 
GDP growth (GDPg) 1.14 0.87 
GDP per capita PPP (GDPpc)  3.79 0.26 
CC x PRO 1.27 0.78 
CC x TEDU 1.77 0.56 
CC x AC 2.56 0.39 
CC x TA 1.74 0.57 
Source: Own calculations 
5.5 Regression Analysis Results 
In Table 5.7, Model 1 includes the direct effect of informal and formal institutions on 
entrepreneurial activity, whereas Model 2 shows the moderating influence of the 
informal institution (i.e., corruption) on the relationship between formal institutions 
and entrepreneurial activity. The first two models are central to addressing the 
research question. In this way, we get to test for Hypotheses 1a, 2a, 3a and 4a by 
examining the significant difference in the model fit when progressing from Model 1 
to Model 2. 
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To test hypotheses 1b, 2b, 3b and 4b, Models 3 and 4 consider country-level stages 
of economic development (factor-driven, efficiency-driven, and innovation-driven 
economies) as reported by the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR). These models 
were developed as it was suggested that the institutional factors affect entrepreneurial 
activity differently based on the stage of economic development (Acs et al., 2014a; 
Schwab and Sala-i-Martín, 2014). Accordingly, the sample was split into high/low 
innovation countries to distinguish the country-level stage of development for our 
study. While Model 3 represents more developed emerging countries, characterised 
as being at the innovation stage or in the transition stage to the innovation stage, 
Model 4 represents less developed emerging countries that are in the lower stages of 
economic development, as shown in Chapter 4 (see Table 4.2). It is noteworthy that 
Model 4 combines factor-driven and efficiency-driven economies, as only six 
countries were classified as factor-driven by GCR (Table 4.1), and therefore, there is 
not sufficient statistical power to evaluate them separately. 
To test the regression model robustness, we conducted a model specification link test 
for Models 1-4, which indicated that the models were well specified and statistically 
significant (p < 0.05). Also, the value of R2 indicates that the model can explain 
approximately 90% of country variations in rates of entrepreneurial activity for all 
models (1-4). However, the summary statistics of the independent variables (Table 
5.1) suggest that outliers are present in the data. This could indicate that the overall 
summary statistics, such as R2, arising from data analyses found on regression 
models can show a misleading and distorted picture (Cook, 1977). Therefore, we 
used Cook’s (1977) distance diagnostic test to estimate the influence of a data point 
when performing regression analysis; we found that these outliers data of the 
independent variables were not a problem.  
While the regression models’ results are discussed thoroughly in Chapter 6, it is 
useful to highlight the main results of Model 2 in Table 5.7 as an introduction to the 
next chapter. In Model 2, we see that all four interaction terms are statistically 
significant, indicating that corruption does moderate the effect of the formal 
institutions on the rates of entrepreneurial activity. We see, for example, that the 
coefficient on PRO is -0.104 and the coefficient on CCxPRO is -0.163. This means 
that while PRO has a negative effect in general, with a one-unit higher value of PRO 
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associated with a 0.163 reduction in NER in countries for which CC is 0, the effect 
of PRO is even more strongly negative in countries in which there is a high level of 
CC (lower levels of corruption). 
Table 5.7: Regression analysis explaining entrepreneurial activity (NER) for 
emerging economies-baseline models 
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F-statistic 46.44 51.36 201.99 7.99 
Prob.(F-statistic) 0.0039 0.0285 0.0006 0.0000 
R2  0.898 0.907 0.913 0.892 
Observations 396 396 180 216 
Countries 44 44 20 24 
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors between parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Source: Own calculations 
Also, the coefficient on TEDU is 0.004 and the coefficient on CCxTEDU is 0.040. 
This means that while TEDU has a positive effect in general, for one unit increases 
of TEDU, NER is expected to increase by 0.040 units in countries for which CC is 0. 
As a result, for every one-unit increase in CC, the effect of a one-unit increase in 
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TEDU on NER becomes more positive by 0.040. Therefore, the effect of TEDU is 
seen even more strongly in countries that have lower levels of corruption. 
Moreover, the coefficient on AC is -0.014 and the coefficient on CCxAC is -0.020. 
This means that while AC has a negative effect in general, for one-unit increases in 
AC, NER is expected to decrease by 0.020 units in countries for which CC is 0. As a 
result, for every one-unit increase in CC, the effect of a one-unit increase in AC on 
NER becomes more negative by -.020. Therefore, the negative effect of AC is seen 
even more strongly in countries that have lower levels of corruption. 
Finally, the coefficient on TA is -0.100 and the coefficient on CCxTA is -0.681. This 
means that while TA has a negative effect in general, for one-unit increases in TA, 
NER is expected to decrease by 0.681 units in countries for which CC is 0. 
Consequently, for every one-unit increase in CC, the effect of a one-unit increase in 
TA on NER becomes more negative by -0.681. Thus, the negative effect of TA is 
seen even more strongly in countries that have lower levels of corruption. 
5.6 Model Robustness Checks  
5.6.1 Moderated hierarchical regression analysis 
To assess the robustness of the interaction effects results in this study, a moderated 
hierarchical regression analysis was performed. This approach was used in different 
studies to minimise the possibility of multicollinearity (De Clercq et al., 2010a, b). 
Although multicollinearity was not a concern in this study (see Table 5.6), reporting 
the interaction terms in separate regression equations can provide consistency of the 
signs of the interactions terms compared with those in the models in which the 
interaction terms are included in the full model (De Clercq et al., 2010b). 
The results in Table 5.8 show that the interaction terms in Models 1-4 were 
consistent in sign compared with Model 2 in Table 5.7. However, the interaction 
effects of CCxAC and CCxTA became subdued and insignificant in Table 5.8 
(Models 3 and 4). This shift to different effects could suggest that the simultaneous 
inclusion of the interaction terms considers each effect in the presence of the other 
effects as shown in Table 5.7 (Model 2). Specifically, the moderating effect of 
control of corruption (CC) covers each of the interaction terms that represent the 
151 
 
differential effect of formal institutions (PRO, TEDU, AC and TA) on 
entrepreneurial activity (NER). Therefore, the lack of significance in Table 5.8 
(Models 3 and 4) indicated that each of the moderating effects is sensitive to the 
other moderators, as shown in Table 5.7 (Aiken and West, 1991; De Clercq et al., 
2010b). 
Table 5.8: Hierarchical regression analysis explaining entrepreneurial activity (NER) 
for emerging economies 
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  H1: CC x PRO -0.161*** 
(0.024) 
- - - 
  H2: CC x TEDU - 0.037** 
(0.010) 
- - 
  H3: CC x AC - - -0.004 
(0.006) 
- 
  H4: CC x TA - - - -0.498 
(0.534) 
Control variable     

























F-statistic 83.00 53.91 39.05 39.16 
Prob.(F-statistic) 0.0038 0.0035 0.0085 0.0083 
R2  0.901 0.902 0.898 0.899 
Observations 396 396 396 396 
Countries 44 44 44 44 
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors between parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 





5.6.2 Assessing the role of time effects  
In this study, the period covered by the dataset comprises the outbreak of the 
international economic and financial crisis in 2007 (but with consequences in 
emerging economies starting in 2008 and 2009) that strongly influenced many of the 
nations comprised in the study’s sample (see Figure 5.1). Therefore, there is a need 
to control for time effects, and to test the robustness of the estimates against the 
inclusion of such effect in the study’s models. One approach, as suggested by Roman 
et al. (2018), was to introduce an indicator for the crisis period 2008-2009 that 
captures the effect of the international economic crisis as compared to the after-crisis 
period 2010-2014 as shown in Table 5.9. 
Also, as suggested by Roman et al. (2018), we included individual time dummies for 
each of the years in the study period, in the right-hand side of Equation (5.1) (in fact, 
we introduced just 8-year dummies (2007-2014) for the total 9 years, to avoid falling 
into the dummy variable trap). The results are summarised in Table 5.10. Results 














Table 5.9: Results of regression analysis with economic crisis effects 















    








Formal institutions     
























































Control variable     








































F-statistic 34.99   72.99 80.31 8.34 
Prob.(F-statistic) 0.0111 0.0124 0.0020 0.6756 
R2  0.899 0.908 0.915 0.892 
Observations 396 396 180 216 
Countries 44 44 20 24 
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors between parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 








Table 5.10: Results of regression analysis with time effects 
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  GDPpc 0.000 
(0.000) 














































































F-statistic 62.41 53.45 5.38 19.40 
Prob.(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2  0.902 0.910 0.921 0.897 
Observations 396 396 180 216 
Countries 44 44 20 24 
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors between parentheses. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 




This chapter reported the findings from the investigation into the interaction effect of 
formal and informal institutions on the development of entrepreneurial activity 
across emerging economies. Different statistical techniques and approaches have 
been used to meet the objective and to test the hypotheses of this study (see Table 
5.11). 
The results from Section 5.2 revealed that the there was a considerable variation in 
rates of entrepreneurial activity across emerging economies. Indeed, it is apparent 
from the regression models presented in Section 5.5 that the quality of institutions 
can predict the rates of entrepreneurship. In particular, the empirical results showed 
that the interaction effect of formal and informal institutions has a significant impact 
on the development of entrepreneurial activity in emerging economies. In the next 
chapter, the results of the regression models are discussed in detail. 
Table 5.11: A summary of statistical tests included in this chapter 
Test Description Null hypothesis Result 
Correlation To exclude strongly correlated 
variables, all correlation 
coefficients should be below 0.8. 




To test the presence of 
multicollinearity, the score should 
be below the threshold of 5. 
 VIF score is not a 
concern 
Lagrange multiplier 
(LM) test for random 
effects, Breusch and 
Pagan (1980) 
To choose between the simple 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
random-effects regressions 
The variance of the 
unobserved fixed-
effects is zero 
Rejected, so OLS is 
not the most 
appropriate model 
The F test of 
heterogeneity 
to choose between the (OLS) and 
fixed-effects within-group model 
The constant terms are 
equal among units 
(countries)  




The Hausman test To choose between fixed (within-
group) and random effects 
The coefficients 
estimated by the 
random-effects 
estimator do not differ 
substantially from the 
ones estimated by the 
fixed-effects estimator 
Rejected, so fixed 
effect model is more 
appropriate 
The Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test of 
endogeneity 
To deal with the potential reverse-
causality and endogeneity issues 
The variables are 
exogenous  
Not rejected, so 
reverse causality is 
not a concern  
The modified Wald test 
for groupwise 
heteroscedasticity in the 
fixed-effects regression 
model  
Although the error structure may 
be homoscedastic within cross-
sectional units, its variance may 
differ across units, a condition 
that is known as groupwise 
heteroscedasticity 
Variation in the 
residuals is unrelated to 
group identity. 
Rejected, so there is 
heteroscedasticity 
Wooldridge (2002) test 
for serial correlation in 
linear panel-data models 
A standard assumption in panel-
data models is that the error terms 
are not correlated, both in time 
There is no first-order 
autocorrelation. 





and across cross sections 
(entities). 
To test for serial correlation in the 
idiosyncratic errors. 
Test of Pesaran (2004) The existence of cross-section 
dependence 
There is no 
contemporaneous 
correlation. 
Rejected, so there is 
cross-section 
dependence  
Driscoll and Kraay’s 
(1998) standard errors 
To offer more robust for the 




diagnostic test (1977) 
It is used to estimate the influence 
of outliers data points when 
performing regression analysis 
 Outliers in the data 
are not a concern 
Moderated hierarchical 
regression analysis 
To minimise the possibility of 
multicollinearity and to provide 
the consistency of the signs of the 
interactions terms compared with 
those in the models in which the 
interaction terms are included in 
the full model 
 The signs of the 
interaction terms 
were consistent with 
the full model. 
Control variable for the 
international economic 
crisis 
Assessing the need to control for 
time effects and checking the 
robustness of our estimates 
against the international economic 
and financial crisis in 2007 (but 
with consequences starting in 
2008 and 2009) 
 Adding a control for 
the economic crisis 
does not change the 
estimates of interest. 
Including individual 
time dummies, for each 
of the years in our study 
period 
There may be time-specific events 
that affect both NER and 
institutions on a country level. 
 Adding time effects 
does not change the 
estimates of interest. 




CHAPTER SIX: INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
6.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter of this thesis presented the results following a quantitative 
investigation into the interactive effect of formal and informal institutions on the 
development of entrepreneurial activity in emerging economies.  
This chapter aims to discuss the panel regression findings reported in the previous 
chapter. The results of each fixed effect model are interpreted and discussed in line 
with the earlier theoretical and empirical literature outlined in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Synthesising the results with the theoretical and empirical literature allows drawing 
the conclusions and policy recommendations in Chapter 7. Also, it helps to evaluate 
the extent to which the different econometric models can offer a better understanding 
of the different rates of entrepreneurial activity in emerging economies. 
6.2  The interaction effect of formal and informal institutions on 
entrepreneurship 
As mentioned before in Chapter 5, Model 1 included only the direct effect of formal 
and informal institutions on entrepreneurial activity with control variables. The 
results showed (Table 5.7) that, for emerging economies, corruption is not a 
significant direct factor, controlling for the presence of other institutions. In this 
respect, the relationship between the number of procedures for starting a business 
and entrepreneurial activity was significant at (p < 0.05) with a negative sign. In 
contrast, the relationship between education and training with entrepreneurial activity 
was not significant. Moreover, the relationship between access to credit and 
entrepreneurial activity was not significant at the 95% level. Lastly, the relationship 
between firm-level technology absorption and entrepreneurial activity was not 
significant. This model explains 89.8% of the total variation in entrepreneurial 
activity. 
Opposite to Model 1, the results found in Model 2 (see Table 5.7) showed that the 
interaction effect of informal and formal institutions was related with entrepreneurial 
activity. In this model, we included control of corruption as the moderating factor 
between the relationship of formal institutions and entrepreneurship. While most of 
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the moderating coefficients in this model were significant at (p < 0.05), the 
moderating coefficient of technology absorption was only marginally significant at 
(p < 0.10). Model 2 explains 90.7% of the total variation in entrepreneurial activity. 
In comparison with Model 1, the Model 2 results were indicative that, overall, 
corruption has an indirect impact as a moderator when it comes to the relationship 
between institutions (formal and informal) and entrepreneurship for each emerging 
economy listed in the study, thereby consolidating the importance of corruption to 
promoting entrepreneurial activity in emerging economies (Pathak et al., 2015).  
Model 3 assessed the moderating effect of control of corruption on the relationship 
between formal institutions and entrepreneurial activity for emerging economies that 
are located in the innovation-stage, or in the transition to the innovation-driven stage 
(more developed emerging countries). The results (Table 5.7) indicated that the 
interaction between control of corruption and number of procedures and technology 
absorption were highly significant (p < 0.01) on entrepreneurial activity. While the 
number of procedures has the expected sign (negative), technology absorption did 
not have the expected sign (negative). At the same time, the estimated model showed 
that the interaction between control of corruption and education and training has a 
positive and marginally significant influence (p < 0.10) on entrepreneurial activity. 
However, the estimated model shows that the interaction between control of 
corruption and access to credit has no significant impact on entrepreneurial activity. 
The model explains 91.3% of the total variation in entrepreneurial activity. 
Finally, Model 4 assessed the moderating effect of control of corruption on the 
relationship between formal institutions and entrepreneurial activity for emerging 
economies that are located in lower stages of development (less developed emerging 
countries). In contrast to the previous model, the results (Table 5.7) indicated that 
only the interaction effect between corruption and number of procedures was 
marginally significant (p < 0.10) on entrepreneurial activity and has the expected 
sign. This model explains 89.2% of the total variation in entrepreneurial activity. 





6.2.1 Corruption, number of procedures and entrepreneurship  
Concerning the hypotheses testing, Hypothesis 1a suggested that the number of 
procedures for starting a business has a negative influence on entrepreneurship in 
each emerging economy that has lower levels of corruption. While Model 1 showed 
that number of procedures has a negative and significant influence on entrepreneurial 
activity for each emerging economy (  = -0.103; p < 0.05), Model 2 showed that the 
interaction effect between number of procedures and corruption has a negative and 
significant influence on entrepreneurial activity for each emerging economy (  = -
0.163; p < 0.01). The results showed that the interaction effect of control of 
corruption and the number of procedures coefficient is higher than the coefficient of 
the direct effect of number of procedures in each emerging economy, supporting 
Hypothesis 1a. Although the results of Model 1 were congruent with the literature 
(the more days required for the creation of a new firm, the less likely it is that the 
entrepreneurial activity will occur) (Álvarez and Urbano, 2011; Aparicio et al., 
2016), the results of Model 2 showed that the number of procedures has a better 
impact on entrepreneurial activity in emerging economies that have lower levels of 
corruption as suggested by the literature (Naudé, 2008; Klapper and Love, 2010; 
Aparicio et al., 2016).  
To test whether the moderating effect of control of corruption has a higher influence 
in more developed than in less developed emerging countries included in the sample, 
as proposed in Hypothesis 1b, this study followed Cloggs et al.’s (1995) guidelines 
and was adopted recently by Danis et al. (2011). The null hypothesis is that the two 
coefficients in Models 3 and 4 (Table 5.7) are equal. In this regard, Table 6.1 shows 
the coefficients on the more developed interaction terms give the differences between 
the two Models 3 and 4 from Table 5.7. As shown in Table 6.1, we performed a z-
test to assess whether the regression coefficient for the number of procedures in more 
developed emerging economies (-0.204) was significantly greater than the corollary 
coefficient for less developed emerging economies (-0.182). No support was found 
for Hypothesis 1b as the z-value (-1.620) was not rejected at p < 0.05. Therefore, the 
results showed that the interaction effect between control of corruption and the 
number of procedures on entrepreneurial activity is similar in emerging economies 
that are located in more developed and less developed stages.  
160 
 
6.2.2 Corruption, education and training and entrepreneurship  
Hypothesis 2a proposed that lower levels of corruption positively influence the 
relationship between education and training with entrepreneurial activity in each 
emerging economy. While Model 1 showed that education and training were not 
significant to entrepreneurial activity, Model 2 showed that the interaction effect 
between education and training with corruption has a positive and highly significant 
influence on entrepreneurial activity (  = 040; p < 0.01). The results for the 
moderating role of corruption were in line with our expectations, supporting 
Hypothesis 2a. Therefore, an educational system with an entrepreneurial focus is 
more likely to increase entrepreneurial activity in emerging economies that have 
lower levels of corruption rather than higher levels of corruption as suggested by 
literature (Álvarez and Urbano, 2011; Aparicio et al., 2016). 
Hypothesis 2b proposed that this interaction effect has a higher influence in more 
developed than in less developed emerging countries included in the sample. In this 
respect, we performed a z-test to assess whether the regression coefficient for the 
tertiary education in more developed emerging economies (-0.030) was significantly 
greater than the corollary coefficient for less developed emerging economies (0.056). 
No support for Hypothesis 2b was found as the z-value (-0.870) was not rejected at p 
< 0.05 (see Table 6.1). Therefore, the results showed that the interaction effect 
between control of corruption and the education and training on entrepreneurial 
activity is similar in emerging economies, regardless of the level of economic 
development.  
6.2.3 Corruption, access to credit and entrepreneurship  
Hypotheses 3a and 3b suggested that access to credit from banks has a positive 
influence on entrepreneurial activity in the context of each emerging economy that 
has lower levels of corruption, and that this interaction effect is higher in more 
developed countries. While Model 1 showed that access to credit was not significant 
to entrepreneurial activity, Model 2 showed that the interaction effect between 
control of corruption and access to credit has a negative and significant influence on 
entrepreneurial activity (   = -0.02; p < 0.05). Also, Table 6.1 showed that this 
interaction effect was insignificant for both more developed and less developed 
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emerging countries. The results from the previous models did not support the study’s 
expectations.  
The interpretation of the previous results could be explained in three ways. First, the 
previous results could suggest that entrepreneurs who are associated with higher risk 
levels tend to obtain financial resources from social networks and family 
connections; this may be because existing financial institutions are underdeveloped 
and less likely to support their new ventures (Ho and Wong, 2007; Chowdhury et al., 
2015b; Fuentelsaz et al., 2015; Ghura et al., 2017). This argument was consistent 
with Aidis et al. (2008, p. 670) who stated that:  
“Our findings suggest that in the case of Russia, the weakness of institutions 
is detrimental to entrepreneurial activity and though networks are important, 
they are not entirely able to offset these deficiencies. Further research in this 
area is needed to pin down more carefully the relationship between 
institutional development and levels of entrepreneurial activity and how 
additional factors such as the presence and strength of informal networks may 
act as substitutes for dysfunctional institutions in a different way for business 
insiders than for newcomers”.  
Second, another interpretation for the findings was suggested by Wennekers et al. 
(2005), who argued that emerging economies have higher rates of necessity 
entrepreneurship (i.e., informal entrepreneurship), which does not require large 
amounts of credit.  
Lastly, although this latter idea could be true, the results also suggested that 
entrepreneurs may later depend on alternative sources to fund their growing 
businesses, such as venture capital funds, angel investors and corporate investors, 
due to the lack of adequate financial infrastructure (Denis, 2004; Bowen and De 
Clercq, 2008; Aidis, 2012; De Clercq et al., 2013; Ghura et al., 2017). This latter 
argument was supported by Acs and Szerb (2007, p. 116) who stated that:  
“In the past several decades, a vibrant venture capital industry has developed 
to fund the relatively small but vital number of technologically sophisticated 
or capital-intensive start-ups. In recent years, “angel investors” – wealthy 
individuals or groups of such individuals – have become an increasingly 
important source of early-stage equity capital as well (by some accounts, 
angel investors may now be more important than venture capital, especially 
since the “Internet stock bubble” burst in 2000)”. 
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6.2.4 Corruption, technology absorption and entrepreneurship  
Finally, Hypotheses 4a and 4b suggested that firm-level technology absorption has a 
significant influence on entrepreneurship in each emerging economy that has lower 
levels of corruption, and that this interaction effect is stronger in more developed 
countries than less developed countries. The results were contrary to the study’s 
expectations as the coefficient regression was not significant in Model 1 and 
marginally significant (  = -0.681; p < 0.1) with a negative sign in Model 2. 
However, this interaction effect was highly significant in Model 3 ( = -1.790; p < 
0.01) with a negative sign, while it was not significant in Model 4. Also, Table 6.1 
showed that this interaction effect was insignificant for both more developed and less 
developed emerging countries. The results from the previous models did not support 
the study’s Hypotheses 4a and 4b. 
Although not what we predicted, the previous results could suggest that new business 
activities in emerging economies that have lower levels of corruption are still not 
technology-based and characterised by imitative entrepreneurship (Models 2 and 3 in 
Table 5.7). In this regard, entrepreneurs in emerging economies tend to copy 
technologies from developed economies to expand their economy of scale (Acs, 
2006; Minniti and Lévesque, 2010). Entrepreneurs are therefore less likely to invest 
in R&D, even though imitative entrepreneurship is significant to economic growth. 
This is especially true in the case of emerging economies, as they increase 
competition and product availability when the revenues to R&D expenditure are low 
(Minniti and Levesque, 2010). 
We also acknowledge the possibility of alternative explanations drawn from the 
literature that suggested that educated individuals may work for technology-based 
corporations to seek higher returns in emerging economies that have lower levels of 
corruption. Anokhin and Schulze (2009) found that economies with lower costs of 
corruption are more likely to benefit from FDI investment by attracting high tech 
companies to enter markets (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009). Therefore, educated 
people are free to behave entrepreneurially within existing companies, and they 
enjoy high-wage employment and high remunerations (see Model 3 in Table 5.7). 
This could suggest that corporate entrepreneurial activity substitutes for start-up 
activity and therefore has a positive relationship with technology absorption in 
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emerging economies that have lower levels of corruption (Romer, 1990; Acs et al., 
2014b; Turro et al., 2014). 
6.3 Economic Growth and Economic Growth Per Capita 
In general, the estimated coefficient of the control variable of economic growth was 
consistent with the existing literature (Models 1-3), which indicated a positive and 
significant influence between economic growth and entrepreneurial activity (Levie 
and Autio, 2011; Fuentelsaz et al., 2015). These results were consistent with 
previous studies that indicated that economic growth is essential for entrepreneurs to 
exploit new opportunities in each level of economic development (Bowen and De 
Clercq, 2008; Levie and Autio, 2011; Fuentelsaz et al., 2015). However, economic 
growth was not significant for emerging economies located at the lower stages of 
economic development (Model 4).  
Moreover, the estimated coefficient of the control variable of GDP per capita was 
significant with a positive sign in Model 1 (   = 0.000; p < 0.05). In Model 2, 
economic growth per capita was marginally significant with a positive sign (   = 
0.000; p < 0.1). However, Models 3 and 4 showed that GDP per capita did not have a 
significant influence on entrepreneurial activity. 
Table 6.1: z-test results to compare the regression coefficients between Models 3 and 
4 in Table 5.7 
 All countries  Z value [95% Conf. Interval] 
Informal institutions      
  CC -0.678 
(0.627) 
 -1.080 -2.334 0.977 
  More developed CC 2.256** 
(0.849) 
 2.660 0.072 4.439 
Formal institutions      
  PRO -0.084 
(0.047) 
 -1.790 -0.219 0.052 
  TEDU 0.009 
(0.015) 
 0.640 -0.030 0.049 
  AC 0.012 
(0.017) 
 0.730 -0.033 0.058 
  TA 0.014 
(0.412) 
 0.030 -1.020 1.048 
  CC x PRO -0.182* 
(0.074) 
 -2.450 -0.379 0.016 
  CC x TEDU 0.056 
(0.030) 
 1.900 -0.030 0.142 
  CC x AC -0.012 
(0.015) 
 -0.770 -0.058 0.034 
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  CC x TA -0.201 
(0.896) 
 -0.220 -2.413 2.011 
  More developed PRO 0.209** 
(0.067) 
 3.120 0.007 0.412 
  More developed TEDU -0.013 
(0.027) 
 -0.480 -0.086 0.060 
  More developed AC -0.035 
(0.035) 
 -1.000 -0.130 0.061 
  More developed TA 0.250 
(0.487) 
 0.510 -1.003 1.503 
  More developed CC x PRO -0.204 
(0.126) 
 -1.620 -0.521 0.112 
  More developed CC x TEDU -0.030 
(0.034) 
 -0.870 -0.126 0.066 
  More developed CC x AC 0.000 
(0.019) 
 0.010 -0.053 0.053 
  More developed CC x TA -1.590 
(0.858) 
 -1.850 -3.738 0.558 
Control variable      
  GDPg 0.027 
(0.015) 
 1.820 -0.017 0.072 
  GDPpc 0.000 
(0.000) 
 1.090 0.000 0.000 
  More developed GDPg 0.032 
(0.019) 
 1.670 -0.025 0.088 
  More developed GDPpc 0.000 
(0.000) 
 0.070 0.000 0.000 
Constant 1.279* 
(0.590) 
 2.170 -0.238 2.796 
F-statistic 105.71     
Prob.(F-statistic) 0.000     
Observations 396     
Countries 44     
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors between parentheses. 
The coefficients on the more developed interaction terms give the differences between the two models 3 and 4 
from Table 5.7. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Source: Own calculations 
6.4 Discussion and Conclusions 
6.4.1 Overall model evaluation 
In this chapter, the quantitative results were interpreted and discussed in accordance 
with the theoretical and empirical literature outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, as a 
foundation to the policy suggestions and conclusions in the next chapter. This thesis 
has the potential to address an important and primary question – how do formal 
institutions positively and negatively affect the development of entrepreneurial 
activity in the presence of higher or lower levels of the perception of corruption? We 
provide answers by looking into how the control of corruption interacts with other 
formal institutions proxied by the number of procedures required to start a business, 
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education and training, access to credit, and technology absorption in emerging 
economies that are located at different levels of development. The discussion and 
comparison of the research findings confirmed as hypothesised in Chapter 3 (Section 
3.5), that the variation in entrepreneurial activity in each emerging economy is 
determined by the interaction effect of formal and informal institutional factors. In 
addition, the presence of the above-mentioned predictors in regression models 
collectively explained approximately 90% of the remaining variance across the 44 
countries included in our study after controlling country level of economic 
development, thus confirming the choice of institutions and making them relevant 
predictors of the likelihood of entrepreneurs starting their new ventures in emerging 
economies. 
The findings of the study are intriguing. First, on the basis of the results reported in 
the previous chapter, both our main results (Table 5.7) and the robustness checks 
(Tables 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10) indicated that the differences between Model 1 and Model 
2 provided some support for the conceptual premise that it is essential to consider the 
interactions of formal and informal institutions and their impact on entrepreneurial 
activity (Baumol, 1990; North, 1990, 2005; Williamson, 2000; Acs et al., 2014a; 
Ghura et al., 2017). Specifically, this study added to a growing stream of research 
that suggests that the combined effect of corruption and other formal institutions play 
an important role in accounting for variations in rates of entrepreneurial activity 
across emerging economies (Levie and Autio, 2011; Aparicio et al., 2016; Krasniqi 
and Desai, 2016; Urbano et al., 2018; among others).  
Second, our findings were directly consistent with arguments advanced by 
Williamson (2000), who emphasised that informal institutions are at the top of the 
hierarchy of institutions that can hinder other formal institutional reforms. While 
Williamson (2000) did not consider corruption as an informal institution, following 
North’s (1990) propositions that highlighted the significant role of informal 
institutions, this current thesis hypothesised that corruption represents an embedded 
pattern of informal behaviour norms that become institutionalised as part of a slow 
changing informal order (Aidis et al., 2012; Estrin et al., 2013).  
Finally, the study’s findings have significant implications for governance and 
institutional reform in emerging economies. Briefly, efforts aimed at enhancing the 
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control of corruption seem to have a strong but indirect effect on the development of 
entrepreneurial activity. The results from the panel data analysis suggested that it 
takes time for institutional reforms (i.e., the number of procedures, and education and 
training) in emerging economies to generate positive outcomes on entrepreneurial 
activity (Baumol, 1990; Hoskisson et al., 2000; Williamson, 2000; Bruton et al., 
2009; Kiss et al., 2012; Estrin et al., 2013; among others). Therefore, Anokhin and 
Schulze (2009, p. 2) stated that “Patience and persistence are thus essential parts of 
the reformer's toolkit”. 
6.4.2 The combined effect of formal and informal institutions on 
entrepreneurship 
Here, we offer a more in-depth discussion of the findings of this study. Interestingly, 
except for the number of procedures variable, the findings in Model 1 (Table 5.7) 
were contrary to previous studies that have suggested that low levels of corruption 
(Anokhin and Schulze, 2009; Aidis et al., 2012; Avnimelech et al., 2014; Aparicio et 
al., 2016; Dutta and Sobel, 2016), education and training (Baumol et al., 2007; Aidis 
et al., 2008; Valliere and Peterson, 2009), access to capital (Bowen and De Clercq, 
2008; Aparicio et al., 2016), and technology absorption (Gnyawali and Fogel, 1994; 
Stenholm et al., 2013; Acs et al., 2014b) have a direct impact on, and often increase, 
the probability of entrepreneurial activity. 
However, the results in Model 2 (Table 5.7) were in line with previous literature that 
suggested that specific informal institutional variables, such as control of corruption 
can allow formal institutions to operate more effectively in affecting the rates of 
entrepreneurial activity for the context of emerging economies (Aidis et al., 2008; 
Tonoyan et al., 2010; Bruton et al., 2013; Aparicio et al., 2016).  
In this regard, the results of the combined effect of the number of procedures and 
control of corruption on the development of entrepreneurial activity were in line with 
the study’s expectations (hypothesis 1a), suggesting that the reforms of lower 
number of procedures and control of corruption are significant for increasing 
entrepreneurial activity in emerging economies (Klapper and Love, 2010; Aparicio et 
al., 2016). These findings were contrary to the “public interest” theory of regulation 
that proposed that countries have high registration costs because there are high 
benefits to registration. Alternatively, the study’s results were consistent with the 
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“public choice” theory and the hypothesis that high registration costs exist to benefit 
corrupt officials (Djankov et al., 2002; Klapper and Love, 2010). Therefore, the 
signal sent by promoting greater trust in government reform policies through lower 
levels of corruption, as well as facilitating entry regulations, is significant to increase 
the new firms to benefit from the formal economy (Spence, 1973; Levie and Autio, 
2011).  
In the same way, the results of the joint effect of education and training, and control 
of corruption were in line with the study’s expectations (hypothesis 2a), suggesting 
that education and training reforms are significant for increasing entrepreneurial 
activity in emerging economies, if it is accompanied by lower levels of corruption 
perception (Álvarez and Urbano, 2011; Aparicio et al., 2016). These results may be 
explained by the fact that educated individuals have more confidence and the 
necessary skills to start new businesses in emerging economies that have lower levels 
of corruption (Levie and Autio, 2008). Also, emerging economies that have lower 
levels of corruption are more likely to spend more money on the education system, 
which in turn would increase the rates of entrepreneurial activity (Aparicio et al., 
2016). 
Contrary to the study’s expectations, the results of the interaction effect between 
corruption with access to credit and with technology absorption were inconsistent 
with the study’s hypotheses (3a and 4a). The results showed that the joint effect of 
access to credit and control of corruption on entrepreneurial activity is negative, 
suggesting that such reforms reduce the growth effects of the entrepreneurial activity. 
At the same time, the results showed that the combined effect of reforms related to 
the diffusion of firm-level technology and control of corruption on the development 
of entrepreneurial activity is negative, suggesting that the control of corruption 
reform diminishes the positive effect of technology absorption on entrepreneurial 
activity. 
This could suggest that entrepreneurs in emerging economies that have lower levels 
of corruption are more likely to depend on informal financing (e.g., social networks 
or angel investors) rather than the formal financial sector when they start a new 
business activity (Szerb et al., 2007). This explanation is consistent with Aidis et al. 
(2008, p. 662) who argued that “In an environment where outside financing is 
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restricted, informal investors or business angels play an especially important role in 
providing financing for business start-ups”.  
In addition, entrepreneurs are likely to start new ventures that are based on imitative 
entrepreneurship, which offers lower cost products rather than technology-based 
entrepreneurship (Minniti and Lévesque, 2010). In this realm, Klapper and Delgado 
(2007) contended that new formal firms in developing countries tend to work in the 
sectors of wholesale and retail trade rather than manufacturing, which are less 
dependent on access to credit and technology. Klapper and Delgado (2007, p. 3) 
stated that:  
“Understanding why entrepreneurs in developing countries focus so 
disproportionately on some sectors requires a deeper analysis. Still, a 
preliminary analysis suggests that reasons for focusing on the wholesale and 
retail trade sector might include its lower requirements for investment, human 
resources, knowledge, and capital. Besides, firms in this sector might be more 
likely to join the formal economy—and therefore to be recorded by the 
survey— because of a reluctance among overseas importers and large 
domestic traders to purchase from informal sector firms”.  
Simultaneously, improvements in each emerging economy’s infrastructure (e.g., 
telecommunications, transportation and credit markets) may increase the advantages 
of larger corporations over new business activity. Therefore, improvements in access 
to credit and technology absorption in the presence of lower costs of corruption 
would provide an attractive environment for high tech firms to expand their economy 
of scale to enter emerging markets; therefore, some educated entrepreneurs are more 
willing to work for them (Acs, 2006; Acs et al., 2008a; Anokhin and Schulze, 2009).  
This previous explanation was in line with Minniti and Lévesque’s (2010) study that 
suggested that entrepreneurial activity in emerging economies may take different 
forms, such as research-based and imitative entrepreneurship, which have a positive 
contribution to economic growth. Although our data did not permit us to differentiate 
between research-based and imitative entrepreneurship, we speculate that the 
financial and technology sectors could offer corporate entrepreneurship 
(entrepreneurship that occurs within organisations) preferential access to credit and 




6.4.3 Emerging economies at different levels of development 
Concerning hypotheses 1b, 2b, 3b, and 4b, given that our full sample includes 
emerging economies that are located at different stages of economic development, 
the sample was adjusted into more developed and less developed emerging 
economies. We re-estimated the equation and report the results in Models 3 and 4 
(Table 5.7). The results were similar to those reported in Models 1 and 2, and thus 
we draw the same conclusions, suggesting that the interaction effect between control 
of corruption and the formal institutions in this study have failed to show that the 
effects were different for emerging economies located at different levels of 
development. In contrast to Aidis et al.’s (2012) and Acs et al.’s (2014a) proposition, 
these findings were unexpected and suggested that the selected institutions have no 
significant impact on the development of entrepreneurial activity in emerging 
economies that are located at different stages of development. It is difficult to explain 
these results, but they might be related to the fact that other studies examined 
different institutional variables and study samples. For example, Carlos Díaz Casero 
et al. (2013) and Kuckertz et al. (2016) focused only on the impact of formal 
institutions on entrepreneurial activity in the context of developed and developing 
countries. In addition, these studies used different regression models that may offer 
different results. Therefore, our findings need to be interpreted with caution.  
Moreover, it seems that our results were more consistent with Naudé (2011, p. 331), 
who argued that:  
“There is as yet no substantial literature on the relationship between the 
stages of development, the evolving nature of entrepreneurship and the 
orientation of the state. It is likely to be cofounded by difficulties for 
governments and international development organisations to identify their 
stage of economic development, due to the fact that stages overlap [see the 
third column in Table 2.4], that some countries may leapfrog stages and that 
the instruments and measurements to guide appropriate policies at each stage 
are not well understood”.  
Although Acs et al. (2014a, b) suggested that there is a link between 
entrepreneurship policy design across different stages, the measures of the selected 
institutional variables and entrepreneurship in our study were previously untested in 
the context of emerging economies. Clearly, future studies on the current topic are 
therefore recommended.  
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6.4.4 Concluding remarks 
In short, this study confirmed that the dynamics of institutions might not have the 
same effects on entrepreneurs in emerging economies that might be expected in 
developed countries, as suggested by the literature (Bruton et al., 2009; Hoskisson et 
al., 2011; Pathak et al., 2016). The results robustly indicated that institutions might 
have different, even negative effects of, access to credit and technology used by new 
start-ups in emerging economies. This could go a long way towards explaining the 
conflicting findings of the interaction effect of institutions on entrepreneurship found 
in the existing literature (Dutta and Sobel, 2016). For example, Anokhin and Schulze 
(2009) found a positive effect for control of corruption whereas Dreher and 
Gassebner (2013) reported negative associations between control of corruption and 
entrepreneurship. Similarly, Manolova et al. (2008) suggested a negative effect of 
high levels of education while Aparicio et al. (2016) found a positive impact of 
tertiary education and business skills on entrepreneurial activity. In general, 
therefore, it seems that future research should take into account the level of political 
and socio-economic development of a country when theorising about the role of 
institutions. It is noteworthy, however, that the study’s results should be handled 
carefully as they may vary from results in other studies that have used different 
regression models (pooled OLS or the random effects model) (Aidis et al., 2012). 
The final and following chapter concludes by offering an overview of the research 
findings found in this thesis. Based on these findings, a number of policy 
recommendations will be suggested in an attempt to encourage higher rates of 




CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS  
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the results of the panel data analysis that examined 
the hypotheses of the developed conceptual framework. This chapter offers an 
overall summary and summarises the the previous chapters of this thesis. Next, it 
highlights how this study contributes to the theory and practice. Finally, policy 
recommendations are suggested based on the main findings of the research; it also 
shows the limitations of the research and offers some recommendations for future 
work in order to advance the knowledge in the field of entrepreneurial economics. 
Given that entrepreneurship is a key driver to economic growth and development 
through job creation, innovation and prosperity, the primary aim and contribution of 
this thesis was to study the impact of institutional dynamics on the development of 
entrepreneurial activity in the context of emerging economies. It specifically argued 
that lower levels of corruption as an informal institution could improve the impact of 
formal institutions presented by the number of procedures, education and training, 
access to credit and technology absorption on the rates of entrepreneurial activity. 
Moreover, this previous relationship may vary under the level of development of a 
particular emerging economy. Therefore, there is a continuous need to understand the 
institutional determinants that encourage entrepreneurial activity in emerging 
economies located at different stages of development theoretically, empirically and 
from a policy viewpoint. 
The role of the institutional environment was examined by testing a number of 
hypotheses reflecting if the interaction effects of the above-mentioned institutions are 
able to explain disparities in rates of entrepreneurial activity in the context of 
emerging economies. To achieve this, this thesis was able to provide a better 
understanding of the interplay between the formal and informal institutions for 
entrepreneurial activity, and contribute to the limited body of existing research using 
panel data analysis of entrepreneurship in the case of emerging economies.  
In addition, it is hoped that the study findings will offer guidance for policymakers 
and other associations that are interested in the design of entrepreneurship policy in 
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emerging economies, as part of an effort to encourage an institutional environment 
that is conducive to more productive entrepreneurial activities. The next section 
briefly reviews the results achieved from the quantitative results reported and 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
7.2 Research Summary and Findings 
Considering that entrepreneurship is a key driver for economic growth and 
development (Acs et al., 2014a, b; Aparicio et al., 2016; Ghura et al., 2017), 
understanding which institutional variables contribute to fostering and enhancing 
entrepreneurship appears to be a remarkable phenomenon (Autio and Acs, 2010; 
Levie and Autio, 2011; Stenholm et al., 2013; Fuentelsaz et al., 2018; Urbano et al., 
2018). In this thesis, balanced longitudinal panel data (for the period 2006-2014) 
were used to empirically examine the simultaneous effect of institutional variables on 
the development of entrepreneurial activity in the context of 44 emerging economies. 
By developing a conceptual framework of institutional economics, this study 
analysed the interaction effect of informal (i.e., corruption) and formal institutions 
(i.e., the number of procedures involved in starting a business and education and 
training, access to credit, and technology absorption) on the rates of entrepreneurial 
activity. Also, this study considered the comparison of emerging economies that are 
located at different stages of economic development in the sample.  
The research generated four key results. First, the quantitative findings provided 
evidence regarding the scheme proposed by Gnyawali and Fogel (1994), who 
suggested that the rates of entrepreneurial activity depend on the socio-economic and 
political context. Following the conceptual framework used in this thesis, these 
socio-economic factors and political context could be associated with the interaction 
between the formal and informal institutions (North, 1990, 2005). Also, Williamson 
(2000) suggested that informal institutions are at the top of the hierarchy of the 
institutional framework.  
The findings of examining the developed conceptual framework in this study showed 
that there is evidence of a positive relationship between institutional variables and 
entrepreneurship. This is in line with the recent findings of entrepreneurship 
research, which suggests that the institutional environment of a specific economy 
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plays a crucial role in explaining the rates of entrepreneurial activity (Levie and 
Autio, 2011; Acs et al., 2014a; Aparicio et al., 2016; among others). Moreover, the 
study findings revealed that the rates of entrepreneurial activity could be explained 
by the interaction of formal and informal institutional variables within each emerging 
economy. As expected, this study found that variances in rates of entrepreneurship 
could most significantly be explained by the interaction effect between control of 
corruption with the number of procedures and, secondly, with education and training. 
However, the interaction between control of corruption and access to credit was 
found to influence rates of entrepreneurial activity negatively and, therefore, 
indicated that entrepreneurs who have limited access to finance are likely to fund 
their new ventures from different sources, such as social networks and family 
members. Similarly, findings related to the interaction between firm-level of 
technology absorption and control of corruption had a marginally significant effect 
with a negative sign and, therefore, indicated that entrepreneurs tend to work for big 
high-tech corporations due to higher returns.  
Second, the research findings highlighted that the study of entrepreneurial activity is 
a country event, and that the characteristics of the country mainly affect the rates of 
entrepreneurial activity in each emerging economy. In consideration of this, the 
research findings showed that the nature of each country’s political and socio-
economic factors could affect the levels of entrepreneurial activity. Therefore, it is 
inappropriate to suggest an homogenous, one-size fits all entrepreneurship policy as 
each economy varies significantly based on social, economic and historical events 
(North, 1990).  
Third, the results supported the idea that formal institutions have a more significant 
impact on the rates of entrepreneurial activity in emerging economies if they are 
accompanied by lower levels of corruption, as suggested by the literature (e.g., 
Aparicio et al., 2016). In this respect, theoretical and policy implications could be 
derived regarding the institutional variables, particularly corruption as an informal 
institution, which influence the economic growth (North, 1990) indirectly throughout 
entrepreneurship (Aparicio et al., 2016; Urbano et al., 2018). 
Lastly, the results suggested that the interaction effect of formal and informal 
institutions on the development of entrepreneurial activity did not show a significant 
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influence on emerging economies located at different stages of economic 
development. Therefore, it is vital that policymakers adopt different strategies to 
encourage the rates of entrepreneurial activity, regardless of the level of economic 
development of each emerging economy (Naudé, 2011). Following the research 
summary and findings, the next section sheds more light on how this thesis 
contributes to the limited body of existing research analysing entrepreneurship in the 
context of emerging economies under institutional lenses. 
7.3 Thesis Contributions 
Recently, different studies have focused on the interaction between formal and 
informal institutions and their effect on entrepreneurial activity (Estrin et al., 2013; 
Belitski et al., 2016; Fuentelsaz et al., 2018). However, this study presented several 
contributions to knowledge by creating a multilevel understanding of 
entrepreneurship within the context of institutional theory in emerging economies. 
Three main theoretical, methodological, and contextual contributions were made in 
this research; they are supported by significant contributions given by each chapter in 
the thesis. 
7.3.1 Theoretical contributions 
The study has several theoretical contributions. First, it advanced the existing theory 
in the field of entrepreneurship and institutional economics as few empirical studies 
were grounded in both theories (Acs et al., 2014a, b). The institutional environment 
was emphasised in this study as being at the core of productive entrepreneurship. 
Specifically, institutions provide the appropriate incentives for entrepreneurs to 
contribute to economic growth and development through innovative new firms 
(Baumol, 1990; North, 1990, Naudé, 2011; Urbano et al., 2018).  
Second, this study contributes theoretically by expanding the application of the 
theory to address the interaction effect between formal and informal institutions on 
the development of the entrepreneurial activity (e.g., North, 1990; Estrin et al., 2013; 
Stenholm et al., 2013). In this regard, this thesis extends Gnyawali and Fogel’s 
(1994) framework by making a clear distinction between the informal institutions 
level and the lower level of formal institutions (Williamson, 2000). This distinction 
is essential because the outcomes derived from the interaction of each institutional 
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level (i.e., formal and informal) can influence the rates of entrepreneurial activity in a 
different way (Baumol, 1990; North, 1990).  
Third, this study approached formal and informal institutions in a substantially 
different way by adopting a more comprehensive approach in examining the 
dynamics of institutional effects on the rates of entrepreneurial activity (Gnyawali 
and Fogel, 1994). Specifically, we extended the previous research on the intricate 
relationship between informal institutions reflecting the perception of corruption 
(e.g., Aidis et al., 2012; Dreher and Gassebner, 2013) and formal institutions 
captured here by the number of procedures (e.g., Aparicio et al., 2016), education 
and training (e.g., Aidis et al., 2008), access to credit (e.g., Bowen and De Clercq, 
2008), and technology absorption (e.g., Stenholm et al., 2013). Based on the 
institutional theory, this research suggested that, together with the formal institutions 
emphasised by the entrepreneurship literature, it is important not to underestimate the 
role of informal institutions in encouraging entrepreneurial activity (North, 1990; 
Estrin et al., 2013; Aparicio et al., 2016). 
Fourth, the link between entrepreneurship in the form of new start-ups and 
institutional dynamics is considered in this thesis; previously, few studies used these 
variables simultaneously (Bjørnskov and Foss, 2013). Unlike other studies, this type 
of entrepreneurship is particularly useful in accounting for “productive” 
entrepreneurship, as aspiring entrepreneurs are more likely to register their ventures 
in order to benefit from the potential advantages of participating in the formal 
economy based on the incentives provided by the institutional environment (Baumol, 
1990; Klapper et al., 2010; Levie and Autio, 2011).  
Lastly, to the knowledge of the researcher, this is the first study of substantial 
duration that examined the moderating role of corruption as an informal institution 
(Aidis et al., 2012) on the relationship between formal institutions and 
entrepreneurial activity. Before this study, it was difficult to make predictions about 
whether corruption can facilitate (grease the wheel theory) or constrain the rates of 
entrepreneurship (Dutta and Sobel, 2016). Thus, the empirical findings reported here 
shed new light on how the interplay between corruption and other formal institutions 
can affect the development of entrepreneurial activity (North, 1990; Williamson, 
2000). The results found that formal institutions can have a better impact on the rates 
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of entrepreneurial activity if it is accompanied by lower levels of corruption. This 
new understanding should help to improve predictions of the development of 
entrepreneurial activity in the context of emerging economies. 
7.3.2 Methodological contributions 
This research contributed to the yet limited literature that provided a panel 
(longitudinal) study of entrepreneurship phenomena by demonstrating the interactive 
effect between formal and informal institutions at the macro-level environment.  
While previous studies mainly used cross-sectional data to test the impact of 
institutions on entrepreneurship (De Clercq et al., 2010a; Danis et al., 2011; 
Stenholm et al., 2013), still missing from the literature is a large longitudinal panel 
study of country-level rates of entrepreneurship. Using panel data analysis for a 
group of countries may offer a better understanding of the evolution of institutional 
quality through a specific period of time (Williamson, 2000; Levie and Autio, 2011; 
Stenholm et al., 2013).  
Therefore, this thesis advances our understanding of institutional dynamics by using 
panel (longitudinal) data over the period 2006-2014 for 44 emerging economies. 
Because the development of institutions may take a long period (Hoskisson et al., 
2000; Williamson, 2000), this type of analysis is necessary for testing the interaction 
effect of informal and formal institutions on the development of entrepreneurial 
activity (Estrin et al., 2013). 
7.3.3 Contextual contributions 
This study contributed to the currently limited literature that examined 
entrepreneurship in emerging economies by considering the context of 44 emerging 
economies (Bruton et al., 2008; Bruton et al., 2009; Hoskisson et al., 2011). In this 
realm, our findings suggested the impact of an institutional environment on 
entrepreneurship is genuinely relevant for emerging economies reagradless to the 
stage of development. In this perspective, reducing corruption levels is significant in 
order to increase the impact of formal institutions on the development of 
entrepreneurial activity.  
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As a result, this thesis has significant implications for policymakers in the context of 
emerging economies, suggesting some new insights as to which institutions improve 
new business activity and which hinder them. In short, the research findings found a 
moderating effect of control of corruption for strengthening the impact of the number 
of procedures and education and training on entrepreneurial activity, regardless of 
the level of economic development. This calls upon governments’ policymakers to 
promote reforms of the institutions mentioned above.  
Building on the research findings of this study, the next section attempts to offer 
potential policy recommendations that could be implemented to foster and improve 
the institutional environment for entrepreneurial activity in the case of emerging 
economies. 
7.4 Policy Implications 
Policymakers in emerging economies should consider entrepreneurship in setting 
national policies; this is because it is apparent that entrepreneurship plays an 
essential role in sustaining economic growth and development. However, the 
literature reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3 showed that this relationship might not 
necessarily be the case. In particular, it should be noted that suitable policies for 
entrepreneurship, specifically in emerging economies where the institutional 
infrastructure is underdeveloped, should take into account that entrepreneurial 
activity may not always promote economic development (Baumol, 1990; Bruton et 
al., 2009). For example, in emerging economies with high levels of corruption:  
“the entry barriers could be a source of rents to corrupt officials, so that these 
barriers may not keep out dishonest entrepreneurs or will make reform or 
abolitions of these barriers difficult” (Naudé, 2011, p. 325).  
Therefore, there is a need for supportive institutions to make effective 
entrepreneurship policies that, in turn, encourage entrepreneurial activity through the 
formation and growth of new firms (Acs and Szerb, 2007, Acs et al., 2014a, b). In 
this regard, there are a number of policy recommendations to consider based on the 
research findings of this study. 
The research’s findings have significant implications for policymakers. The 
empirical results in this study provided a new understanding of the institutional 
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dynamics and how the higher level of informal institutions, such as corruption, are 
slower to change than lower levels ones, such as formal institutions. Moreover, the 
findings of this study suggested that policymakers concerned about increasing the 
rates of entrepreneurship through new business activity should focus their efforts on 
understanding the elements of the institutional environment that are most critical for 
a particular emerging economy. They should then work systematically to develop an 
attractive environment for entrepreneurs for the short term as well as the long-term 
(Aidis et al., 2012; Estrin et al., 2013). Also, it is inappropriate to rely on the reform 
changes of the formal institutions without considering the reforms of the informal 
institutions, such as corruption. The evidence from this study showed that formal 
institutions, such as the number of procedures, and education and training, are more 
likely to encourage individual’s choice to become an entrepreneur and start a new 
business activity in emerging economies that have a perception of lower levels of 
corruption. Therefore, informal institutions, such as corruption, remain essential for 
increasing the rates of entrepreneurial activity as they act as a moderator between 
formal institutions and entrepreneurial activity (Belitski et al., 2016). 
Indeed, the results of this study recommended that entrepreneurship policies should 
be treated at the country level, and should consider emerging economies’ 
heterogeneity regardless of the stage of economic development. However, this 
section of the thesis could suggest general policy recommendations drawn from the 
research findings. These policy suggestions could be useful for the governments and 
other organisations involved in growing new start-ups in the context of emerging 
economies. 
7.4.1 Number of procedures for entrepreneurship 
As predicted, the quantitative results highlighted that the number of procedures is a 
significant determinant explaining country variation in rates of entrepreneurial 
activity for emerging economies that have lower levels of corruption. In this regard, 
the Doing Business Report (2005, p. 23) stated that:  
“Cumbersome entry procedures push entrepreneurs into the informal 
economy, where businesses pay no taxes and many of the benefits that 
regulation is supposed to provide are missing. Workers lack health insurance 
and pension benefits. Products are not subject to quality standards. Businesses 
cannot obtain bank credit or use courts to resolve disputes. Women are hurt 
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disproportionately since they constitute 75% of informal employees. 
Corruption is rampant, as bureaucrats have many opportunities to extract 
bribes”. 
Therefore, one of the main steps that should be taken by policymakers seeking to 
encourage entrepreneurs to move from the informal to formal entrepreneurship is to 
enable the starting of a business to take place as quickly and cheaply as possible 
(Gnyawali and Fogel, 1994; Acs and Szerb, 2007; van Stel et al., 2007; Aparicio et 
al., 2016).  
To effectively support entrepreneurial activity, all the governments in our sample 
need to institute both high quality business regulations and procedures supported by 
high quality control of corruption (Autio and Fu, 2015). However, there is some 
evidence that governments are able to decisively change cultural or social norms, 
such as corruption, as they tend to be resistant and stable over long periods (North, 
1990; Naudé, 2011, p. 325). Therefore, what types of public policy instruments are 
best suited to fight corruption are beyond the scope of this study. On the basis of our 
definition, all policy recommendations that increase control of corruption will be 
useful.  
In a recent study, Tonoyan et al. (2010) suggested that corruption is a rooted social 
norm that can only be changed in the long run through education and training, 
investing in strong mass media, building and supporting civil society, and promoting 
sustained public campaigns: a critical mass of business people and public officials 
has to be persuaded of the social and economic costs of corruption. For example, 
Bulgaria and Moldova fought corruption by increasing judges’ salaries and 
introducing a random allocation of court cases to judges. Moreover, Bulgaria 
developed a more transparent recruitment process for judges (Doing Business, 2008, 
p. 81). Therefore, there is a need to pay attention to the country-specific formal and 
informal institutions through political will to develop effective anti-corruption 
reforms, and a desire to change and coordinate with stakeholders to provide a 
supportive environment for entrepreneurs to flourish (Aidis et al., 2012; Doing 
Business, 2012, p. 31). 
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Concerning reducing the number of procedures, the Doing Business report (2005, p. 
21; 2009, p. 10) suggested several policy reforms to simplify the administrative 
process to start a business such as:  
(1) creating one-stop shop for entrepreneurs; 
(2) eliminating the need for the mandatory use of both notaries and judges to 
register the business; 
(3) allowing for online registration; 
(4) letting entrepreneurs operate and function by introducing temporary business 
licenses; 
(5) imposing a “silence is consent” rule, which states that once the deadline for 
registration has passed, the business is automatically considered registered; 
(6) standardising paperwork to make it easier for entrepreneurs to process the 
documents; and  
(7) having no minimum capital requirement.  
The Doing Business report (2005, p 23) found that countries (e.g., Ethiopia, France, 
Morocco, Slovakia and Turkey) that adopted such reforms helped the new entry of 
formal businesses to grow 2-4 times faster compared to other countries.  
To this end, policymakers can influence market mechanisms and make them work 
more effectively by removing and changing regulations, as well as preventing 
corruption that produces rigid administrative procedures and imperfections in the 
market (Gnyawali and Fogel, 1994; Castaño-Martínez et al., 2015). 
7.4.2 Education and training for entrepreneurship 
The research findings highlighted that control of corruption, as well as a country’s 
level of education and training measured by tertiary education, is fundamental to 
generating incentives regarding entrepreneurial activity. Therefore, one method of 
increasing the awareness of entrepreneurship as a career option is by focusing on 
supporting tertiary education, accompanied by the perception of lower levels of 
corruption. 
In this regard, the key question to be addressed at a policy level is whether the 
population has the skills necessary to start a business based on the availability of 
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tertiary education, and if corruption makes entrepreneurship difficult relative to other 
career paths. 
A number of key policy priorities should, therefore, be to plan for the long-term care 
of tertiary education and control of corruption. Governments should make tertiary 
education more accessible to the people, offer interest-free loans to cover educational 
expenses, and, in some cases, adopt policies to minimise the child labour force. 
Moreover, policymakers in emerging economies should make high school business 
education compulsory, and offer regional fund initiatives to inspire students for 
entrepreneurship. In line with the previous policy recommendations, governments in 
emerging economies should ensure appropriate systems to reduce and prevent 
corruption as it can undermine the confidence of educated entrepreneurs to select an 
entrepreneurial career path (Acs et al., 2018b). 
7.4.3 Access to credit for entrepreneurship 
Although the financial system is important to provide sufficient tools needed by 
entrepreneurs, the results of this study suggested that greater coverage of private 
credit may be a deterrent to new business activity in emerging economies that have 
the perception of lower levels of corruption. This finding was unexpected and could 
suggest that access to finance is significant to corporate entrepreneurship, rather than 
the new business activity that could depend on other capital sources such as social 
networks and angel investors.  
Taken together, these findings did not support strong policy recommendations for 
new business activities. However, policymakers in emerging economies should 
consider to what extent capital is available for high growth and larger firms, and 
whether corruption hinders the process of funding. Therefore, continued efforts are 
needed by governments to make finance more accessible by reducing corruption by 
providing venture capital and private equity financing (Acs et al., 2018b). 
7.4.4 Technology absorption for entrepreneurship 
The quantitative results reported that the benefits of technology absorption have a 
negative effect on rates of entrepreneurial activity in emerging economies with lower 
levels of corruption. This could suggest that the diffusion of new technology, and the 
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capacity to absorb it, is more important for larger organisations with high growth 
potential than new start-ups. 
One of the ways in which policymakers might achieve higher levels of corporate 
entrepreneurship in emerging economies is through sponsoring leading technologists 
at ecosystem events, promoting local technologies and technologists, and paying 
particular attention to FDI (Acs and Szerb, 2007; Acs et al., 2018b). Although jobs 
from FDI are apparently a vital source of increasing corporate entrepreneurship in 
emerging economies, it is essential to start enterprise development policies to 
encourage technology-based start-ups in the long run (Acs and Szerb, 2007; Pathak 
et al., 2013). 
7.4.5 Generalisability of policy recommendations 
The results reported in this thesis provided evidence that entrepreneurship research 
should be discussed in a country event. Therefore, the policy recommendations 
mentioned above are only generalisable to the study’s sample and may not fit other 
economies. This is due to the fact that suggestions were presented by arranging 
institutional determinants affecting entrepreneurial activity within each emerging 
market. Hence, it is an unavoidable limitation showing the complexity of the 
entrepreneurship study, which is restricted to country-specific unique characteristics 
(North, 1990).  
Moreover, in consideration of the different characteristics of these countries, it is 
possible that some of the policy proposals offered from the study findings will be 
more appropriate in particular emerging economies than others. Accordingly, as 
previously explained, individual nations should retain their own unique set of tailor-
made policies that consider the requirements, capacities and institutional structure of 
that country, as trying to adopt policy suggestions from other countries is no 
guarantee for achieving higher rates of entrepreneurial activity (Acs et al., 2018b). 
To provide tailored policies for each country, a recent attempt was made by Acs et 
al. (2014a) who offered the Global Entrepreneurship Index (GEI). This report was 
established in 2009 to measure country level entrepreneurship based on a National 
System of Entrepreneurship (NSE) perspective. In this context, NSE is defined as:  
183 
 
“a dynamic, institutionally embedded interaction between entrepreneurial 
attitudes, entrepreneurial abilities, and entrepreneurial aspirations by 
individuals, which drives the allocation of resources through the creation and 
operation of new ventures” (Acs et al., 2014a, p. 479).  
The critical features of GEI methodology can be summarised as follows (Acs et al., 
2014a). First, entrepreneurship is a multifaceted concept of NSE that consists of 14 
pillars divided into three sub-indices: entrepreneurial attitudes (i.e., societies’ 
attitudes toward entrepreneurship), abilities (i.e., the characteristics of the 
entrepreneurs and their businesses), and aspirations (i.e., reflects the quality aspects 
of start-ups and new businesses). Second, each pillar includes an individual 
combined with an institutional variable that reflects the micro- and the macro-level 
facets of entrepreneurial activity, as shown in Table 7.1. All of the individual level 
data were obtained from the GEM adult population survey results, as published in 
annual GEM executive reports. National institutional variables were derived from 
different sources, such as the World Bank, World Economic Forum, UNESCO, and 
the Heritage Foundation (for more details about the variables used, see Acs et al., 
2014a, b). Finally, NSE is a dynamic system that allows continuous interaction 
between system components to trace the observable conditions within individual 
countries. 
Table 7.1: The selection of institutional and individual variables used in GEI  
Pillars Institutional variables Individual variables 
Entrepreneurial Attitudes   
Opportunity Perception Market Agglomeration Opportunity Recognition 
Start-up Skills Tertiary Education Skill Perception 
Risk Acceptance Business Risk Risk Perception 
Networking Internet Usage Know Entrepreneurs 
Cultural Support Corruption Career Status 
Entrepreneurial Abilities   
Opportunity Start-up Economic Freedom Opportunity Motivation 
Technology Absorption Tech Absorption Technology Level 
Human Capital Staff Training Educational Level 
Competition Market Dominance Competitors 
Entrepreneurial Aspirations   
Product Innovation Technology Transfer New Product 
Process Innovation  GERD New Tech 
High Growth  Business Strategy Gazelle 
Internationalization  Globalization Export 
Risk Capital  Depth of Capital Market Informal Investment 
Source: Acs et al. (2014b) 
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Building on the Configuration Theory, the Penalty for Bottleneck (PFB) 
methodology was adopted to offer system dynamics into the GEI by allowing its 
pillars’ components to interact. Concerning entrepreneurship, a bottleneck refers to 
the weakest link of a particular entrepreneurial pillar, relative to other pillars. This 
notion of bottleneck portrays a direct effect of the 14 pillars interacting to produce 
NSE performance. Therefore, increasing entrepreneurship performance can only be 
reached by strengthening the weakest link (i.e., the bottleneck) that restrains the 
performance of the system. In the context of NSE, the worse performing pillars (e.g., 
start-up skills) hinder the better performing pillars (e.g., product innovation) and 
consequently the overall GEI score (Szerb et al., 2012; Acs et al., 2014a).  
Through the GEI of entrepreneurship, Acs et al. (2014b) provided some evidence 
that a higher level of entrepreneurial activity is contingent upon the institutional 
structures that are consistent with societal attributes and requirements. The authors 
classified the countries in line with the index result. Interestingly, some emerging 
economies, such as Estonia, Slovenia, and Turkey, among others, appeared in the top 
35 out of the 88 countries analysed in their sample. While they emphasised the top 
position of advanced economies in the ranking, they found that emerging economies 
could achieve higher levels of entrepreneurial activity if they improved specific 
institutional variables. Analysing these results under the lens of institutional variables 
utilised by Acs et al. (2014b), emerging economies face different challenges, such 
developing the tertiary education and business skills, controlling corruption, and 
assuring access to the financial system, among others. In this regard, the study results 
were in line with the previous findings concerning the significance of the 
institutional variables, as mentioned above, to encourage higher rates of 
entrepreneurial activity. 
Summarising, GEI could be a helpful instrument for policies trying to ameliorate 
entrepreneurship performance in a specific nation. In contrast to other 
entrepreneurship reports (e.g., Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) and Doing 
Business), which suggest limited essential factors for improving entrepreneurial 
performance, GEI proposes a comprehensive balance of all the 14 pillars of 
entrepreneurial performance. Moreover, other entrepreneurship reports offer general 
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and uniform policy implications, while GEI gives individual, country level, tailor-
made policy suggestions. 
7.5 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research  
The generalisability of the study’s findings is subject to certain limitations that could 
become future research lines. First, more accurate measures for both dependent and 
independent variables could be used. Our study has considered only one particular 
aspect of “productive” entrepreneurship, which is newly registered firms with limited 
liability (Baumol, 1990). Although newly registered firms are recognised among key 
components that entrepreneurial activity may make to economic growth (Acs et al., 
2008b; Levie and Autio, 2011), future research should seek to examine other aspects 
of productive entrepreneurship, such as activities involving a high level of 
innovation, corporate entrepreneurship or export-oriented entrepreneurship (Bowen 
and De Clercq, 2008; Turro et al., 2014; González-Pernía and Peña-Legazkue, 2015; 
Belitski et al., 2016).  
Second, using other (or more) environmental variables (e.g., national culture or 
property rights) is crucial to understanding entrepreneurship in emerging countries 
where institutional arrangements can vary significantly from those in developed 
countries (Bruton et al., 2008; Estrin et al., 2013; Hayton and Cacciotti, 2013; 
Fernández-Serrano and Romero, 2014; Sambharya and Musteen, 2014; Brancu et al., 
2015; Chowdhury et al., 2015b). In this regard, Urbano et al. (2018) stated that:  
“In particular, we identified that property rights (formal institutions) and the 
belief systems (informal institutions) should be further analysed since there is 
still a scarcity of evidence dealing with these types of institutions”.  
Therefore, future research could widen the scope of knowledge of how these formal 
and informal institutions might interact and affect the productivity of 
entrepreneurship at different levels of economic development (Belitski et al., 2016) 
Finally, it is recommended that further research should be undertaken in larger 
samples across more countries or in different regions such as resource-based 
economies, African or Asian contexts in which corruption is prevalent in many of 
those nations (Pathak et al., 2015).  
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We hope that our study will inspire further investigations in the future into the 
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Author(s) Title Theoretical 
framework 
Methodology Results Key term Dvariable Ivariable Type of 
paper 
Acs, Z., Audretsch, 
D., Braunerhjelm, 






Panel data Entrepreneurship is a conduit of 
knowledge and positive effect of 




Growth Self-employment Empirical 
Acs, Z., Desai, S., 







Cross section The impact of entrepreneurship depends 
on the stage of development 
Economic 
development 
  Special 
issue 
Acs, Z., Desai, S., 








Cross section The impact of entrepreneurship depends 
on the stage of development 
Entrepreneurship 
data 
GDPpc TEA Empirical 




and Public Policy 
Endogenous 
growth theory 
Summarise The impact of entrepreneurship depends 
on the stage of development 
Entrepreneurship has a positive effect 
on regional development, which is a 
relevant fact to design public policies 
Economic growth   Special 
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Probit regression Russia's institutional environment is 
important in explaining its relatively 
low levels of entrepreneurship 
development 
Institutions TEA Formal institutions Empirical 
Aidis, R., Estrin, S., 







Panel data Entrepreneurial entry is inversely 
related to the size of the government, 
and more weakly to the extent of 
corruption. A cluster of institutional 
indicators representing ‘‘market 
freedom’’ is only significant in some 
specifications. Freedom from 
corruption is significantly related to 
entrepreneurial entry, especially when 
the richest countries are removed from 
the sample, but unlike the size of 
government, the results on corruption 
are not confirmed by country-level 
fixed-effects models. 
Institutions Start-up rate Formal institutions Empirical 
Álvarez, C., 
Urbano, D., 






Literature review The institutional approach is the most 
commonly used conceptual 
framework in the field of 
entrepreneurship. 









Contract theory Panel data Control of corruption contributes to the 
increase of innovation (number of 
Patent applications and rate of 
Realized Innovation) and 
entrepreneurship (TEA) 
These relationships are moderated by 
FDI which is a driver of technological 
advancement in developing nations. 

















Panel data The impact of informal institutions on 
entrepreneurial activity is more than 
the formal ones and at the same time 
entrepreneurship is positively 
contributes to economic growth   
Variables such as control of corruption, 
confidence in one’s skills and private 
coverage to obtain credit promote a 
positive effect of opportunity 
entrepreneurship on economic growth 
in all the countries and especially 









Autio, E., Fu, K. 
(2015) 
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Panel data An increase in the quality of economic 
and political institutions could double 
the rates of formal entrepreneurship 
and halve the rates of informal 
entrepreneurship. 












Entrepreneurship capital is a conduit of 
knowledge spill over and positively 
contributes to economic growth 
Economic growth   Theoretical 
Audretsch, D., 
Bönte., W., 
Keilbach, M. (2008) 
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capital and its impact on 
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Cross section There is a positive impact of 
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Keilbach, M. (2005) 
Entrepreneurship 





Cross section There is a positive impact of 




Regional growth Entrepreneurship 
capital 
Empirical 
Audretsch, D., Resolving the Endogenous Cross section Entrepreneurship serves as a conduit of Knowledge spill Regional growth Entrepreneurship Empirical 
203 
 




growth theory knowledge spill over and positive 
impact of entrepreneurship activity 
(TEA) on economic growth 
over capital 
Baumol, W., Storm, 





Comment Institutions are crucial in determining 
the positive effect of entrepreneurship 
on economic growth  
Institutions   Theoretical 
Belitski, M., 
Chowdhury, F., 
Desai, S. (2016).  




Panel data Higher tax rates consistently discourage 
entry. Further, although the direct 
influence of corruption on entry is also 
consistently negative, the interaction 
influence of corruption and tax rate is 
positive. This indicates that corruption 
can offset the negative influence of 
high taxes on entry. 








the institutional context 




Time series There is a positive impact of self-
employment and institutions on total 
productivity factor  
Institutions TFP Self-employment, 
institutions 
Empirical 




economic growth: what 
do we know and what 




Literature review The literature narrowly identifies 
entrepreneurship with start-ups and 
self-employment; does not theorize 
many potentially relevant inter-level 
links and mechanisms; and suffers 
from sample limitations, omitted 
variable biases, causality issues, and 
response heterogeneity. 
Theories in management research, such 
as the resource-based view, 
transaction cost economics, and 
strategic entrepreneurship theory, can 




  Theoretical 
Bruton, G. D., 
Ahlstrom, D., Li, H. 
L. (2010) 
Institutional theory and 
entrepreneurship where 
are we now and where 




Literature review Institutional theory has the potential to 
provide great insights for 
entrepreneurship and the broader 
management discipline. However, 
since the theory has matured, it is time 
to employ new and richer insights and 
uses of the theory. 
Institutions   Theoretical 
Bruton, G. D., 
Ahlstrom, D., Puky, 
T. (2009).  
Institutional differences 




Grounded theory The venture capital industry exhibits a 
strong consistency across many 
dimensions; yet institutions in these 






two distinct settings result in 
significant differences in industry 
practice. 
Busenitz, L.W., 
















The institutional profile should provide 
a useful tool to explain cross-national 
differences in entrepreneurship 








Á. (2015)  








Greater expenditure on R&D, education 
and stimulating entrepreneurial culture 
have a positive effect on 
entrepreneurship 
Countries with complex legal systems 
which regulate the start-up of an 
economic activity and where access to 
credit is complicated, present lower 
levels of entrepreneurship 
Societies with a greater number of 
innovative entrepreneurs present 
higher levels of entrepreneurial 
activity and economic performance 
Economic growth GDPpc TEA Empirical 
Carlos Díaz Casero, 
J., Almodóvar 













Cross section The effect of institutions depends on the 
development stage.  
Institutions GDPpc TEA, institutions Empirical 
Chowdhury, F., 
Audretsch, D. B., 
Belitski, M. (2015a) 







Panel data The effect of regulations on 
international nascent entrepreneurship 
varies depending on types of 
regulation. 
Corruption plays a dual role, serving as 
both grease and sand for nascent 
international entrepreneurship. 
Corruption worsens the burden of 
regulations which have financial costs 
element. Also, corporate tax is not a 
significant deterrent factor for IE 















activity and country 
Institutional 
approach 
Panel data Institutional factors influence the 
disparate varieties of entrepreneurship 
differently: property rights, freedom 
from corruption, and fewer start-up 
procedures are significantly positively 
related to nascent/new firm ownership. 
Property rights protection is 
significantly positively related to new 
firm startup. 
Tax and regulatory burden have 
significant positive impacts on self-
employment but significantly 
negatively related to new firm start-
up.  






De Clercq, D., 
Danis, W. M., 
Dakhli, M. (2010a) 
The moderating effect 
of institutional context 
on the relationship 
between associational 
activity and new 






There is positive relationship between a 
country’s associational activity and 
new business activity; this relationship 
is stronger for higher regulatory and 
normative institutional burdens and 
lower cognitive institutional burdens. 




Dutta, N., Sobel, R. 
(2016) 




Panel data Corruption hurts entrepreneurship. The 
impact is smaller, but remains 
negative, when business climates are 
bad. 
















The relationship between aspiring 
entrepreneurs and institutions is 
complex; they benefit simultaneously 
from strong government (in the sense 
of property rights enforcement), and 
smaller government, but are 
constrained by corruption. Social 
networks mediate some but not all 
institutional deficiencies. 














Panel data Opportunity TEA and export-oriented 
entrepreneurship are positively 









Gnyawali, D. R., 







 Proposed a framework consisting of five 
dimensions of entrepreneurial 
environments and links these 
dimensions to the new venture 
Institutions   Theoretical 
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research implications creation process 
Hayton, J. C., 
Cacciotti, G. (2013). 
Is there an 
entrepreneurial culture? 




Literature review Understanding the effect of national 
culture, alone and in interaction with 
other contextual factors, is important 
for refining our knowledge of how 
entrepreneurs think and act. 
Institutions   Theoretical 
Klapper, L., 
Laeven, L., Rajan, 
R. (2006)  
Entry regulation as a 
barrier to 
entrepreneurship.\ 
Contract theory Linear regression Costly regulations hamper the creation 
of new firms, especially in industries 
that should naturally have high entry.  
    
Krasniqi, B. A., 
Desai, S. (2016) 
Institutional drivers of 
high-growth firms 
country-level evidence 




Panel data Interaction effects, rather than direct 
effects, are useful in explaining 
systematic variations in HGFs 
prevalence in transition economies. 




Krasniqi, B. A., 
Mustafa, M. (2016) 
Small firm growth in a 
post-conflict 
environment: the role of 
human capital, 









Probit; Tobit Growth aspirations, managerial 
capacities and training are among the 
most significant variables associated 
with growth. Among the institutional 
quality variables, only corruption 
appears to be significant and 
negatively associated with growth. 





Berger, E. S., 
Mpeqa, A. (2016) 
The more the merrier? 








The effects of Economic freedom (EF) 
vary according to the developmental 
stage of an economy and the type of 
entrepreneurial activity (EA) in 
question. Overall, high levels of EF 
trigger high levels of EA regardless of 




Formal institutions Empirical 
Levie, J., Autio, E. 
(2008) 
A theoretical grounding 




Panel data In high-income countries, opportunity 
perception mediates fully the 
relationship between the level of post-
secondary entrepreneurship education 
and training in a country and its rate 
of new business activity, including 
high-growth expectation new business 
activity. 
The mediating effect of skills perception 
is weaker.  
This result accords with the Kirznerian 
concept of alertness to opportunity 
stimulating action. 












patterns across the 
European Union 












Panel data Governments could achieve a 
sustainable economic development by 
creating a desirable environment 
where entrepreneurs are able to 
change the structure of the economy 











There are positive effects of 
entrepreneurship on economic growth 
Economic growth Growth Self-employment Empirical 
Manolova, T. S., 
Eunni, R. V., 












There are important differences in the 
three dimensions (regulatory, 
cognitive, and normative) of the 
institutional profiles across the three 
emerging economies (Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Latvia), reflecting their 
idiosyncratic cultural norms and 
values, traditions, and institutional 
heritage in promoting 
entrepreneurship. 
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and panel data 
Entrepreneurship is a conduit of 
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entrepreneurship activity on economic 
growth   
Regional 
economic growth 
Regional growth Start-up rate Empirical 
Pathak, S., Xavier-
Oliveira, E., 
Laplume, A. O. 
(2013) 











Regimes with strong intellectual 
property rights protection combined 
with high levels of foreign direct 
investment per capita decrease the 
likelihood of individuals' entry into 
technology entrepreneurship, whereas 
low barriers to technological adoption 
increase this likelihood. 
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arrangements on the 






Differences in institutional 
arrangements are associated with 
variance in both the rate and type of 
entrepreneurial activity across 
countries. For the formation of 
innovative, high-growth new ventures, 
the regulative environment matters 
very little.  
For high-impact entrepreneurship an 
institutional environment filled with 
new opportunities created by 
knowledge spill overs and the capital 
necessary for high impact 
entrepreneurship matter most. 














A favourable regulative dimension 
(fewer procedures to start a business), 
normative dimension (higher media 
attention for new business) and 
cultural-cognitive dimension (better 
entrepreneurial skills, less fear of 
business failure and better knowing of 
entrepreneurs) increase the probability 
of being an entrepreneur. 










and developed countries 
Endogenous 
growth theory 
Cross section There is a positive impact of 
entrepreneurship on economic growth 
Economic growth Growth TEA Empirical 
van Stel, A., Storey, 
D. J., Thurik, A. R. 
(2007) 
The effect of business 
regulations on nascent 
and young business 
entrepreneurship 
Contract theory Two equation 
model 
The minimum capital requirement 
required to start a business lowers 
entrepreneurship rates across 
countries, as do labour market 
regulations. However, the 
administrative considerations of 
starting a business – such as the time, 
the cost, or the number of procedures 
required – are unrelated to the 
formation rate of either nascent or 
young businesses. 
Institutions TEA Formal institutions Empirical 
Veciana, J. M., The institutional Institutional Literature review An attempt is made to justify why Institutions   Special 
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Urbano, D. (2008) approach to 
entrepreneurship 
research. Introduction.  
approach entrepreneurship research using the 
institutional approach is promising. 
issue 
Source: Aparicio (2017) and author’s own work
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1. Albania 0.89 -0.63 7.11 44.53 34.99 4.21 3.64 9251.88 
2. Argentina 0.52 -0.45 13.78 73.90 13.02 4.28 3.35 18214.14 
3. Armenia 1.41 -0.57 5.89 46.11 28.31 4.27 4.52 7047.82 
4. Azerbaijan 0.63 -1.04 6.78 20.13 18.98 4.86 10.52 14816.65 
5. Botswana 9.31 0.93 9.78 15.39 27.25 4.46 5.53 13713.43 
6. Brazil 3.08 -0.09 13.76 31.98 52.56 5.07 3.55 14151.27 
7. Bulgaria 6.15 -0.24 7.00 57.61 62.41 3.95 2.23 14856.06 
8. Chile 4.66 1.45 8.00 68.52 70.72 5.27 4.05 19026.69 
9. Colombia 1.13 -0.31 8.89 40.98 33.97 4.38 4.74 11046.17 
10. Croatia 3.36 0.03 8.11 55.81 66.28 4.43 -0.12 20014.22 
11. Czech Republic 2.94 0.27 8.78 61.19 45.33 5.22 1.78 28167.62 
12. Estonia 13.12 0.98 5.00 69.29 81.56 5.43 1.81 23619.88 
13. Georgia 3.88 0.06 4.22 33.11 32.78 4.00 5.36 6968.74 
14. Ghana 0.73 -0.02 8.11 9.32 15.05 3.27 7.48 3177.83 
15. Hungary 5.14 0.35 5.78 61.22 53.50 4.86 0.62 21708.62 
16. India 0.09 -0.47 14.16 18.95 49.81 5.25 7.52 4330.82 
17. Indonesia 0.17 -0.67 11.47 24.74 27.41 4.84 5.72 8427.76 
18. Israel 3.25 0.81 5.00 56.28 68.56 6.09 4.09 29864.86 
19. Jamaica 1.16 -0.39 5.44 19.66 27.87 4.79 0.00 8120.69 
20. Jordan 0.81 0.19 7.56 32.93 77.88 5.38 4.72 9098.71 
21. Kazakhstan 1.36 -0.90 7.78 33.61 42.81 4.43 5.98 20308.04 
22. Korea Republic 1.76 0.45 6.67 95.80 
137.6
7 
5.88 3.65 30064.09 
23. Kyrgyz Republic 0.96 -1.16 5.44 44.13 12.81 3.61 4.81 2805.86 
24. Latvia 8.80 0.21 4.56 71.99 66.36 4.62 1.69 19492.01 
25. Lithuania 3.31 0.22 6.44 80.24 45.49 5.05 2.76 21892.07 
26. Macedonia, FYR 4.82 -0.11 5.67 33.82 41.95 3.76 3.17 11122.64 
27. Malaysia 2.30 0.20 8.11 33.42 
109.1
9 
5.57 4.92 21310.62 
28. Mauritius 7.45 0.52 5.22 32.64 86.71 4.88 4.67 15756.68 
29. Mexico 0.83 -0.38 7.56 26.48 19.17 4.56 2.41 15210.65 
30. Morocco 1.35 -0.34 5.78 16.47 63.41 4.68 4.49 6365.27 
31. Nigeria 0.74 -1.07 9.00 2.17 19.61 4.55 6.33 4995.97 
32. Pakistan 0.04 -0.92 12.33 6.94 21.56 4.50 3.61 4282.03 
33. Peru 2.20 -0.33 7.78 8.32 26.18 4.54 6.14 9873.39 
34. Philippines 0.18 -0.66 7.78 27.47 31.74 5.03 5.37 5598.52 
35. Portugal 4.39 0.98 6.11 63.58 
147.1
0 
5.39 -0.33 26754.92 
36. Romania 4.86 -0.19 6.22 59.84 35.10 4.31 2.65 16931.70 
37. Russian 
Federation 
4.49 -0.99 7.39 67.40 43.10 4.06 3.16 21329.08 
38. Slovak Republic 4.36 0.22 6.89 53.44 43.69 5.05 3.67 24579.71 
39. Slovenia 3.98 0.88 6.00 85.08 73.22 4.78 1.04 28496.37 
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40. South Africa 1.45 0.08 6.67 6.45 71.56 5.41 2.82 11960.00 
41. Tajikistan 0.26 -1.08 8.78 22.74 13.33 3.49 6.89 2126.73 
42. Thailand 0.71 -0.34 7.56 49.73 97.53 4.95 3.41 13308.16 
43. Tunisia 1.23 -0.13 9.00 34.19 64.94 4.54 3.39 10028.42 
44. Turkey 0.93 0.06 7.11 56.95 41.52 5.24 5.15 18133.47 
 The number of newly registered firms with limited liability per 1,000 people of working age (ages 15-64) per calendar year. 
 Capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms 
of corruption, as well as the “capture” of the state by elites and private interests. The values are between -2.5 and 2.5, with 
higher scores corresponding to better outcomes of institutions. 
 Natural logarithm of the product between the number of procedures that are officially required for an entrepreneur to start up 
and formally operate an industrial or commercial business and the duration of these procedures. 
 Percentage of individuals who have business and entrepreneurial skills. It is obtained as the product of the percentage of 
tertiary graduates in the population multiplied by the percentage of tertiary graduates in social sciences, business and law. 
 Domestic credit indicator provided by the banking sector, which includes all credit to various sectors. 
 To what extent do businesses in your country absorb new technology? [1 = not at all; 7 = aggressively absorb]. 
 Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 
2010 US dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value. 
 GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to international 
dollars using purchasing power parity rates. 
Source: Own calculations 
 
 
 
